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THE FUTURE OF DEFAMATION IN ILLINOIS AFTER
COLSON V. STIEG AND CHAPSKI V. COPLEY PRESS, INC.
Linda A. Malone*
Rodney A. Smolla**
I.

INTRODUCTION

In William Shakespeare's Othello, the character lago describes the sanctity of reputation in words that have become almost platitudinous to the
modern ear:
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls:
Who steals my purse steals trash;
'tis something, nothing;
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him
And makes me poor indeed.'

As often as these famous lines are heralded as evidence of the high regard
for reputational values that runs through Anglo-American cultural tradition,
other far less famous words, also spoken in Othello by Shakespeare's lago,
usually are ignored:
As I am an honest man, I thought you had received some bodily wound;
there is more sense in that than in reputation.
Reputation is an idle and most false imposition;
oft got without merit and lost without deserving:
you have lost no reputation at all,
unless you repute yourself such a loser.'

lago, of course, is a duplicitous character without compunction for uttering
contradictory sentiments in the same play. But the two conflicting views that
Iago voices about the importance of reputation are more than the mere selfincongruities of a fickle Shakespearean antagonist; they reflect a deeper
dissonance in Anglo-American culture concerning the value of reputation,
a dissonance that has in turn manifested itself in sharp contradictions within
the common law. 3 Like Iago, the common law has frequently been of two
• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville School of Law. B.A.,
Vassar College, 1975; J.D., Duke University, 1978.
•• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville School of Law. B.A.,
Yale University, 1975; J.D., Duke University, 1978. The authors wish to thank Ms. Julie A.
Lilienthal and Mr. Mark Edward Gralen for their assistance in preparing this article.
I. Shakespeare, The Tragedy of Othello, The Moor of Venice, act 3, scene 3, lines 60-67.
2. /d. act 2, scene 3, lines 260-67.
3. For a general discussion of the common law origins of defamation, see Donnelly, History
of Reputation, 1949 Wis. L. REV. 99; Leflar, Legal Liability for the Exercise of Free Speech,
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minds in its willingness to lend legal protection to reputation-at times permitting harsh penalties for defamatory speech well out of proportion to the
harm of the words or the culpability of the speaker, 4 and at times permitting obviously damaging speech uttered with transparently dark motives to
be spoken with complete impunity.' In recent years the opposing forces long
extant in the common law have been elevated to conflicts of constitutional
status, as the social desire to elicit state protection of an individual's good
name has directly confronted society's first amendment interest in the
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" 6 exchange of comment on matters of
public importance.'
In the evolution of common law and constitutional law principles governing defamation, Illinois has been a particularly lively jurisdiction, and significant contradictions in the law of defamation abound in this state. The inherent conflict in the desire to protect reputational interests, and at the same
time preserve a robust, invigorating marketplace of free speech, has always
presented itself with special dramatic relief in Illinois. From the frontier journalism of the first Illinois newspapers to the powerful corporate media interests that dominate the state's radio, television, and newspaper markets
in the 1980s, Illinois has enjoyed the luxury of an energetic, dynamic press.
Moreover, from the debates of Lincoln and Douglas to the often bizarre
machinations of modern statewide and local politics, the Illinois press has
always had tumultuous public events about which to broadcast and write.
On a less visible plane, Illinois is also a state in which average citizens, im-

10 ARK. L. REv. 155 (1956); Lovell, The Reception of Defamation by the Common Law,
15 VAND. L. REv. 1051 (1962); Pound, Equitable Relief Against.Defamation and Injuries to
Personality, 29 HARV. L. REv. 640 (1916); Sheintag, From Seditious Libel to Freedom of the
Press, II BROOKLYN L. REv. I 25 (1942); Veeder, History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 COLUM. L. REV. 546 (1903).
4. The Court of the Star Chamber vigorously punished the crime of seditious libel, to
which truth could be an aggravating rather than a mitigating factor, to suppress allegedly seditious
publications. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § Ill, at 738 (4th ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as PRossER].
5. Doctrines of absolute privilege, for example, shield the speaker from liability altogether
without regard to injury Or fault. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 585-592A (1979).
6. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
7. For analyses of the conflict between privacy and reputational interests and the interest
in allowing uninhibited comment on important public issues, see L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF
DEFAMATION 242-97 (1978); Berney, Libel and the First Amendment-A New Constitutional
Privilege, 51 VA. L. REv. I (1965); Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The
Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 SuP. CT. REv. 191; Pedrick, Freedom of the
Press and the Law of Libel, 49 CORNELL L. REv. 581 (1964); Pierce, The Anatomy of an Historic
Decision, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 43 N.C.L. REV. 315 (1964). For two recent expositions on the tensions within the Supreme Court's current first amendment jurisprudence, see
Christie, Underlying Contradictions in the Supreme Court's Classification of Defamation, 1981
DuKE L.J. 811; Van Alstyne, The First Amendment and the Free Press: A Comment on Some
New Trends and Some Old Theories, 9 HOFSTRA L. REv. I (1980).
8. The first lllinois newspaper was the Illinois Herald, published in Kaskaskia in 1814. H.
STONECIPHER & R. TRAGER, THE MASS MEDIA AND THE LAW IN ILLINOIS Xi (1976).
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hued with a certain straightforward Midwestern solidity, are accustomed to
speaking their minds frankly, particularly in those focal points of daily life
in which "free speech" is probably most essential: workplaces, churches,
schools, clubs, organizations, and neighborhoods. More than in any other
American jurisdiction, the law of defamation in Illinois has taken unique
and sometimes mysterious turns in response to the tension between the state's
desire to protect reputation and its desire to nurture its tradition of wideopen, free expression. Lawyers and newspeople familiar with the law of
defamation know, for example, that Illinois has been virtually unique in
the common law world in its adherence to the "innocent construction rule,"
a principle that ostensibly requires that allegedly defamatory words that are
capable of being read innocently must be so read. 9 Originally formulated
as a crude doctrinal device to reduce the number of defamation actions
brought in Illinois, the innocent construction rule was refitted for the state's
modern jurisprudence as a threshold defense designed to enhance free expression values. ' 0 Illinois is virtually the only jurisdiction that attempts to
use the innocent construction concept to effectuate first amendment
principles." _
Illinois also has been innovative in adjusting the balanct: between reputation and free expression by periodically updating and transforming common
law privileges to defamation suits. Since the United States Supreme Court's
watershed decision in New York Times v. Sullivan' 2 first "constitutional9. See, e.g., John v. Tribune Co., 24 Ill. 2d 437, 442, 181 N.E.2d 105, 108 (1962) (newspaper
story identifying arrested woman by listing her aliases and address not "of and concerning"
plaintiff with the same address and name of one alias); Lowther v. North Central College,
60 Ill. App. 3d 902, 377 N.E.2d 357 (2d Dist. 1978) (college administration's statement that
tenured professor was '.'forced" to resign not actionable); Homestead Realty Co. v. Stack,
57 Ill. App. 3d 575, 373 N.E.2d 429 (1st Dist. 1978) (statement that realty company appeared
to engage in "racial steering" capable of innocent, nondefamatory construction); Bruck v. Cincotta, 56 Ill. App. 3d 260, 371 N.E.2d 874 (1st Dist. 1978) (newspaper article that referred
to plaintiff as "rip-off speculator" not libelous per se).
10. See infra note 428 and accompanying text.
II. By 1966, Illinois was apparently the only state still adhering to the innocent construction rule in its strict form. See Stonecipher & Trager, The Impact of Gertz on the Law of
Libel in Illinois, 1979 S. ILL. L. REv. 73, 83 n.64 [hereinafter cited as Stonecipher & Trager];
Note, The Illinois Doctrine of Innocent Construction: A Minority of One, 30 U. Cm. L. REv.
524 (1963). The impact of the innocent construction rule has been verified empirically by Professor Marc Franklin. A recent comprehensive study conducted by Professor Franklin revealed
that Illinois media defendants won 93% of all appellate decisions. Franklin, Suing Media for
Libel: A Litigation Study, 1981 AM. B. FoUND. RESEARCH J. 795, 828. This 93% defense success rate is higher than in any other state with a large number of appeals. In New York, for
example, the success rate for media defendants is 69%, and in California, the success rate
is 55%. !d. Professor Franklin attributes the "startlingly high" success rate for the media in
Illinois to the "existence in that state, and only in that state, of the innocent construction
rule." !d. at 828-29.
12. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The New York Times decision held that the first amendment prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his
or her official conduct unless the official proves that the statement was made with "actual
malice," that is, with "knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it
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ized" a major segment of the law of defamation, Illinois frequently has been
among a handful of states that have led the nation in the intricate and
sometimes baffling task of reconciling the complex, sometimes arcane twists
of the common law of libel and slander with the first amendment
jurisprudence of New York Times and its progeny. 13
In 1982, the Illinois Supreme Court rendered two decisions that will affect dramatically the ongoing efforts of Illinois courts to define the appropriate balance between reputational and free speech interests. In Colson
v. Stieg, 14 the court drew on the most liberal strains of first amendment
thought to support its decision to require that a "private figure" plaintiff
meet the New York Times' "knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for
the truth" standard in order to recover against a private, non-media defendant. The Colson opinion, through a confusing intertwining of first amendment and common law principles, substantially broadens the protection that
Illinois law provides for speech about matters of public importance. 15 In
its second important 1982 decision concerning defamation, Chapski v.
Copley Press, Inc., 16 the Illinois Supreme Court reconsidered and modified
the innocent construction rule. Although Chapski may be heralded by some
as the demise of the innocent construction rule, in fact Chapski is more
significant for those aspects of the rule that it left unaltered.
This article analyzes the Colson and Chapski opinions and assesses their
impact on the law of defamation in Illinois. The article concludes that, in
combination, Colson and Chapski place Illinois in the forefront among those
few states that have decidedly tipped the balance between reputational and
free expression values in favor of free expression. Colson is permeated with
a regard for free expression that extends far beyond the requirements of
the first amendment as construed by the Burger Court. After Colson, Illinois' common law privileges provide more protection to defamation defendants than does the federal constitution as interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court since New York Times. Similarly, under the innocent construction rule as redefined in the Chapski decision, defamation defendants
in Illinois continue to enjoy appreciably greater protection from the
vicissitudes of juries than do defamation defendants in other states.
II.

COLSON

v.

STIEG: THE RADICAL EXPANSION OF

COMMON LAW PRIVILEGES TO DEFAMATION

In Colson v. Stieg,

17

A. The Facts of Colson
John Calvin Colson, an assistant professor in the

was false or not." Id. at 279-80. The "knowing or reckless disregard" formula is commonly
referred to as the "actual malice" or "New York Times" standard.
13. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
14. 89 Ill. 2d 205, 433 N.E.2d 246 (1982).
15. See infra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
16. 92 Ill. 2d 344, 442 N.E.2d 195 (1982).
17. 89 Ill. 2d 205, 433 N.E.2d 246 (1982).
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Department of Library Science at Northern Illinois University, brought suit
against Lewis Stieg, the chairman of Northern Illinois' Library Science
Department. Colson, who was appointed an assistant professor at Northern
Illinois in 1975, alleged that Stieg had uttered a defamatory statement against
him during a meeting of the Department of Library Science Personnel Committee, a meeting at which Colson's performance as an assistant professor
and his application for tenure and promotion were evaluated . At that meeting,
Stieg allegedly stated, "I have information I cannot divulge which reflects
adversely on John's performance as a teacher." 18 Colson further claimed
that Stieg had made a second defamatory statement before the University
Council Personnel Committee, a university-wide committee that considered
Colson's appeal from the adverse determination made regarding Colson by
the Department of Library Science Personnel Committee. Colson alleged that
at the meeting of the University Council Personnel Committee Stieg stated,
"I have counseled John many times about his teaching and the documents
which would prove the counseling are missing from the department files under
suspicious circumstances." 19 Colson claimed that these statements led to his
denial of tenure and termination from Northern Illinois' faculty. Colson
also alleged that the statements interfered with his ability to secure future
employment, thereby causing him "extensive mental and physical anguish
and financial loss. " 20 The Circuit Court of DeKalb County granted Stieg's
motion to dismiss Colson's complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
The Illinois Appellate Court for the Third District· reversed the trial court
in part and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the first statement allegedly made by Stieg was slanderous per se/ 1 and was incapable
of an innocent construction. 22 The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of
those aspects of the complaint based on Stieg's second statement, reasoning
that the innocent construction rule rendered the statement nonactionable
because it was reasonably capable of conveying a nondefamatory meaning. 23
18. /d. at 208, 433 N.E.2d at 247.
19. /d.
20. /d. at 215, 433 N.E.2d at 250.
21. If an oral or written statement is slanderous or libelous per se, damages are presumed;
if not actionable per se, the statements are "actionable only upon a proper averment of special
damages." Catalano v. Pechous, 69 Ill. App. 3d 797, 805, 387 N.E.2d 714, 721 (1st Dist.
1978) (citing Mitchell v. Tribune Co., 343 Ill. App. 446, 447, 99 N.E.2d 397, 398 (1st Dist.
1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952)). Generally, four classes of statements are actionable
per se:
(I) those imputing the commission of a criminal offense;
(2) those imputing infection with a communicable disease of any kind which, if
true, would tend to exclude one from society;
(3) those imputing the inability to perform or want of integrity in the discharge
of duties of office or employment; and
(4) those prejudicing a particular party in his profession or trade.
!d. (citing Coursey v. Greater Niles Township Publishing Corp., 82 Ill. App. 2d 76, 81-82,
227 N.E.2d 164, 167 (1st Dist. 1967), aff'd, 40 Ill. 2d 257, 239 N.E.2d 837 (1968)).
22. 86 Ill. App. 3d 993, 408 N.E.2d 431 (2d Dist. 1980).
23. /d. at 996-97, 408 N.E.2d at 434.
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Stieg appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court, challenging only the lower
court's ruling that the first statement was actionable. 24 Upon affirming the
lower court, the Illinois Supreme Court held that Stieg's remark was covered
by a qualified, rather than an absolute privilege,2l and that "actual malice,"
a standard first enunciated in New York Times v. Sullivan, 26 must be alleged to overcome this qualified privilege. 27 Because Colson had properly
(though inartfully) 28 alleged actual malice, his complaint stated a cause of
action.

B.

The Colson Court's Analysis: Intertwining the
Constitution and the Common Law

The Illinois Supreme Court was faced in Colson with the difficult task
of resolving tensions between the federal constitutional standards that have
evolved in the aftermath of New York Times and the array of common law
defenses and privileges that have continued to develop in Illinois on sometimes
parallel, sometimes intersecting, and sometimes diverging tracks. The Colson decision is extremely important to Illinois lawyers involved in the defamation area, because it appears to adopt a much broader application of the
New York Times standard than the United States Supreme Court decisions
require. 29 Moreover, Colson reflects a creative use of common law privilege
doctrines; the decision moves Illinois law toward a flexible "public interest"
approach in applying the New York Times actual malice standard.
Casebooks, digests, and casenotes inevitably will cite Colson v. Stieg as
an opinion that places Illinois within that small group of states which have
selected the "high option plan" of Gertz v. Robert Welch, /nc./ 0 and have
chosen to apply the New York Times actual malice standard to defamation

24. 89 Ill. 2d at 209, 433 N.E.2d at 247.
25. For a discussion of privileges applied in defamation law, see infra notes 177-97 and
accompanying text.
26. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); see supra note 12.
27. Colson, 89 Ill. 2d 205, 212, 433 N.E.2d 246, 249 (1982).
28. Colson's allegations in his complaint concerning Stieg's statement, "I have information
I cannot divulge which reflects adversely on John's· performance as a teacher," read:
Said statement was made by Defendant knowing it to be false, without reasonable
grounds for believing it to be true, maliciously, wilfully, intentionally and without
reasonable justification or excuse with the intention of destroying Plaintiff's personal and professional reputation, causing Plaintiff to be denied tenure, to be terminated from employment with Northern Illinois University effective May, 1979
and interfering with his ability to be suitably employed in the future. Said statement caused Plaintiff extensive mental and physical anguish and financial loss.
/d. at 215, 433 N.E.2d at 250. Although the court noted that these allegations did not
comply "strictly" with the pleading rules of the Illinois Civil Practice Act, the allegations sufficiently included the requisite scienter elements under the New York Times actual malice test.
/d. at 215-16, 433 N.E.2d at 250-51.
29. For an analysis of the broadening of the New York Times standard by the Colson
court, see infra notes 34-49 and accompanying text.
30. 418 u.s. 323 (1974).
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suits brought by private figures whenever the subject matter of the defamatory
speech involves a matter of "general or public interest." 31 Citations to Colson will be appropriate, but may fail to capture much of the decision's
substance, because Colson is an opinion which illustrates the tension between free expression and reputational values inherent in the United States
Supreme Court decisions since New York Times.
· The Colson opinion is a mix of federal constitutional law and lllinois common law; indeed, its language varies between that of constitutional law and
common law. Although the court's use of first amendment values to shape
Illinois' common law on defamation is both laudatory and inevitable, the
court's unwillingness to delineate more carefully the common law from the
constitutional law underpinnings of its decision is disappointing. The court's
impatience with the establishment of a more precise boundary line between
first amendment requirements and Illinois' own prudential additions to those
requirements is evidenced by its statement at the beginning of its analysis,
that ''the classification of the privilege is of little help in determining whether
or not the defendant's statement is actionable or whether the allegations of
the complaint state a cause of action." 32 To generations of lawyers taught
to understand that classification of the privilege is among the most important things a lawyer does in determining the viability of a potential libel
action, the Colson statement may be disquieting. Uneasiness about the scope
of Colson, however, is unnecessary. The decision is not a license for Illinois
courts to roam .at large across the landscape of defamation, applying the

31. Since Gertz, and prior to Colson, Jess than a handful of state courts chose to adopt
the actual malice standard in suits brought by non-public figures. See, e.g., Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450 (en bane) ("actual malice" standard
applied where plaintiff not public official or public figure and contested remarks concerned
matter of public or general interest), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975); AAFCO Heating &
Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 162 Ind. App. 671, 321 N.E.2d 580
(1974) ("actual malice" standard applied when statements concern an issue of general and public
concern), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); cf Chapadeau v. Utica Observer Dispatch, Inc.,
38 N.Y.2d 196, 199, 341 N.E.2d 569, 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61, 64 (1975) (utilizing a "grossly
irresponsible'' standard).
Most state court decisions have applied the minimum standard of negligence to defamation
suits brought by non-public figures. See, e.g., Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 114 Ariz.
309, 560 P.2d 1216 (1977) (en bane); Corbett v. Register Publishing Co., 33 Conn. Supp. 4,
356 A.2d 472 (1975); Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 56 Hawaii 522, 543 P.2d 1356
(1975); Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975); General Motors
Corp. v. Piskor, 277 Md. 165, 351 A.2d 810 (1976); Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc.,
367 Mass. 849, 330 N.E.2d 161 (1975); Thomas H. Maloney & Sons, Inc. v. E.W. Scripps
Co., 43 Ohio App. 2d 105, 334 N.E.2d 494 (1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 883 (1975); Martin
v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85 (Okla. 1976); Foster v. Loredo Newspapers, Inc., 541
S.W.2d 809 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977); Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co.,
86 Wash. 2d 439, 546 P.2d 81 (1976). Prior to Colson, many would probably have placed
Illinois in this latter category, relying on Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill. 2d 184, 198, 340 N.E.2d
292, 299 (1975) (negligence is basis of liability regardless of public interest in issue). For a
discussion of Troman and its relation to Colson, see infra notes 105-44 ancl accompanying text.
32. Colson, 89 Ill. 2d at 209, 433 N.E.2d at 247 (emphasis added).
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New York Times standard indiscriminately. Although the opinion is regrettable for its ambiguous intertwining of common law and constitutional law
concepts, to paraphrase Judge Friendly, what the court did in the case makes
better sense than what it said. 33
The court's analytical methodology in Colson was to treat the first amendment principles enunciated in New York Times as subsuming the common
law privileges while ignoring the more conservative limitations that the United
States Supreme Court has placed on those first amendment requirements in
the wake of the public figure/private figure dichotomy created by Gertz. 34
In many ways, Colson is a doctrinal throwback to the Warren Court era,
a decision that cuts against the grain of post-Gertz United States Supreme
Court precedent. In effect, Colson is a pre-Gertz decision in a post-Gertz
world.
The court began its analysis of John Colson's defamation claim by noting
that since New York Times v. Sullivan, most common law privileges have
been altered by "first amendment constitutional considerations." 35 Due to
these first amendment "considerations," the court stated that "the scope
of the privileges has been broadened beyond that within which they had
previously been recognized." 36 The court then asserted that the New York
Times decision "essentially replaced" the common law qualified privilege
of "fair comment. " 37 The fair comment privilege, the court emphasized,
33. The phrase is from Judge Friendly's famous opinion on proximate cause, In re Kinsman
Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964). In that case, Judge Friendly stated, "what courts
do in such cases makes better sense than what they, or others, say." !d. at 725.
34. The commentary on Gertz is extensive, with much of it centering on the public
figure/private figure distinction. See generally Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53
TEx. L. REv. 422 (1975) (discussing Gertz's perpetuation of the New York Times "actual malice"
and minimum of negligence standards and problems inherent in the Gertz approach); Anderson, A Response to Professor Robertson: The Issue is Control of Press Power, 54 TEX. L.
REv. 271 (1976) (arguing that Gertz will lead to press self-censorship); Brosnahan, From Times
v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Welch: Ten Years of Balancing Libel Law and the First Amendment,
26 HASTINGS L. REv. 777 (1975) (discussing development of constitutional protection of libelous
and defamatory statements and contrasting this precedent with Gertz) [hereinafter cited as
Brosnahan); Eaton, American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and
Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REv. 1349 (1975) (extensive analysis of the changes
that recent Supreme Court decisions have made in the common law of defamation) [hereinafter
cited as Eaton); Frakt, The Evolving Law of Defamation: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond, 6 RuT.-CAM. L. REv. 471 (1975) (discussing the
law of defamation in light of Gertz and suggesting weaknesses in, and alternatives to, the Court's
reasoning in Gertz); Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEX. L. REv. 199 (1976) (arguing that Gertz has commendably reemphasized the individual privacy interest while maintaining constitutional protection for media,
rather than private, defendants).
35. 89 Ill. 2d at 209, 433 N.E.2d at 247-48 (citing Schaefer, Defamation an!f the First Amendment, 52 U. Cow. L. REv. I (1980)) (discussion of the law of defamation as it contrasts with
the Court's treatment of other first amendment problems).
36. !d. at 209, 433 N.E.2d at 248.
37. !d. at 209-10, 433 N.E.2d at 248. For a discussion of the common law privilege of
fair comment, see infra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
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"was not limited to public discussion of public officials or figures, but also
extended to the discussion of matters of public concern." 311 The court then
noted with approval Dean Prosser's observation-an observation made several
years before the Supreme Court's decision in Gertz-"that there is no reason
the constitutional privilege of New York Times should not be extended to
all matters of public concern." 39
In these preliminary remarks, the court worked a clever bit of lawyering,
because the deliberate intermingling of the New York Times decision and
the history of the fair comment privilege layed the groundwork for the court's
ultimate conclusion that Stieg's statements were protected by the New York
Times privilege. The court hitched the common law privilege of fair comment, which it was ostensibly interpreting, to the engine of the constitutional privilege established in New York Times, and then subtly broke loose
from that engine to generate an even more aggressive common law privilege
when the engine of New York Times began to slow down. Although the
court was correct in stating that the New York Times decision obviated much
of what had previously been encompassed by the common law fair comment privilege, the court was mistaken in its effort to distill from the United
States Supreme Court's current jurisprudence the principle that the actual
malice standard of New York Times should apply whenever the subject of
the defamatory speech is a matter of public interest or concern. The United
States Supreme Court has emphatically rejected the public interest test as
the touchstone for the application of first amendment privileges; 40 the Illinois Supreme Court's reincarnation of that test in effect mischaracterized
federal constitutional law in the process of recreating Illinois common law.
The Colson opinion heavily emphasized the importance of avoiding selfcensorship on controversial subjects. In order to provide the "breathing
space essential to the exercise of constitutional freedoms,'' the court observed that the actual malice standard of New York Times is imposed so
as to interdict the threat that a speaker will forego constitutionally protected
speech rather than run the risk of liability when, in the cold light of hindsight, his or her assessment of a given set of facts is proven wrong. 41 In
order to balance the competing concerns of the first amendment and Illinois'
interest in protecting reputation, the Colson court held that ''the challenged
statement must be assessed in the context in which it was published. " 42 This
evaluation of the speech "in context" involves two primary considerations:
the extent of the publication, and the nature of the publication's recipients_. 3
Rather than focus, as did the United States Supreme Court in its landmark
redefinition of the New York Times line of cases in Gertz v. Robert Welch,

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

89 Ill. 2d at 210, 433 N.E.2d at 248.
Id. (citing PROSSER, supra note 4, § 118, at 823).
See infra text accompanying notes 199-216.
89 Ill. 2d at 211, 433 N.E.2d at 248-49.
/d. at 212, 433 N.E.2d at 249.
/d.
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on the "public" or "private" status of the person defamed, 44 the focus of
the Colson court's analysis was on the speaker, the audience, and the
functional relationship between the two. Thus, the court emphasized that
"whether or not one is defamed depends upon the effect the publication had
upon those who received it," 4 l and that "[t]he focus therefore must be upon
the statement and its predictable effect upon those who received the
publication.' ' 46
The Colson court's functional relationship analysis easily led to the invocation of a New York Times-style privilege. The publication of Stieg's
comments concerning Colson was not made to the general public; rather,
the audience, apparently consisting of four people, 47 were state employees
charged with the duty of evaluating the academic performance of another
state employee. The Department of Library Science Personnel Committee
was thus involved in a matter of central importance to the mission of Northern Illinois University, a public· institution. It is certainly understandable
that the Illinois Supreme Court would treat speech concerning the teaching
ability of a professor at a state university as a matter important enough
to require breathing space for free and uninhibited discussion. In the court's
words, "[t]he need for the free flow of information and for vigorous and
uninhibited discussion in a situation [involving tenure and promotion decisions] is such that the first amendment privilege defined in New York Times
must apply to the publication of statements to this committee. " 48 Whether
or not one accepts the first amendment pedigree of these concerns, intuitively,
the court's worries about self-censorship ring true. Most of us are not heroic.
Without some degree of enhanced protection, frank appraisals of teachers
would not be forwarded to personnel committees; people are more likely
to run the institutional risk of allowing persons they deem unqualified to
be promoted than to run the personal risk of a suit for defamation if a
statement they make later proves false.
What is remarkable about the Colson opinion, however, is not its sound,
common sense appraisal of the functional importance of Stieg's speech in
relation to the personnel committee. Rather, it is the court's almost
schizophrenic insistence that it was basing its opinion on the first amendment values expressed in New York Times and Gertz, while simultaneously
rejecting the public figure/private figure distinction established in Gertz. Thus,
although the Colson court repeatedly phrased its holding squarely in terms
of the first amendment-stating, for example, that "we find that the first
amendment privilege of New York Times must be applied to the statement

44. See Christie, Injury to Reputation and the Constitution: Confusion Amid Conflicting
Approaches, 75 MICH. L. REv. 43 (1976); Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1205 (1976).
45. 89 Ill. 2d at 212, 433 N.E.2d at 249.
46. /d.
47. ld.
48. /d. at 213, 433 N.E.2d at 249.
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made by the defendant" 49 -the court also regarded itself as totally unencumbered by the Gertz matrix.

C.

The Underpinnings of the Public Interest Approach

Undet the public interest test defined in Colson, first amendment protection for speech does not depend upon the characterization of the status of
the plaintiff, but instead, is triggered by the significance of the speech itself.
The most important doctrinal influences on the Colson opinion's invocation
of the public interest approach are Farnsworth v. Tribune Co., so a 1969 Illinois Supreme Court decision heavily imbued with the public interest approach toward constitutional privilege, and Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc., 51 a United States Supreme Court decision in which the Court flirted
with the public interest concept at the federal constitutional level. The most
important prior decisions cutting against the grain of the Colson public interest approach are Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 52 the United States Supreme
Court decision that did away with the "public interest" test as a matter
of federal constitutional law, and Troman v. Wood,S 3 an Illinois Supreme
Court decision that not only followed Gertz but also appeared to reject the
public interest approach as a matter of Illinois state law. To place Colson
within its doctrinal context, it is necessary to see the extent to which the
analysis of Colson is directly traceable to the influences of Farnsworth and
Rosenbloom, and also the extent to which it is a repudiation of Gertz and
Troman.
1. Farnsworth v. Chicago Tribune Co.

In Farnsworth v. Chicago Tribune Co., 54 a Chicago Tribune article referred to an osteopathic physician as a "quack." The plaintiff, Myrtle Farnsworth, argued that the actual malice standard should not apply to her because
she was neither a public official nor a public figure. Farnsworth argued that
the jury should have been given an instruction based on the Illinois Constitution of 1870, ss which stated that "[t)ruth is a defense! in a libel action
only when published with good motives and for justifiable ends." 56 If the
actual malice standard applied, the court indicated that the rejection of the
proffered instruction was correct as a matter of law .57
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the Chicago Tribune was protected
49. /d.
50. 43 Ill. 2d at 286, 253 N.E.2d at 408 (1969).
51. 403 u.s. 29 (1971).
52. 418 u.s. 323 (1974).
53. 62 Ill. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975).
54. 43 Ill. 2d at 286, 253 N.E.2d at 408 (1969).
55. ILL. CoNST. of 1870, art. II, § 4 (repealed 1970). The Farnsworth litigation preceded
the adoption of the 1970 Illinois Constitution.
56. /d.
57. 43 Ill. 2d at 290, 253 N.E.2d at 410.
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by the actual malice standard of the New York Times case and, thus, concluded that the trial court was correct in refusing to give the plaintiff's
tendered instruction.ss A careful reading of Farnsworth makes two things
clear. First, the court was of the opinion that the New York Times standard
was not tied to the status of the plaintiff, but rather was activated whenever
the subject matter of the speech was of public interest or concern. s9 Second,
the Farnsworth court did not perceive itself as merely interpreting and extending Illinois common law in reaching its decision that the New York Times
standard was applicable; rather, the court clearly regarded the public interest test as a requirement compelled by federal constitutional law. 60
These two points are made obvious by the Illinois Supreme Court's treatment of the United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting New York
Times that were extant as of the time Farnsworth was decided. The court
observed that the Supreme Court, in Garrison v. Louisiana, 61 held unconstitutional a Louisiana criminal libel statute that directed punishment for true
statements regarding official conduct of public officials made with actual
malice. Further, the court quoted approvingly the Garrison Court's statement that "[t]ruth may not be the subject of either civil or criminal sanctions where the discussion of public affairs is concerned. " 62 Then, the court
relied heavily on Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 63 a case involving a suit brought
by football coach Wally Butts of the University of Georgia (though employed
by a private corporation handling athletic affairs for the university rather
than the state itself) against the publishers of the Saturday Evening Post
for an article charging that Butts conspired with Coach Bear Bryant to fix
a football game. Since Butts was not a public official, the case had usually
been cited along with its companion decision, Associated Press v. Walker, 64
for the proposition that New York Times extended to "public figures" as
well. 6 s The Farnsworth court, however, saw broader implications in Butts,
treating it as encompassing the public interest approach to the New York
Times standard. Thus, the Farnsworth court stated that the issue before it,
"[m]edical quackery," 66 was "an area of critical public concern which clearly
qualifies under the Butts test as a subject 'about which information is needed
or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies
of the period. "' 67 The Farnsworth court explained that "the scope of the
'public figure' classification must be determined by an examination of the

58. Id. at 297, 253 N.E.2d at 414.
59. /d. at 290.92, 253 N.E.2d at 410-11.
60. /d. at 292, 253 N.E.2d at 411.
61. 379 u.s. 64 (1964).
62. Farnsworth, 43 Ill. 2d at 289, 253 N.E.2d at 410 (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 64, 74 (1964)) (emphasis added).
63. 388 u.s. 130 (1967).
64. /d.
65. Farnsworth, 43 Ill. 2d at 289, 253 N.E.2d at 410.
66. /d. at 291, 253 N.E.2d at 411.
67. /d. (quoting Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 147 (1967)) (emphasis added).
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underlying rationale of the first amendment protection involved. " 68 The cases,
the court noted, "have seemed to establish that 'the question is whether
a public issue, not a public official [or public figure], is involved.' " 69
The Farnsworth court further stressed that its view of tht! "public interest"
standard required by the first amendment was not limited to political or
governmental questions, but rather it embraced an extremely broad definition of "public interest" that translated roughly into "anything the public
is interested in." 70 Drawing on Time, Inc. v. Hill, 11 a decision that applied
the New York Times standard in a false light invasion of privacy action,
the Farnsworth court held that "constitutional protection is not limited to
utterances that might enhance the resolution of political or governmental
questions. " 72 Hill had involved a magazine review of a Broadway play that
portrayed the kidnapping of the Hill family by three escaped convicts. The
Hill Court stated that there was no indication that this magazine review would
contribute to the "resolution of any serious social or governmental problems,
or advance the arts. Rather, the key seemed to be that it was a matter of
public interest and that fact was sufficient to trigger at least the constitutional protections of Butts. " 13
Accordingly, the Farnsworth court held that the New York Times actual
malice standard was constitutionally mandated in the case before it even
though Myrtle Farnsworth was not a public figure. Medical quackery was
a matter of public interest, the court stated, since the readers of the Chicago
Tribune would be interested in it. Moreover, the Tribune's zeal in uncovering and exposing quackery would be substantially diminished without the
protection of the actual malice standard. In determining the subject's importance, the court noted (in a statement that would become critical in the
Colson court opinion thirteen years later),
we must consider not only the number of persons affected by the subject,
but also the severity of its impact upon those so affected. Thus, the fact
that plaintiff's personal contacts were presumably with only a small portion of the public does not militate against immunity where the publica-

68. /d. at 290, 253 N.E.2d at 410.
69. /d. at 290, 253 N.E.2d at 411 (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 81 (1966)
(Harlan, J ., concurring)).
70. /d. The Farnsworth court's expansive reading of the "public interest" approach typifies
a tendency that may well be the "Achilles heel" of cases such as Farnsworth, Rosenbloom,
and even Colson: their inexorable inclination to allow the defendant to bootstrap himself into
the application of the New York Times standard by defining "public interest" as anything
the media happens to focus its attention upon. Although the public interest test need not be
so tautological, the threat that it will become so has certainly contributed to judicial criticism
of the public interest test. In Troman v. Wood, for example, Justice Schaefer admonished
that "[w]hether a matter is one of public interest . . . depends to some degree on whether
the media themselves have chosen to make it one." 62 Ill. 2d 184, 196, 340 N.E.2d 292, 297
(1975).
71. 385 u.s. 374 (1967).
72. 43 III. 2d at 291, 253 N.E.2d at 411.
73. ld.
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tions concern a matter of such vital importance as the qualifications and
practices of one who represents herself as qualified to treat human ills. 74

2.

Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.

Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 7 s involved a suit brought by George
Rosenbloom, an alleged distributor of nudist magazines in the Philadelphia
area, against the operators of radio station WIP in Philadelphia. Following
Rosenbloom's arrest during a police crackdown on the distribution of allegedly obscene books and newspapers, WIP broadcast a series of news stories
describing Rosenbloom's arrest and the seizure of pornographic books and
magazines from his home and a local warehouse. Rosenbloom sued the radio
station, predicating his action on certain factual errors in the broadcasts.
The station claimed that it was entitled to invoke the New York Times actual malice standard as a defense. The judgment of the Supreme Court was
announced in a plurality opinion written by Justice Brennan, who phrased
the issue before the Court as
whether the New York Times' knowing-or-reckless-falsity standard applies in a state civil libel action brought not by a "public official" or
a "public figure" but by a private individual for a defamatory falsehood
uttered in a news broadcast by a radio station about the individual's involvement in an event of public or general interest. 76
Using precisely the same analysis that the Illinois Supreme Court had
adopted in Farnsworth, the plurality opinion of Justice Brennan held that
the New York Times standard applied to any defamatory speech involving
matters of "public or general interest. " 77 Justice Brennan's analysis, like the
analysis of the Illinois court in Farnsworth, shifted the focus of the New
York Times standard from the status of the defamation victim to the status
of the speech itself. "If a matter is a subject of public or general interest,"
Justice Brennan wrote, "it cannot suddenly become less so merely because
a private individual is involved, or because in some sense the individual did
not 'voluntarily' choose to become involved."' 8 Rather, Brennan wrote, the
public's primary interest is in the event; the public's natural attention is on
the content, effect, context, and importance of the conduct and actions of
the participants in newsworthy events, not the participants' prior anonymity,
notoriety or fame. The Court thus extended the coverage of New York Times
"to all discussion and communication involving matters of public or general
concern, without regard to whether the persons involved are famous or
anonymous.'' 79

74. /d. at 292, 253 N .E.2d at 411.
75. 403 u.s. 29 (1971).
76. /d. at 31-32.
77. Id. at 52. This phraseology was derived from the famous Warren and Brandeis article
on the right to privacy. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193,
214 (1890).
78. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 43.
79. Id. at 44.
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Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 80 was the landmark United States Supreme
Court decision involving Illinois law; its holding directly contradicted the
Colson court's preoccupation with whether defamatory speech involved subjects of public interest and concern. Nevertheless, the Colson court seemed
to acknowledge the existence of Gertz only grudgingly. Gertz concerned a
libel action brought by Elmer Gertz, a well-known Chicago attorney and
law professor, 81 against Robert Welch, Inc., the publisher of the monthly
magazine American Opinion, an organ of the John Birch Society. 82 Gertz
had been retained as co-counsel by the family of seventeen-year-old Ronald
Nelson to pursue civil remedies against Richard Nuccio, a Chicago police
officer who had killed Ronald. 83 Nuccio ultimately was convicted of Nelson's
murder, but Gertz played no role in Nuccio's criminal prosecution and made
no public statements or comments concerning the civil or criminal actions. 84
Shortly after Nuccio's conviction, an article appeared in American Opinion
entitled "Frame-Up-Richard Nuccio and the War on Police." 85 The article
alleged that Nuccio was being "railroaded" as part of a Communist conspiracy to undermine local police so as to pave the way for a national police
force which would support and enforce a Communist dictatorship. 86 The
article named Elmer Gertz as one of the members of this conspiracy. He
was identified as the lawyer for the Nelson family and one of the leaders
of the attack on Nuccio. Gertz was further described, among other things,
as a "Communist-fronter," a "Leninist" and a "Marxist." 87 Virtually
everything of significance in the American Opinion article was false. 88
80. 418 u.s. 323 (1974).
81. Ironically, Gertz had been the attorney of record on at least two important defamation
cases litigated in the Illinois Supreme Court. See Farnsworth v. Chicago Tribune Co., 43 Ill.
2d 286, 253 N.E.2d 408 (1969); Zeinfeld v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 41 Ill. 2d 345, 243
N.E.2d 217 (1968).
82. Early in the 1960's, American Opinion began to warn of a nationwide conspiracy to
discredit local police forces and establish, in their stead, a national law enforcement agency
capable of supporting a Communist dictatorship. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 325.
83. /d. at 326.
84. Gertz, in his capacity as counsel for the Nelson family in the civil litigation, attended
the coroner's inquest into the Nelson boy's death, and initiated actions for damages. He neither
discussed Officer Nuccio with the press nor played any part in the criminal proceedings against
Nuccio. /d.
85. /d.
86. !d.
87. !d.
88. Interestingly, in 1982, eight years after the historic Supreme Court decision in Gertz,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided the merits of the defendant's appeal from the district court decision on remand. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 680
F .2d 527 (7th Cir. 1982). In that decision, Gertz was able to prove both negligence and actual
malice, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed a jury award of compensatory damages in the amount
of $100,000 and punitive damages of $300,000. In summarizing the defendant's behavior, the
court noted, with regard to Scott Stanley, the managing editor of American Opinion, that
Stanley conceived a story line; solicited Stang, a writer with a known and
unreasonable propensity to label persons or organizations as Communist, to write
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The defendant claimed that Gertz was a public figure and that Welch was
thus entitled to the protection of the New York Times actual malice standard. In a pre-trial ruling, the district court held that the words published
by Welch constituted libel per se. 89 Due to this ruling, injury was presumed
under Illinois law, and only the issue of damages was submitted to the jury. 90
The district court, however, having second thoughts, granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the grounds that the subject matter of the article was of "public interest" and therefore required the plaintiff to prove
actual malice as defined in New York Times. 91 The decision was affirmed
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 92 whereupon
the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. 93
In Gertz, the Supreme Court established a matrix of guidelines to govern
the interplay between the first amendment principles articulated in New York
Times and the traditional solicitude for interests in reputation evidenced by
the common law. Thus, Gertz was a judicial compromise that attempted
to accommodate the competing values of "uninhibited, robust, and wideopen" debate on public issues with society's need to protect reputation. The
Gertz Court reiterated the unsuitability in a free society of the traditional
rule of strict liability for defamation, since compelling a speaker to "guarantee
the accuracy of his factual assertions may lead to intolerable selfcensorship."94 The need to avoid self-censorship, however, was not the
only societal value recognized by the Court; to give absolute protection to
the news media would completely dissolve the competing social concerns
underlying the law of defamation. 95
Gertz attempted to resolve the inherent friction between freedom of speech
and protection of reputation by announcing a series of rules setting forth
the minimum constitutional requirements for compensating injury to reputation. First, suits brought by public officials and public figures, at least against
media defendants, must always meet the New York Times actual malice test. 96
the article; and after the article was submitted, made virtually no effort to check
the validity of statements that were defamatory per se of Gertz, and in fact added
further defamatory material based on Stang's "facts." There was more than enough
evidence for the jury to conclude that this article was published with utter disregard
for the truth or falsity of the statements contained in the article about Gertz.
/d. at 539.
89. 306 F. Supp. 310, 311 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
90. !d.
91. 322 F. Supp. 997, 1000 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
92. 471 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
93. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
94. !d. at 340.
95. /d. at 341 (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, · 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)). The Court recognized the traditionally strong state interest in creating compensation
for the harm caused by defamatory falsehood. The individual's right to protect his or her
good name, the Court emphasized, "reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential
dignity and worth of every human being-a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered
liberty." !d.
96. !d. at 343.
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Second, all defamation suits, even those brought by private individuals concerning non-public issues, must, at the minimum, be based upon proof of
negligence. 97 Third, "presumed damages" would no longer be permitted;
damages could not be awarded without proof of injury, though the scope
of injury and the nature of the evidence required remained broad. 98 Fourth,
any award of punitive damages would always require a showing of actual
malice. 99
Although the Gertz opinion stated that it was unwise for the Supreme
Court itself to proceed on a case-by-case basis in attempting to balance the
constitutional claims of the press against individual claims for compensation, the Court invited state courts to develop for themselves the proper
standard of liability in suits brought by private plaintiffs. Thus, the Court
stated that as long as the states did not dip below the negligence standard,
they should "retain substantial latitude in their efforts to enforce a legal
remedy for defamatory falsehood injuries to the reputation of a private
individual." 100
The Gertz compromise was grounded on two rationales reflecting the
Supreme Court's perceptions about the differences between public and private
figures. Public officials and figures, the Court reasoned, are more likely to
have effective opportunities for self-help when they are defamed. Given the
fact that, generally, public officials and public figures enjoy significantly
greater access to channels of effective communication, the Court assumed
that, as a class, they have a more realistic opportunity to contradict the
lie or correct the error than do private individuals. 101 The second rationale
of the Court was more normative, largely reflecting the homespun moral
that one who seeks the public arena must accept the heat of the fire as
part of the price for entering the kitchen. People who voluntarily attain public
figure status often have assumed roles of special prominence in social affairs, and in all fairness they can be required to accept greater public scrutiny
and greater exposure to defamation as part of the cost of such fame. Some
public figures occupy positions of such great power and influence that they
are public figures for all purposes. 102 A president, a movie star, or a sports
hero might be considered a "universal" public figure. Most public figures,
however, are "limited public figures," persons who have "thrust themselves
to the forefront of particular controversies in order to influence the resolu-

97. /d. at 347.
98. /d. at 349-50.
99. ld. at 350.
I00. /d. at 345-46. For commentaries on how state courts have reacted to the options created
for them by Gertz. see Frakt, Defamation Since Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.: The Emerging
Common Law, 10 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 519, 536-47 (1979); Developments in the Law, The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1324, 1404-06 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Developments in the Law]; Note, The Constitutional Law of Defamation-Recent
Developments and Suggested State Court Responses, 33 ME. L. REv. 371, 393-98 (1981).
101. 418 U.S. at 344.
·
102. Jd. at 345.
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tion of the issues involved." 103 Such limited public figures are subject to
the New York Times standard when they are defamed in connection with
issues about which they have invited attention, but in all other aspects of
their lives they remain private figures, for whom states are free to create
compensation on a lesser showing of simple negligence. 104
4.

Troman v. Wood

Troman v. Wood 101 involved a defamation suit based on a Chicago SunTimes article which reported on the criminal activities of a youth gang and
actions taken by a local community group to combat the gang's activities.
Residents of the neighborhood in which the gang operated were interviewed
for the article. One resident was quoted as saying, "Ten years ago, I became
very friendly with the family that moved into what became the gang
headquarters." 106 A second resident was quoted as saying, "The gang stole
us blind. One time after my husband had paid them for painting and stripping his basement, he returned home to find one TV set gone. You know
where it was? It was in the basement of the gang house." 107 The paper printed
a photograph of the home of Mrs. Mary Troman with the article. The caption beneath the picture read: "Home of Mrs. Mary Troman at 5832 N.
Wayne. Thomas Troman testified he is a member of the gang." 108 Mary
Troman filed suit against Field Enterprises, Inc., publisher of the Sun-Times,
claiming that the photograph and article together implied that her home was
the headquarters of the gang.
Troman's complaint was grounded upon a traditional theory of strict liability. The trial court granted the publisher's motion to dismiss, holding that
even though Mary Troman was a private figure, it was necessary for her
to allege actual malice to state a cause of action because the subject matter
of the article involved an issue of public concern. 109 The Illinois Supreme
Court took the case on a direct appeal. Although Troman had failed to
allege actual malice, she had offered to amend her complaint to allege
negligence, "gross negligence," and "journalistic malpractice." 11 ° Consequently, the court, pursuant to stipulations, agreed to treat the complaint
as sounding in those three variations on the negligence standard rather than
on strict liability. 111 In a thoughtful opinion, Justice Schaefer first analyzed
the line of United States Supreme Court decisions from New York Times
through Butts, Walker, Rosenbloom, and finally Gertz. Justice Schaefer noted

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
Ill.

!d.
!d.
62
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.

at 349.
Ill. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975).
at 188, 340 N.E.2d at 293.

at 193, 340 N.E.2d at 296.
at 194, 340 N.E.2d at 296.
at 193-94, 340 N.E.2d at 296.

1983]

FUTURE OF DEFAMATION IN ILLINOIS

237

that the Gertz Court had retreated from the position taken by the plurality
in Rosenbloom, and had rejected the proposition that actual malice must
be proven even as to a defamatory falsehood about a private individual,
if the statement related to matters of public or general interest.' 12 Justice
Schaefer then made it clear that the Troman court interpreted Gertz as allowing Illinois to adopt a mere negligence standard in cases involving private
figure plaintiffs: "The defendant concedes that the Federal Constitution does
not require Illinois to apply the New York Times standard. Nevertheless the
defendant urges that we should now adopt that standard as a matter of State
policy. " 113 The Troman court's view, conceded by the defendant, was that,
after Gertz, federal constitutional law had no bearing on the private figure
standard beyond the floor level of negligence, and that any decision to
enhance media protection above the negligence standard wa.s purely a question of Illinois state law. 114 Thus the court stated that its
function [was] not to make an independent reappraisal of the requirements
of the first amendment, but rather to ascertain whether ther~: is any basis
in Illinois law which would prevent the application here of the general
principle that a person is responsible for damage that he intentionally or
negligently inflicts upon another.'"

The Troman court then decided that under Illinois law no basis existed for
extending New York Times protection to defendants who defame private
figures, even if the defamatory speech involved matters of public interest.' 16
Therefore, the Troman court's analysis of Illinois law was flatly inconsistent with the underlying jurisprudential themes in both Farnsworth and
Colson.' 11
The Troman court initially emphasized the substantial state policy of protecting reputation. Prior to New York Times, the court noted, it had been
the policy of the state to impose strict liability for defamatory falsehood.
In the Illinois Constitutions of 1818,' 18 1848,' 19 1870, 120 and 1970,' 21 the people of Illinois expressly endorsed the state policy of vindicating individual
112. Id. at 192, 340 N.E.2d at 296.
113. /d. at 194, 340 N.E.2d at 296 (emphasis added). This passage is extremely important
in assessing the significance of the Farnsworth- Troman..Colson trilogy, because it establishes
beyond peradventure that the Troman court was never confused about whether its refusal to
elevate Illinois law to the New York Times standard for private figure plaintiffs implicated
the federal constitutional law.
114. The defendant "concede[d) that the Federal Constitution [did] not require Illinois to
apply the New York Times standard," but nevertheless urged the Troman court to "adopt
that standard as a matter of State policy." /d.
115. /d. at 194, 340 N.E.2d at 297.
116. /d. at 198, 340 N.E.2d at 299.
117. For an analysis of the judicial themes of Farnsworth and Colson, see supra notes 54-74
and accompanying text.
118. ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. VIII, § 12.
119. ILL. CoNsT. of 1848, art. XIII, § 12.
120. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. II, § 4.
121. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. I, § 4.
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interests in reputation. 122 The court then recognized that a libel suit is often
the best form of "counterspeech" available to a defamed plaintiff.' 23 The
court stated that judicial process provides a safety valve that permits the
injured private individual who is not part of the corporate mass media
superstructure to strike back and obtain retribution through the lawful and
orderly processes of society. The court thus recognized that the state has
a strong interest in insuring that courts remain open as a vehicle for making
a public and authoritative declaration that an injurious statement about a
private individual was in fact false, and the state should be careful not to
constrict this vital avenue of public vindication.' 24
The Troman court finally turned to the heart of the public interest standard itself; its dissection of that standard is, more than any other aspect of
the Troman opinion, the direct antithesis of the theoretical underpinnings
of Farnsworth and Colson. The public interest standard, the court wrote,
"as a matter of Illinois law, unduly subordinates the rights of the
individual." 12 s The court noted that the first problem with the public interest standard is that it is overly broad, and has a tendency to become
a self-fulfilling prophecy. 126 For example, is an event a matter of "public
interest" because it has some preexisting transcendental quality that
automatically makes it so, or does an event graduate to the hallowed status
of "public interest" simply because the public becomes interested in it? And
in a society dominated by an ever-expanding network of print, broadcast
and cable media hungry for stories, is there not a proclivity on the part
of the media to self-define what the public fancies? The Troman court was
troubled by this characteristic of the public interest concept, stating that
"[w]hether a matter is one of public interest . . . depends to some degree
on whether the media themselves have chosen to make it one. ''' 2 ' Individual
media personalities such as Dan Rather, Tom Brokaw and Peter Jennings
become the arbiters of the New York Times actual malice test if any story
that finds its way into the network evening news by definition qualifies as
a matter of public interest. The Troman court refused to inculcate the fabric
of Illinois tort law with such an inherently "bootstrapping" concept, arguing that it would eviscerate the central distinction of Gertz between private
and public figure plaintiffs. The use of the public interest test would undercut the Gertz dichotomy by treating those persons whose connection with
the matter of public interest at issue was involuntary, and perhaps peripheral,
122. Troman, 62 Ill. 2d at 195, 340 N.E.2d at 297.
123. /d. The news media may not choose to provide access to a private figure who claims
he or she has been wronged in order to alleviate some of the damage done to the person's
reputation, but the media may publicize the filing of a defamation action seeking sizeable
damages, and will surely report the award of such a judgment should the plaintiff prevail.
124. /d. For a criticism of this balance struck in Troman, see Note, Troman v. Wood-A
Negligence Standard for Private Individuals in Defamation Actions, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 503,
512-23 [hereinafter cited as Note, Troman v. Wood].
125. 62 Ill. 2d at 195, 340 N.E.2d at 297.
126. !d. at 196, 340 N.E.2d at 297.
127. /d. (emphasis added).
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as the equivalent of public figures.
The Troman court further rejected the defendant's suggestion that the court
effectuate a compromise by placing liability at a level above negligence but
below actual malice, 128 thereby employing an intermediate "gross negligence"
or "journalistic malpractice" approach. 129 The court found the gross
negligence suggestion flawed on grounds that the law is already too complex
and would not profit by the importation of yet another ill-defined tier of
fault. 130 Given the subsequent confusion in Illinois concerning the application of the negligence and actual malice standards,' 31 the Troman court's
judgment on this point obviously was correct. With regard to the "journalistic malpractice" suggestion, the court again recharacterized the innovation as a problematic departure from straightforward negligence concepts.
The court reasoned that the problem with the journalistic malpractice approach is that "it would make the prevailing newspaper practices in a community controlling,"ll 2 thereby encouraging a progressive "Gresham's law"
devaluation' 33 in the standard of care. In fact, the court may have overstated
128. For examples of states employing the above negligence standard to defamation suits
brought by private plaintiffs, see Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 538
P.2d 450 (adopting a modified New York Times gross negligence test applicable in those instances where the defamatory conduct is directed at a private plaintiff involved in an event
of public or general concern); AAFCO Heating and Air Conditioning Co. v . Northwest Publications, Inc., 162 Ind. App. 671, 321 N.E.2d 580 (1974) (utilizing the "serious doubts as to
the truth" standard as the formulation of an actual malice fault requirement); Chapodeau v.
Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1961) (applying a gross negligence test similar to that adopted in Walker).
129. 62 Ill. 2d at 197-98, 340 N.E.2d at 298-99. Within its analysis, the Illinois Supreme
Court first defined "journalistic malpractice" as a "departure from the general standards of
care set by publishers in the community." /d. at 197-98, 340 N.E.2d at 298. The court then
compared this definition with the U.S. Supreme Court's definition in Curtis Publishing Co.
v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967), of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme
departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers. In refusing to apply the journalistic malpractice approach to determine liability,
the court was of the opinion that such a standard would make the prevailing newspaper practices in a community controlling, whether those practices were adequate or not. For example,
"[i]n a community having only a single newspaper, [the journalistic malpractice approach] would
permit that paper to establish its own standards"; in a community having more than one
newspaper, the journalistic malpractice standard might lead "toward[s) a progressive depreciation of the standa~d of care." 62 Ill. 2d at 198, 340 N.E.2d at 298-99.
130. /d. at 197, 340 N.E.2d at 298.
131. Compare, e.g., Catalano v. Pechous, 83 Ill. 2d 146, 419 N.E.2d 350 (1980) (applying
actual malice standard) with Newell v. Field Enters., Inc., 91 Ill. App. 3d 735, 415 N .E.2d
434 (1st Dist. 1980) (applying negligence standard).
132. 62 Ill. 2d at 198, 340 N.E.2d at 298.
133. "Gresham's Law" is an economic observation named after Sir Thomas Gresham, a
16th century English financier who posited that when two coins are equal in debt-paying value
but unequal in intrinsic value, the one having the lower intrinsic value tends to remain in circulation while the other tends to be hoarded or exported as bullion. WEIISTERS THIRD NEw
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 998 (4th ed. 1976). Similarly, when two or mort: accepted practices
of journalism are present within the same community, the praCiice which affords the lower
standard of care tends to be used as the standard in determining journalistic malpractice.
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the case against the journalistic malpractice concept, because if it is
understood simply as importing the traditional rules applicable in medical
or legal malpractice cases into the journalism field, the custom followed in
the community would not be absolutely controlling-courts and juries would
have the power to declare an entire custom unreasonable. 134 The journalistic
malpractice approach, however, would require the plaintiff to introduce
testimony concerning customary journalistic practice in a particular area. That
evidentiary burden could be severely crippling, since one would expect
reporters an<;l editors to be just as unwilling to testify that a colleague engaged
in an unreasonably sloppy investigation of a story as doctors historically
have been to testify that a colleague was unreasonably lax in investigating
the cause of an illness. The familiar "conspiracy of silence" that pervades
professional malpractice litigation 135 was precisely the sort of evidentiary impediment that the Troman court was resolved to eliminate.
Although the opinion in Troman was, on the whole, a systematic and
logical treatment of Illinois law and policy in the aftermath of Gertz, its
analysis had two significant failings, which in combination gave rise to the
confusion that ultimately surfaced six years later in Colson. The first failing
of the Troman opinion was that it nowhere discussed or even cited Farnsworth v. Tribune Co., 136 the most important libel case involving standard
of care ever decided by the court prior to Troman, and also a case that
dealt heavily with the merits of the public interest test. Troman 's failure
to overrule, distinguish, reconcile, or even discuss Farnsworth could only
generate confusion in the future, because the underlying principles of Farn-

134. Custom is merely a factor to be taken into account in determining whether an actor's
conduct is negligent. It is not controlling where a reasonable person would not follow the custom.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 295A (1965); PROSSER, supra note 4, at 167. The most
well-known statement concerning the use of custom came from Judge Learned Hand in The
T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom. Eastern Transp. Co. v. Northern
Barge Corp., 287 U.S. 662 (1932). In that case, Judge Hand stated:
Indeed in most cases reasonable prudence is common prudence; but strictly it is
never its measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new
and available devices. It never may set its own tests, however persuasive be its
usages. Courts must in the end say what is required; there are precautions so imperative that even their universal disregard will not excuse their omission.
60 F.2d at 740.
135. Given the incompetency of most jurors in passing judgment on questions of medical
science or technique, most malpractice cases require expert testimony to support a finding of
negligence. Unfortunately, most doctors are reluctant to testify against one another. This reluctance is commonly referred to as the "conspiracy of silence" and often deprives the injured
party of an equitable remedy. For a more extensive discussion of the "conspiracy of silence,"
see Reynolds v. Struble, 128 Cal. App. 716, 18 P.2d 690 (1933); Morgan v. Rosenberg, 370
S.W.2d 685 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963); Simon v. Friedrich, 163 Misc. 112, 296 N.Y.S. 367 (1937);
Coleman v. McCarthy, 53 R.I. 266, 165 A. 900 (1933); Halldin v. Peterson, 39 Wise. 2d 668,
159 N.W.2d 738 (1968). See generally Markus, Conspiracy of Silence, 14 CLEv.-MAR. L. REv.
520 (1965); Seidelson, Medical Malpractice Cases and the Reluctant Expert, 16 CATH. U.L. REv.
158 (1966).
136. 43 Ill. 2d 286, 253 N.E.2d 408 (1969).
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sworth and Troman clash like a polkadot tie on a plaid shirt.
The second failing of Troman was more fundamental; in announcing the
negligence standard, the court wrote a single qualifying sentence that created
a loophole which would allow Farnsworth and its public interest approach
to subsume the negligence test that Troman purported to establish. After
holding that "negligence may form the basis of liability regardless of whether
or not the publication in question related to a matter of public or general
interest,"' 37 the court stated, "[o)ur holding in the present case is, of course,
not intended to remove any of the qualified privileges which have heretofore
been recognized in this State to the extent that the facts may warrant their
application."' 38 This statement, when combined with the Troman court's
failure to deal with the Farnsworth opinion, guaranteed that Illinois defamation law would remain unstable. It left an opening that would be exploited
in Colson, because it allowed the Colson court to revive the public interest
standard by technically treating it as a state-created c~mmon law privilege
of the sort which had, in the Troman court's language, "heretofore been
recognized in this state." 139 This critical qualifying language in Troman
became a funnel through which the Farnsworth opinion was pulled intact
for reuse in Colson.
These shortcomings in the Troman opinion are hardly unique, because
in neither Farnsworth, Troman, nor Colson did the Illinois Supreme Court
ever directly confront the underlying problem common to all: the proper
relationship between the matrix of first amendment privileges set forth in
the opinions of the United States Supreme Court and the continuing evolution of common Jaw privileges that existed prior to New York Times. Farnsworth, Troman, and Colson all failed to address the relationship between
the common law privileges that antedated New York Times and the constitutional privileges that crystallized in its wake. For example, in Colson,
the court stated, to the probable shock of Illinois lawyers familiar with Gertz
and other United States Supreme Court decisions defining public and private
figures:
[W]e need not in this case decide whether plaintiff was a public figure
or official, because the facts justify following Farnsworth and holding that
this case clearly qualifies under the Butts test as a subject about which
information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of the committee to cope with the issues confronting them. ' 40

To the discerning, this last sentence contains an internal contradiction;
it alone establishes the need to reshape the Colson decision along more precise
doctrinal lines. If Colson is, as the court states repeatedly, a case in which
137. 62 Ill. 2d at 198, 340 N.E.2d at 299.
138. ld. (emphasis added).
139. ld.; see Note, Troman v. Wood, supra note 124, at 522 ("A broad definition [of the
public figure concept] would reduce the size of the class of plaintiffs who would benefit from
Troman.").
140. Colson, 89 Ill. 2d at 213, 433 N.E.2d at 249 (emphasis added).
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"the first amendment privilege of New York Times must be applied," 141
then why did the court not decide whether Stieg was a public figure? If
the answer is that the court was merely "following Farnsworth," does that
mean that the decision is merely an interpretation of state law or does the
"must be applied" phrase only mean "must" as a matter of Illinois com. mon law? And in "following Farnsworth," is not the court following an
outdated Illinois decision that erroneously treated the public interest test as
constitutionally required in all cases-a view parallel to the one espoused
in Rosenbloom and expressly rejected in Gertz? If the court was merely
"following Farnsworth," what does the court mean by saying that the case
"clearly qualifies under the Butts test as a subject about which information
is needed?"' 42 Butts is a federal constitutional decision, a decision prior to
Gertz, which, like Farnsworth, may well be undermined by Gertz.' 43 Furthermore, even in Butts the United States Supreme Court was compelled
to decide and did decide that the plaintiff was a public figure.' 44
These are critical 'questions if the treatment of privileges in Illinois is going to avoid disarray. Fortunately, beneath the surface confusion in Colson
lies a sound accommodation of conflicting values; if the language of the
opinion reflecting that resolution can be sifted into a more coherent structure, the decision could generate a logical and well-balanced approach to
the application of both common law and constitutional privileges.

D.
1.

Straightening Out the Colson Confusion: A Suggested Analysis

The Need to Escalate the Fault Standard for Common Law Privileges
in the Aftermath of Gertz
·

The most important point to recognize in attempting to reconcile the ongoing development of common law privileges in Illinois with the constitutional
scheme declared in New York Times and Gertz is that because Gertz proscribes liability for defamation without a showing of fault, 145 common law
conditional privileges are meaningless unless they require conduct more
egregious than negligence to overcome them. At least in the context of media
defendants, Gertz eliminated strict liability for all defamation actions, requiring negligence as a minimum. 146 Prior to New York Times and Gertz,
141. /d. (emphasis added).
142. /d.
143. Although the Butts and Walker decisions technically do not rest on a public figure/private
figure distinction, there is language in the Butts opinion that approaches a public interest standard. For example, the opinion talks of matters ''about which information is needed or appropriate
to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period." 388 U.S. at 147 (quoting
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)). This language obviously influenced the Illinois
Supreme Court in Farnsworth. See 43 Ill. 2d at 291, 253 N.E.2d at 410.
144. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154 (1967). For a discussion of the confusing line-up of votes in the
Butts and Walker decisions, see W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON TORTS 1031-32 n.4 (1982).
145. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
146. /d.
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when strict liability remained the operative law in Illinois, 147 a common law
conditional privilege that shielded a defendant from liability unless he was
negligent made sense, since requiring proof of negligence added a burden
to the plaintiff's case that would not otherwise exist.' 48 If Gertz is understood
147. See Stonecipher and Trager, supra note II, at 86-90.
148. This is the flaw in Justice Clark's analysis in his specially concurring opinion in Colson,
where he advocates the use of a negligence standard whenever a defendant's speech would be covered
by a common law qualified privilege. Colson, 89 Ill. 2d at 219,433 N.E.2d at 252 (Clark, J., concurring). Justice Clark conceded that a qualified privilege should attach to Stieg's comments, but
argued that such a privilege could be overcome by the plaintiff simply by showing "that the defendant did not believe the truth of the defamatory matter, or had no reasonable grounds to believe
it true." Id. Since Justice Clark's formulation would permit recovery by tht: plaintiff merely on
a showing that the defendant "had no reasonable grounds to believe [his statement] true," Justice
Clark clearly believes that negligence alone should be sufficient to overcome a common law privilege.
This is made even clearer by his statement:
[T]here is no Federal constitutional reason why a plaintiff cannot recover actual
damages in a defamation suit upon a showing of the defendant's negligence .
. . . Nor do I think we are required by any reason of State law or policy to extend
the New York Times scienter standard to cases of purely private defamation.
/d. at 218, 433 N.E.2d at 252.
The problem with this analysis is that Gertz already requires negligence in all cases, so that a
common law privilege that gives the defendant negligenoe-level protection gives the defendant nothing.
Justice Clark correctly noted that negligence is the standard established by the Restatement of Torts
for defamation not involving a public figure. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 580A, 580B
(1977). Justice Clark also correctly asserted that prior Illinois cases had equatt:d common law conditional privileges with the negligence standard. For instance, in Zenfield v. Hayes Freight Lines,
Inc., 41 Ill. 2d 345, 349, 243 N.E.2d 217,221 (1968), the court declared:
A privileged communication is one which, except for the occasion on which or the circumstances under which it is made, might be defamatory and actionable .... Where
circumstances exist, or are reasonably believed by the defendant to exist, from which
he has an interest or duty ... or in good faith believes he has an interest or duty,
to make a certain communication to another person having a corresponding interest
or duty, and the defendant is so situated that he believes, in the discharge of his interest or duty or in the interests of society, that he should make the communication,
and if he makes the communication in good faith, under those circumstances, believing the communication to be true, even though it may not be true, then the: communication is qualifiedly or conditionally privileged, even though the defendant's interest or
duty be not necessarily a legal one but only moral or social and imperfect in character.
/d. (quoting Judge v. Rockford Memorial Hosp., 17 Ill. App. 2d 365, 377, 150 N.E.2d 202,
207 (2d Dist. 1958)} (citation omitted); see also Spencer v. Community Hosp. of Evanston, 87
Ill. App. 3d 214, 408 N.E.2d 981 (1st Dist. 1981) (report concerning physician made at request
of hospital conditionally privileged); Myers v. Spohnholtz, II Ill. App. 3d 560, 297 N.E.2d
183 (1st Dist. 1973) (union had conditional privilege to respond to other union's inquiry about
former member).
The plain fact is, however, that all of this precedent is obsolete after Gertz, and should be discarded.
Since Justice Clark does not dispute the essential point that common law conditional privileges
should continue to exist in Illinois, he must concede that the privileges will need a level of culpability
greater than negligence to separate them from the prima facie standards that all plaintiffs must
meet in any event. A number of Illinois cases prior to Colson did properly apply the actual malice
standard in common law conditional privilege situations. See, e.g., Allen v. Ali, 105 Ill. App. 3d
887, 435 N.E.2d 167 (1st Dist. 1982) (client's letter to bar association complaining of attorney's
fee conditionally privileged absent proof of actual malice); Ramsey v. Greenwald, 91 Ill. App. 3d
855, 414 N.E.2d 1266 (2d Dist. 1980) (absent allegation of actual malice, forrner supervisor's memo
to supervisor who fired plaintiff conditionally privileged); Basarich v. Rodeght:ro, 24 Ill. App. 3d
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as requmng negligence in media cases as a matter of course, however, it
does the media defendant no good to invoke a common law privilege if all
that Is necessary to overcome that privilege is proof of negligence, because
negligence is required in any event. Furthermore, if the Gertz rules are
understood as applying to media and non-media defendants alike, then
negligence is a prerequisite to the maintenance of any defamation action. 149
The Gertz decision involved a newspaper article, and ever since Gertz there
have been suggestions that the opinion might have been intended to apply
only to media defendants.' 50 The national consensus appears to be, however,
that the Gertz Court did not intend to draw a distinction between media
and non-media defendants. 151
889, 321 N .E.2d 739 (3d Dist. 1974) (teachers and athletic coaches are public figures who must
show actual malice to secure a favorable judgment).
149. One might argue that even though negligence is required as a minimum in all postGertz cases, common law privileges could still have force without automatically equating them
with the actual malice standard by reverting back to the type of traditional "ill-will" malice
required by the common law before New York Times. Some modern cases continue to invoke
old-fashioned ill-will malice. See, e.g., Nagib v. News-Sun, 64 Ill. App. 3d 752, 381 N.E.2d
1014 (2d Dist. 1978) (intent to injure required); Fopay v. Noverosko, 31 Ill. App. 3d 182,
334 N .E.2d 79 (5th Dist. 1975) ("evil motive or ill-will toward plaintiff" required); Bloomfield
v. Retail Credit Corp., 14 Ill. App. 3d 158, 302 N.E.2d 88 (1st Dist. 1973) (defining "express
malice" or "malice in fact" in terms of "ill-will, evil motive, [or) intention to injure without
just cause or excuse"); Van Norman v. Peoria Journal-Star, Inc., 31 Ill. App. 2d 314, 175
N.E.2d 805 (2d Dist. 1961) ("a wrongful act done intentionally"). The far better view, however,
followed by a number of Illinois and federal decisions, is that traditional common law ill-will
"malice in fact" should be discarded entirely. The decks should be cleared of all but two
standards for all cases involving either constitutional or common law privileges: negligence,
as the minimum for all cases, and "actual malice" -intentional or reckless disregard of the
truth. For decisions rejecting the use of old-fashioned ill-will malice, see Meiners v. Moriarty,
563 F.2d 343 (7th Cir. 1977); Suchomel v. Suburban Life Newspapers, Inc., 40 Ill. 2d 32,
240 N.E.2d I (1968); Ramsey v. Greenwald, 91 Ill. App. 3d 855, 414 N.E.2d 1266 (2d Dist.
1980); Basarich v. Rodeghero, 24 Ill. App. 3d 889, 321 N.E.2d 739 (3d Dist. 1974).
150. Justice Powell's cautiously worded opinion in Gertz literally referred only to media defendants; he used the terms "publisher or broadcaster" and "the news media" over 15 times. See
Note, Mediaocracy and Mistrust: Extending New York Times Defamation Protection to Non
Media Defendants, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1876, 1877 n.9 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Mediaocracy & Mistrust]. Extrapolating from the Gertz language, some commentators have
suggested that Gertz might be intended to provide special constitutional protection only for
media speakers. See generally C. GREGORY, H. KALVEN & R. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON TORTS 1118-20 (3d ed. 1977) (discussing possible interpretations of Gertz's coverage)
[hereinafter cited as GREGORY); Brosnahan, supra note 34, at 792-93 (language of Gertz strongly
suggests that only media defendants are affected by the decision); Shiffrin, Defamatory NonMedia Speech and First Amendment Methodology, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 915 (1978) (media
defendants do, but should not, receive greater constitutional protection under Gertz than nonmedia defendants); Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975) (media defendants
should receive greater constitutional protection from defamation liability than non-media defendants); Note, First Amendment Protection Against Libel Actions: Distinguishing Media and NonMedia Defendants, 47 S. CAt. L. REv. 902 (1974) (non-media defendants should be held to
a higher standard of care than the New York Times standard because media and non-media
defendants have different options and responsibilities).
151. For decisions refusing to apply Gertz to non-media defendants, see Rowe v. Metz, 195
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Several Illinois cases prior to Colson indicate that Illinois, like most other
states, has implicitly accepted the applicability of Gert:c. to non-media
defendants.'s 2 Colson lays to rest any doubt on the point. The publication
in Colson was completely unrelated to media channels; the defendant Stieg
was simply a supervisory state employee communicating orally to a
committee.'ll More importantly, the "context public figure concept" 1 s4
presupposes the substantial functional importance of many communications
within limited contexts, and even suggests that at times the media will have
less protection than a private person because the media may spread the
defamatory communication beyond the bounds of those who have a
legitimate, special interest in the speech, thus relegating the defendant to
the negligence minimum of Gertz. 1 ss Of prime importance, however, is the
fact that because Illinois does not distinguish between media and non-media
defendants in applying Gertz, conditional common law privileges anchored
in negligence become meaningless across the entire spectrum of Illinois
defamation law because they add nothing to the plaintiff's case that is not
already there. 1s6
To the extent that Colson requires a level of culpability above negligence
in order to overcome a common law privilege, its logic is sound, because
Colo. 424, 579 P.2d 83 (1978); Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 279 Or. 361,
568 P.2d 1359 (1977); Calero v. Del Chemical Corp., 68 Wis. 2d 487, 228 N.W.2d 737 (1975).
For decisions holding that Gertz standards do apply to non-media defendants, see Mathew
v. Tuscaloosa County, 421 So. 2d 98 (Ala. 1982); Bryan v. Brown, 339 So. 2d 577 (Ala. 1976);
Rogozinski v. Airstream by Angell, 152 N.J. Super. 133, 377 A.2d 807 (1977); Ryder Truck
Rentals v. Latham, 593 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). Most states that have considered
the question apply Gertz to non-media defendants. See Note, Mediaocracy & Mistrust, supra
note 150, at 1878 n.l2.
The leading discussion of the media/non-media defendant distinction is found in Jacron Sales
Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976), where the court dedared that it could
not "discern any persuasive basis for distinguishing media and non-media cases." /d. at 592,
350 A.2d at 695. The court noted that "issues of public interest may equally be discussed
in media and non-media contexts, and the need for a constitutional privilege, therefore, obtains in either case." /d.
152. See Stonecipher and Trager, supra note II, at 81-82. But see Tom Olesker's Exciting
World of Fashion, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 61 Ill. 2d 129, 137-38, 334 N.E.2d 160,
164 (1975), where the court stated emphatically:
[C)ases involving claimed defamations by credit reporting agencies can be readily
distinguished from those involving alleged defamations through so-called mass-media
publication. In claimed libels involving, for example, magazines, books, newspapers,
and radio and television programs, the publication has been for public attention
and knowledge and the person commented on, if only in his role as a member
of the public, has had access to such published information.
For a discussion of the special problems posed by credit reports, see supra note 188.
153. Colson, 89 Ill. 2d at 213-14, 433 N.E.2d 246, 249 (1982).
154. For a discussion of the "context public figure" concept, see infra text accompanying
note 198.
155. For a thoughtful discussion on the importance of the functional relationship between
the speaker, the audience to whom the speech is addressed, and the "target" of the speech
(the person being discussed), see Note, Mediaocracy & Mistrust, supra note 150, at 1886-95.
156. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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in the absence of some enhanced degree of fault beyond negligence, common law privileges lose all relevance after Gertz. Colson is also completely
defensible in its selection of the actual malice formulation-"knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard for the truth or falsity" -as the appropriate standard for modern common law privileges. All of the other possibilities-gross
negligence, professional malpractice, or old-fashioned common law "ill-will"
malice-in-fact-merely create confusion. ' 57
Where Colson flounders, however, is in the court's assumption that the
actual malice standard of fault is somehow inextricably linked to the New
York Times decision and the first amendment. It is not. "Actual malice"
is merely shorthand for a level of "knowing or reckless" fault that predated New York Times and is familiar across the tort landscape. ' 58 Illinois
is free to adopt the actual malice test as the appropriate standard for common law privileges without purporting to rest that adoption on federal constitutional requirements. As a corollary to that freedom, Illinois is also at
liberty to borrow from the first amendment theory espoused in Rosenbloom
v. Metromedia, Inc., and later rejected in Gertz, without treating that theory
as first amendment law.

2. The Need to Differentiate Between Constitutional
and Common Law Holdings
In borrowing from pre-Gertz first amendment theory, the Illinois Supreme
Court should have made it clear that it was acting solely in its capacity as
the final arbiter of the common Jaw of Illinois, and not resting its decision
on the dictates of federal constitutional Jaw as enunciated in Gertz. The
significance of this state Jaw basis is that if Colson is regarded by the Illinois Supreme Court as a decision compelled by the federal constitution
and grounded in the binding requirements of the first amendment, the decision is constitutionally erroneous, and could be reversed (if followed in a
subsequent case) by the United States Supreme Court. If, however, Colson
merely is grounded in theory borrowed from Rosenbloom and Farnsworth
in an attempt to interpret Illinois state law, it is insulated from evisceration
by subsequent United States Supreme Court decisions.
The most significant recent example of the perils of confusing state common Jaw and federal constitutional law in the context of New York Times
and its progeny came in the "human cannonball case," Zacchini v. ScrippsHoward Broadcasting Co.' 59 Zacchini involved an entertainment act in which
Hugo Zacchini was shot from a cannon into a net two hundred feet away.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 130-34.
158. In New York Times, the Supreme Court borrowed the knowing or reckless disregard
standard from a 1908 Kansas decision, Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908).
Prior to New York Times, all common law courts recognized sonie form of qualified privilege,
defeasible only by proof of malice, to criticize public officials in their public roles. See GREGORY,
supra note 150, at 1097 n.l. Some states extended the privilege to misstatements of fact as
well as opinion. See Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 CoLUM. L. REV.
875, 886-87 (1949).
159. 433 u.s. 562 (1977).
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Zacchini's act was filmed by a free-lance reporter after Zacchini had explicitly asked him not to do so. The film clip, lasting fifteen seconds and
including a favorable commentary, was broadcast on the local eleven o'clock
news that evening. The Ohio Supreme Court held that Ohio state tort law
recognized a "right of publicity" that protected the commercial value of
Zacchini's performance. 160 This state-created right, resembling an intellectual property interest, gave Zacchini the right to prevent his name, likeness,
or performance from being appropriated without his consent. 161 The
methodology employed by the court and the results of that approach proviqe strong lessons about the perils of the intrinsic ambiguities within the
Colson decision.
As in Colson, the Ohio court's holding intertwined first amendment and
common law concepts. The Ohio court placed its principal reliance on United
States Supreme Court opinions after New York Times, primarily Time, Inc.
v. Hill. 162 The Ohio court stated:
[S]ince the gravamen of the issue in this case is not whetht:r the degree
of intrusion is reasonable, but whether First Amendment principles require that the right of privacy give way to the right to be informed of
matters of public interest and concern, the concept of privilege seems the
more useful and appropriate one."'

Moreover, like the Colson court, the Ohio Supreme Court held that there
is "a privilege to report matters of legitimate public interest even though
such reports might intrude on matters otherwise private." 164 Yet, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. 165
Had the Ohio Supreme Court rested its decision explicitly on both state
and federal grounds, either of which would have been dispositive, the United
States Supreme Court would have had no jurisdiction to review the
decision. 166 The "independent and adequate state ground" doctrine precludes
Supreme Court review of a state court judgment, even if that state court
judgment erroneously interprets federal law, whenever the significance of
the error concerning federal law is obviated by a state law precept which
independently supports the judgment. 167 This lack of federal jurisdiction when
160. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 231-33, 351 N.E.2d
454, 459-60 (1976).
161. /d. The court refused, however, to grant Zacchini any relief from the television station.
162. 385 U.S. 374 (1967). For a discussion of Colson's reference to Time, Inc. v. Hill, see
supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
163. Zacchini, 47 Ohio St. 2d at 234 n.5, 351 N.E.2d at 461 n.5 (emphasis added).
164. !d. at 234, 351 N.E.2d at 461. For a similar statement by the Illinois Supreme Court,
see Colson, 89 Ill. 2d at 212, 433 N.E.2d at 249.
165. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
166. See, e.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945) (federal court review of state court
decision barred because an "independent and adequate state ground" existed to support the
state court's holding, regardless of whether or not the federal claim was erroneously decided).
167. See Wilson v. Loew's, Inc., 355 U.S. 597 (1958); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126-28
(1945); Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210-11 (1935); Enterprise Irrigation Dist. v.
Farmers Mut. Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157, 165-66 (1917); Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S.
45, 53 (1908); Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 636 (1875).
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an independent and adequate state ground exists stems from the Article III
principle that federal' courts may not render "advisory opinions"; 168 if "the
same judgment would be rendered by the state court after [the Supreme
Court] corrected its views of federal Jaws, [the] review could amount to
nothing more than an advisory opinion." 169
In reviewing the Ohio court decision, the United States Supreme Court
discussed the independent and adequate state ground issue and conceded that
there was "no doubt that petitioner's complaint was grounded in state Jaw
and that the right of publicity which petitioner was held to possess was a
right arising under Ohio Jaw." 170 The Court further admitted that the "source
of [the] privilege [on which the Ohio court relied] was not identified." ' 11
Nevertheless, the Court was convinced that a careful reading of the state
supreme court's opinion indicated that the decision rested on the Ohio court's
perceptions of federal constitutional law, and not on an interpretation of
Ohio law. The Court noted that the Ohio court's opinion was phrased in
terms of first amendment principles, cited first amendment cases, and failed
to mention the Ohio Constitution. 172 Far more critical to the fate of Colson, however, is the following statement made in Zacchini:
Even if the judgment in favor of respondent must nevertheless be
understood as ultimately resting on Ohio law, it appears that at the very
least the Ohio court felt compelled by what it understood to be ferjeral

constitutional considerations to construe and apply its own law in the manner it did."'

Due to its reliance on federal constitutional mandates, the Court held that
it had jurisdiction to decide the federal issue.' 74 Consequently, the United
States Supreme Court reversed the Ohio Supreme Court in Zacchini, as surely
as it also could have reversed the Illinois Supreme Court in Colson. Because
the liberal jurisprudence that influenced Colson is not synchronized with the
Burger Court's current retraction of first amendment defenses to
defamation, l7l it is imperative in light of Zacchini that decisions such as
168. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. at 126 (1945).
169. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 566 (quoting Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. at 125-26).
170. /d.
171. !d. at 568.
172. !d. "That the Ohio Court might have, but did not, invoke state law does not foreclose
jurisdiction." !d. For cases applying this principle, see Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.
Co., 323 U.S. 192, 197 n.l (1944); Indiana ex rei. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 98 (1938).
173. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 568 (emphasis added).
174. /d.
175. Until its decision in Gertz, the Supreme Court substantially extended the New York
Times standard beyond its original application to public officials. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154-55 (1967) (actual malice standard applicable to suits brought
by public figures). Gertz represented a definitive retraction of New York Times's extension with
its holding that private plaintiffs need only prove some degree of fault in order to recover
from the alleged defamer. Because New York Times was immersed in first amendment considerations, the rejection of its standard beyond public officials/public figure plaintiffs evinces
a restriction of first amendment considerations. The Court's holding in Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448 (1976), solidified the Burger Court's commitment to delimit first amendment prin-
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Colson clearly be grounded on state law bases.
3.

Supplying Colson with a Theory: The "Context Public Figure"

a.

Sharpening the Focus of the Colson Holding Through the Lens
of Common Law Conditional Privileges

Once the federal/state relationship within Colson is clarified, the ultimate
question still remains: even if it is recognized that it is proper to utilize actual malice as the governing standard for common law privileges, why should
a common law privilege be extended to cover statements made about a private
individual concerning matters of public interest? Although Troman v. Wood
did not foreclose such an extension, its rationale is antithetical to it. Can
Colson's implicit rejection of the Troman thesis and its return to the "spirit"
of Farnsworth be defended on the merits? The answer may depend on
whether the holding in Colson is construed narrowly or broadly. If the
holding in Colson is construed as limited to the particular facts involved
in that case, Colson easily can be defended. The court's extension of conditional protection to the comments made by a superior while evaluating a
subordinate's performance, is consistent with a number of the mainstream
conditional privileges that exist in the common law. These privileges fit easily
into the theory that undergirds Colson. They were created prior to New York
Times out of the common law's developing recognition that in certain recurring factual situations, free and open communication should transcend concern for reputation. 176 These traditional privileges, discussed below, are the
vehicles that Illinois courts should revitalize in implementing the Colson
mandate.

1. Self-Interest of the Speaker. -A conditional privilege exists to make
statements for the protection of one's own legitimate interests, such as
statements made to defend one's reputation in response to attack by an~ther,
or statements made in connection with the retrieval of stolen property or
in the course of collecting a bona fide debt. 177 The privilege is roughly
analogous to the common law privilege of self-defense from physical attack,
and the privilege to defend property. 178 Like these common law privileges,
the conditional defamation privilege to defend legitimate self-interest is traditionally regarded as lost if the speaker says more than is reasonably necessary
to defend his or her interest, or if the speaker publishes the speech beyond
ciples in defamation law, because the Court went to great lengths to classify Mrs. Firestone
as a private plaintiff, and thus to avoid the application of the actual malice standard. For
an analysis of Firestone, see infra notes 199-216 and accompanying text. The Court has subsequently reaffirmed its retraction of New York Times in decisions which narrowly construed
the public figure concept. See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Assoc., 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. Ill (1979). The Walston and Hutchinson cases are reviewed at infra
notes 217-54 and accompanying text. See also Note, Whither the Limited-Purpose Public Figure?,
8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 403, 423 (1980) ("[S]ince Gertz the Supreme Court has enhanced the protection of individual reputation by continually refining the public-figure category").
176. See Eaton, supra note 34, at 1359-64.
177. See PROSSER, supra note 4, § 115, at 786-87.
178. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 63, 68, 77-86 (1975).
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the circle of persons to whom the self-defensive action would be relevant. 179
For example, the privilege is lost if one complains to another that a third
party will not pay a debt, when the listener is in no position to render
legitimate assistance in obtaining payment. 180 Again, the analogy to the selfdefense and defense of property privileges is apt, because excessive publication is an exact parallel to the use of excessive force in self-defense of person and property.

2. Statements Made to Protect the Legitimate Interests of Others.-A conditional privilege exists to make statements for the protection of the legitimate
interests of another, particularly when the party whose interests are being
protected occupies such a close relationship to the speaker that the speaker
has a moral or legal obligation to render protection. 181 This privilege finds
a parallel in the common law privilege to use force to protect the safety
of another. 182 A wide variety of statements are covered by the privilege
including: a warning given to a woman that a prospective fiance is an
ex-convict; 183 a doctor's statements to protect a patient; 184 an attorney's
statements made on behalf of a client; 18 s an answer to a prospective
employer's inquiry concerning a person's fitness for employment; 186 statements
to a landlord that a tenant is undesirable; 187 or answers to a potential
creditor's inquiry about a person's credit standing. 188 As in the case of the
179. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 115, at 787.
180. !d.
181. See, e.g., Schlaf v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 15 Ill. App. 2d 195, 199, 145
N.E.2d 791, 793 (1st Dist. 1957) (a statement regarding the character of a former employee
made to a representative of the bonding company to which the former employee applied for
a fidelity bond, is made under a qualified privilege); Wuttke v. Ladanyi, 226 Ill. App. 402,
405 (2d Dist. 1922) (a statement made by an employer to a discharged employee and his representative in answer to the employee's demand for an explanation of the cause of his discharge,
is a qualified privilege); Ritchie v. Arnold, 79 Ill. App. 406, 408 (3d Dist. 1898) (a statement
made by a banker to a mercantile house regarding the solvency of a customer of the house,
whose promissory note had been sent to the banker for collection, is privileged); see also Eaton,
supra note 34, at 1361.
182. A privilege to defend another exists whenever defense of another is called for, or sanctioned. The standard used in determining whether the defense of another is sanctioned is the
commonly accepted standard of decent conduct. This privilege extends to the use of all reasonable
force which is necessary for such defenses, but does not extend to situations where unnecessary
force is used. Furthermore, the defender may do whatever the person attacked might do to
protect himself. PRossER, supra note 4, § 20, at 112-13.
183. ld. § 115, at 787.
184. !d. at 788.
185. !d.
186. Zeinfeld v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 41 Ill. 2d 345, 349,243 N.E.2d 217, 221 (1968).
187. PRossER, supra note 4, § 115, at 788.
188. There has long been division over the issue of whether credit reporting agencies deserve
a conditional privilege for credit report statements. See id. § 115, at 790; Smith, Conditional Privilege
for Mercantile Agencies, 14 COLUM. L. REv. 187 (1914); Note, Defamation and the Mercantile
Agency, 2 DEPAUL L. REv. 69 (1953); Note, Protecting the Subjects of Credit Reports, SO
YALE L.J. 1035, 1050-51 nn.85, 86 & 87 (1971). Both a Seventh Circuit decision applying Illinois
law and an Illinois Supreme Court decision have refused to apply an actual malice standard
to a credit report. Oberman v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 460 F.2d 1381, 1382-84 (7th Cir. 1972);
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conditional self-interest privilege, the conditional privilege to protect another's
interests is lost if the publication extends beyond that which is necessary
to effectuate the defense. 189

3. Common Interest Privilege.-A conditional privilege exists when the
speaker and recipient have common legitimate interests in a particular subject matter and the communication is made in furtherance of those interests. 190
The privilege is rooted in cases where there is a legal obligation to speak,
such as communications by officers or directors of a corporation to
stockholders. 191 It has been expanded to encompass a broad range of situations in which persons with common interests in organizations or enterprises
exchange information relevant to the conduct of that activity. 192 Discussion
Tom Olesker's Exciting World of Fashion, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 61 Ill. 2d 129,
137-38, 334 N.E.2d 160, 164 (1975). In each of these cases, Dun & Bradstreet argued that
the constitutional protection of New York Times should apply, and in both instances the argument was rejected. Under the analysis employed in this article, the pertinent question after
Colson is whether the "intentional or reckless disregard" standard now should be applied to
credit reports as a matter of state law. If such credit reports are to have a conditional privilege
that is at all beneficial to the agencies, then the actual malice standard must be applied in
order to distinguish these from the general run of defamation cases. It does not follow, however,
that every conditional privilege recognized by the common law before Gertz must continue
to be recognized after Gertz. If, as a matter of state policy, it is decided that a negligence
standard is the desirable standard for credit reports, then credit reports should be treated the
same as all other non-privileged speech after Gertz, and the "conditional privilege" that formerly
attached to them should be dropped. This places credit reports in precisely the same position
in which they have always been: under a negligence standard. It drops, however, the now
superfluous conditional privilege label. The 0/esker Fashion case is strong evidence that this
is what Illinois intends to do, because the court in that case flatly refused to apply the actual
malice test to a credit report on grounds that such reports are not sufficiently imbued with
public interest attributes to require it. /d. at 138, 334 N.E.2d at 164. The important lesson
to be drawn from the credit reporting cases is that the mere fact that a common law conditional privilege after Gertz must have some level of culpability greater than negligence to give
it any significance does not mean that all pre-Gertz conditional privileges deserve elevation
to the actual malice level. For an example of a post-Co/son decision in which the court refused
to so "elevate" a qualified privilege, see American Pet Motels v. Chicago Vet. Med. Ass'n,
106 Ill. App. 3d 626, 435 N.E.2d 1297 (1982).
189. Cook v. East Shore Newspapers, Inc., 327 Ill. App. 559, 64 N.E.2d 751 (4th Dist.
1945); PROSSER, supra note 4, § 115, at 789.
190. Judge v. Rockford Memorial Hosp., 17 Ill. App. 2d 365, 376-77, 150 N.E.2d 202, 208
(2d Dist. 1958); Cook v. East Shore Newspapers, Inc., 327 Ill. App. 559, 577-80, 64 N .E.2d
751, 759-60 (4th Dist. 1945); Anderson v. Maim, 198 Ill. App. 58, 62-63 (1st Dist. 1917); Everett
v. DeLong, 144 Ill. App. 496, 500-01 (1st Dist. 1908).
191. Eaton, supra note 34, at 1361.
192. E.g., Jamison v. Reberson, 21 Ill. App. 2d 364, 158 N.E.2d 82 (1st Dist. 1959) (local
union officers had qualified privilege to notify executive board of the international organization of charges of improper advances brought by female union members against plaintiff union
organizer); Judge v. Rockford Memorial Hosp., 17 Ill. App. 2d 365, 150 N.E.2d 202 (2d
Dist. 1958) (letter written by hospital official notifying nurse's professional registry that hospital
no longer wished to employ plaintiff nurse because of disappearance of narcotics while plaintiff was on duty was privileged communication); PROSSER, supra note 4, § 115, at 789-91 (conditional privilege recognized where publisher and recipient have common interest and communication is of type reasonably calculated to protect or further that interest if the matter communicated
pertains to the interest of the group).
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before a university personnel committee about the merits or demerits of a
candidate before the committee, as in Colson, falls squarely within the ambit of this privilege.

4. Communication to Those Who Act in the Public Interest.-The common law has long recognized a conditional privilege to communicate information to public officials relevant to the discharge of their official duties. 193
Complaints made to school boards about the fitness of teachers are among
the types of situations to which this privilege is applicable; 194 thus, statements
such as those made by Stieg would surely qualify under this privilege as
protected communication.
5. Fair Comment Privilege.- The "fair comment" privilege in its original
form insulated "opinion" rather than misstatements of fact, and was
technically not a privilege but rather a threshold means of classifying pure
opinion as beyond the pale of defamatory speech altogether. 19 s Chairman
Stieg's statements about Colson are on the periphery of "opinion"; although
a genuinely subjective evaluation of a colleague's teaching ability would
always qualify as mere "comment," Stieg may have gone beyond its coverage
by claiming the possession of information he could not divulge, 196 a statement that, if not true, would be a misstatement of fact rather than an
opinion.
In sum, if Colson is read narrowly and treated simply as an obtuse application of traditional common law conditional privileges, the application
of the actual malice standard in the case makes perfect sense, since, after
Gertz, common law privileges lose their force without a standard of fault
above negligence to sustain them. It is somewhat disingenuous to read Col193. E.g., Foltz v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 189 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1951) (defendant's
defamatory communication to FBI, causing plaintiff federal administrative officer to be discharged, would not be privileged if statement were made with actual malice); Pecue v. West,
233 N.Y. 316, 135 N.E. 515 (1922) (civil league superintendant's defamatory statement made
to district attorney regarding plaintiff's alleged "disorderly" house was made under qualified
privilege absent proof of actual malice).
194. E.g., Segall v. Piazza, 46 Misc. 2d 700, 260 N.Y.S.2d 543 (1965) (letter to school principal written by parent complaining of teacher's alleged physical mistreatment of student was
privileged); PROSSER, supra note 4, § 115, at 792 (complaints made to school administration
regarding character, conduct, or competence of teachers are qualifiedly privileged); cf Brubaker
v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 973 (7th Cir. 1974) (applying absolute privilege to statements
made about fitness of a school teacher during an open public executive session of a school
board meeting), clarified, 527 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1975); Johnson v. Board of Junior College
Dist. No. 508, 31 Ill. App. 3d 270, 334 N.E.2d 442 (1st Dist. 1975) (applying constitutional
actual malice standard to speech concerning teacher conduct on theory that teachers are public
ffgures within the school).
195. See Eaton, supra note 34, at 1363. The protection of pure opinion is not only nonactionable at common law, it is directly at the core of the New York Times-Gertz first amendment jurisprudence. As Justice Powell stated in Gertz, "Under the First Amendment there
is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem we depend for
its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas."
418 U.S. at 339-40.
196. Colson, 89 Ill. 2d at 208, 433 N.E.2d at 249.
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son so narrowly, however, because the language of the opinion clearly conveys an inclination to do far more than apply common law privileges. If
Colson's holding is stretched out to the broader parameters that the language
of the opinion itself suggests-that is, if it is understood as <!xtending a common law conditional privilege to any statement made by anyone so long
as the· statement implicates matters of public or general concern-defense
of the decision becomes more problematic. Such an extension would entail
substantial widening of the classic common law conditional privileges. It
would enlarge the "fair comment" privilege to encompass misstatements of
fact rather than of mere opinion. Additionally, it would simultaneously
enlarge the universe of subjects covered by the various "interest oriented"
privileges' 97 to such a degree that a far more general privilege to speak at
large about issues of "public or general importance" would effectively be
created.
b. Colson and the Idea of the "Context Public Figure"
An honest reading of the language of Colson indicates that the Illinois
Supreme Court is advocating adoption of some form of the second, broader
reading of the conditional common law privilege concept. Although this contemplated enlargement on common law privileges is sure to be controversial, we defend the general direction in which the Illinois Supreme Court
is moving. The task, however, is to construct a doctrinal basis for giving
this capacious new privilege more precise definition and shape. We suggest
a concept that we have labeled "the context public figure" as a device for
sharpening analysis concerning the scope of the expanded common law conditional privilege.
The "context public figure" idea proceeds on the notion that, for most
persons, speech concerning the neighborhoods, the workplaces, and other
institutions in which they operate daily is more immediatdy vital to their
lives than the speech that appears on the CBS Evening News, in the
Washington Post, or in Harper's Magazine. There are national marketplaces
of ideas and local marketplaces of ideas, and for most citizens, most of
the time, the local marketplaces are where "uninhibited, robust, and wideopen" discussion is most relevant. Though few people purposefully inject
themselves into the arena of national attention, many people inject themselves into events and controversies in the neighborhoods in which they
live, the schools their children attend, or the institutions in which they work.
An assistant professor at a law school is not likely to be a public figure
as defined in Gertz, and a Time magazine article about that assistant professor probably should not be covered by the actual malke standard, but
within the law school community that assistant professor is a "public

197. For example, privileges that shield misstatements of fact in communications made to
protect one's own interest, the interests of another, a common interest, or statements made
to public officials about matters of public concern are interest oriented privileges.
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figure." 198 Statements in a student newspaper attacking the professor for
poor teaching, bad scholarship, diffident public service, or arbitrary grading
deserve the special protection of the actual malice standard, just as statements
made within the faculty committee that reviews the assistant professor's application for tenure and promotion deserve actual malice coverage. Although
articulated in vague and confusing terms, Colson seems to espouse this notion of examination of speech "in context." If that notion can be clarified
as grounded in state rather than federal constitutional law, Colson can become
the basis for a coherent, well-balanced reconciliation between free speech
and reputational interests in Illinois. The first step in attempting such a construction, however, is to describe in greater detail the United States Supreme
Court's own refinements of the term "public figure" in the aftermath of
Gertz.

1. Time, Inc. v. Firestone.-If Gertz curtailed the public interest test
"explosion" that was proceeding apace after Rosenbloom, it was Time,
Inc. v. Firestone, 199 the first case that elaborated on the definition of Gertz's
public figure/private figure dichotomy, that brought the explosion to a halt.
Firestone involved a defamation action brought by Mary Alice Firestone,
wife of Russell Firestone, a scion of the wealthy Firestone family. In 1964
the Firestones became embroiled in a vigorously contested divorce proceeding
198. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Johnston, 448 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1971) (former professional
basketball player did not lose public figure status upon retiring from professional basketball
and working as a college basketball coach); Gallman v. Carnes, 254 Ark. 987, 497 S.W.2d
47 (1973) (treating assistant dean and professor at a law school as public figure); Reaves v.
Foster, 200 So.2d 453 (Miss. 1967) (school principal dubbed "Uncle Tom" by community club
pamphlet required to prove actual malice to recover); Grayson v. Curtis Publishing Co., 72
Wash. 2d 999, 436 P.2d 756 (1967) (college basketball coach considered public figure and could
not recover damages for false statement regarding his public conduct absent proof of actual
malice). A number of Illinois cases prior to Colson appeared to adopt such a "context public
figure" approach. See, e.g., Farnsworth v. Tribune Co., 43 Ill. 2d 286, 253 N.E.2d 456 (1969)
(no relief allowed to doctor called a "quack" by newspaper because public official status includes those whose qualifications for administering to health needs are a matter of public interest); Andreani v. Hansen, 80 Ill. App. 3d 726, 400 N.E.2d 769 (1st Dist. 1980) (real estate
developers accused of greed in publication's letter to editor section could not recover ab~nt
proof of actual malice because they need not actively seek publicity in order to be considered
in the "public eye"); Cassidy v. American Broadcasting Co., 60 Ill. App. 3d 831, 377 N.E.2d
126 (1st Dist. 1978) (undercover policeman unknowingly filmed during an on-duty investigation
of massage parlor not permitted recovery since he was acting in his official capacity); Korbar
v. Hite, 43 Ill. App. 3d 636, 357 N.E.2d 135 (1st Dist. 1976) (conditional privilege applied
against credit union president as public figure because the article, published in a union newspaper
by a member of the credit union, concerned a matter of general interest to members of the
union); Johnson v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 508, 31 III. App. 3d 270, 334 N.E.2d
442 (1st Dist. 1975) Uunior college professors prominent in controversy concerning books to
be used in classes were public figures within college community, thereby precluding recovery
from college newspaper absent proof of actual malice); Basarich v. Rodeghero, 24 Ill. App.
3d 889, 321 N.E.2d 739 (3d Dist. 1974) (high school coaches and teachers held to New York
Times standard because of their special prominence in the school community). For a further
discussion of these Illinois cases, see infra notes 282-99 and accompanying text.
199. 424 u.s. 448 (1976).
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in Palm Beach County, Florida. Mary Alice Firestone had filed a complaint
seeking separate maintenance, and Russell Firestone had counterclaimed for
divorce, on grounds of "extreme cruelty and adultery. " 200 The circuit court
granted the divorce, and included, in the final judgment, the following
language:
According to certain testimony in behalf of the defendant, extramarital
escapades of the plaintiff were bizarre and of an amatory nature which
would have made Dr. Freud's hair curl. Other testimony, in plaintiff's
behalf, would indicate that defendant was guilty of bounding from one
bed partner to another with the erotic zest of a satyr. The court is inclined
to discount much of this testimony as unreliable. Nevertheless, it is the
conclusion and finding of the court that neither party is domesticated,
within the meaning of that term as used by the Supreme Court of Florida ....
In the present case, it is abundantly clear from the evidence of marital
discord that neither of the parties has shown the least susceptibility to
domestication, and that the marriage should be dissolved. The premises
considered, it is thereupon ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. That the 'equities in this cause are with the defendant; that defendant's counterclaim for divorce be and the same is hereby granted, and
the bonds of matrimony which have heretofore existed between the
parties are hereby forever dissolved.
4. That the defendant shall pay unto the plaintiff the sum of $3,000
per month as alimony beginning January 1, 1968, and a like sum on
the first day of each and every month thereafter until the death or
remarriage of the plaintiff. . . . 20 '

Time's editorial staff, headquartered in New York, was alerted to the fact
that a judgment had been rendered in the Firestone divorce proceeding by
a wire service report and an account in a New York newspaper. 202 The staff
subsequently received further information regarding the Florida decision from
Time's Miami bureau chief and from a "stringer" working on a special
assignment basis in the Palm Beach area. 203 On the basis of these four
sources, Time's staff composed the following item, which appeared in the
magazine's "Milestones" section the following week:
DIVORCED. By Russell A. Firestone, Jr., 41, heir to the tire fortune:
Mary Alice Sullivan Firestone, 32, his third wife; a onetime Palm Beach
schoolteacher; on grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery; after six years
of marriage, one son; in West Palm Beach, Fla. The 17-month intermittent trial produced enough testimony of extramarital adventures on both
sides, said the judge, "to make Dr. Freud's hair curl.,, ••

Mary Alice Firestone sued Time for defamation and won a jury verdict
of $100,000, a decision that ultimately was affirmed by the Florida Supreme
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

/d.
/d.
!d.
!d.
/d.

at 450.
at 450-51.
at 448, 451.
at 452.
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Court. 205 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Time argued that
the actual malice standard should have applied because the Firestone divorce
was a "cause celebre," and Mary Alice Firestone was a "limited public figure"
with regard to the divorce proceedings. 206
The United States Supreme Court held that Mrs. Firestone was not a public
figure and that the defendant was not entitled to the protection of the New
York Times standard with regard to her claim. Mary Alice Firestone's prominence in what Justice Marshall depicted as "the sporting set" did not qualify
her as a person of "especial prominence in the affairs of society." 207 Even
though Mrs. Firestone initiated litigation in a public court of law, the Court
held that her action was hardly a purposeful insertion into a matter of public
controversy, since state law compelled her to resort to legal process in order
to obtain lawful release from the bonds of matrimony. 208 Furthermore, the
Court refused to extend New York Times protection to all reports of judicial
proceedings; even if narrowed to reports of what actually transpires in a
courtroom, application of the New York Times privilege would sweep too
broadly, because "the details of many, if not most, courtroom battles would
add almost nothing towards advancing the uninhibited debate on public issues
209
•••• "
Although the Court conceded that some participants in some litigation may be legitimate public figures, either generally or for the limited purpose of press coverage concerning the litigation, 210 the majority will resemble hapless Mary Alice Firestone, "drawn into a public forum largely against
their will in order to attempt to obtain the only redress available to them
or to defend themselves against actions brought by the State or by others." 2 "
The Firestone decision was not only a particularly dramatic narrowing of
the public figure concept, but it was also a severe dilution of the negligence
concept in Gertz, because the alleged libel of which Time was guilty involved
at best a trifling legalistic error. The trial judge had in fact stated that there
was testimony that both Firestones had engaged in frequent extramarital sex,
and that some of Mary Alice Firestone's alleged activity "would. have made
Dr. Freud's hair curl." 212 The only "falsehood" in the brief two-sentence
article was that the grounds of the divorce were "extreme cruelty and
adultery. " 213 The trial court actually made no formal finding of adultery,
205. Firestone v. Time, Inc., 305 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1974).
206. Time emphasized that Mrs. Firestone subscribed to a press clipping service that chronicled
her media exposure and that she held several press conferences during the divorce proceeding
in which she answered questions regarding the case. This evidence was offered to show that
Mrs. Firestone voluntarily injected herself into a matter of public interest, thereby making her
a limited public figure with regard to any statement on her divorce proceeding. Time, Inc.
v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 n.3 (1976).
207. /d. at 453.
208. /d. at 454.
209. /d. at 457.
210. /d.
211. /d.
212. See supra text accompanying note 201.
213. 424 U.S. at 450.
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even though adultery had been alleged in Russell Firestone's pleadings.
Rather, the trial court made no finding at all as to the grounds for the
decree. 214 The Florida Supreme Court concluded that the basis of the judgment was actually "lack of domestication of the parties," a ground not
pleaded and not theretofore recognized by Florida law. 215
What, then, could possibly have been negligent about Time's assumption,
an assumption that most qualified Florida lawyers probably would have made,
that the only pleaded grounds recognized by Florida law at the time of the
judgment-extreme cruelty and adultery-were in fact pleaded in the Firestone
case? The answer offered by the Florida Supreme Court, which the United
States Supreme Court was prepared to accept, was that Time had engaged
in "flagrant" "journalistic negligence" because it had not realized that adultery
could not possibly have been the basis of the decree, since Florida law prohibited an award of alimony to a wife found guilty of adultery, and
Mary Alice Firestone had been awarded alimony. 216 Not only is this a hyperlegalistic view of negligence, it is duplicitous; Time was found guilty of
negligence for not realizing that its interpretation of the judgment was inconsistent with then-existing Florida law, yet at the same moment Time was
not permitted to defend itself on grounds that any alternate interpretation
of the decree's basis (for example, "lack of domestication") also was inconsistent with then-existing Florida law. If one has any sense of fairness, this
double standard view of negligence can also make hair curl.
From the perspective of Illinois law, the Firestone decision dramatically
illustrates the divergent views taken by the United States Supreme Court
and the lllinois Supreme Court. If one combines Colson with its doctrinal
predecessor, Farnsworth, there is little room for doubt that if a married
couple, as famous in lllinois as were the Firestones in south Florida, became
involved in a bitter divorce in the Circuit Court of Cook County, resulting
in a legally ambiguous judgment, the Chicago Tribune or Chicago Sun- Times
could expect that as a matter of lllinois law an actual malic:e standard would
apply to news reports concerning the grounds for the judgment.

2. Wolston v. Reader's Digest.-Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association,
Inc., 217 involved a book written by John Barron and published by the
Reader's Digest Corporation entitled KGB, The Secret Work of Soviet Agents.
The book described Soviet espionage efforts since World War II. One segment chronicled a 1957-58 New York City grand jury investigation into
Soviet intelligence activities in the United States. Wolston was subpoenaed
by the grand jury after his aunt and uncle pled guilty to charges of
214. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
215. Lack of domestication was not one of the nine grounds for divorce under the Florida
divorce law governing this suit. "To grant a divorce on the ground of lack of domestication
would in effect create a tenth ground for divorce under Florida law and would be an improper
invasion of the legislative province." Firestone v. Firestone, 263 So. 2d 223, 225 (Fla. 1972).
·
216. 305 So. 2d at 178.
217. 443 u.s. 157 (1979).
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espionage. 218 After appearing before the grand jury on several occasions,
Wolston ignored a subpoena requiring him to appear before the grand jury
on July I, 1958 and subsequently pled guilty to a charge of criminal
contempt. 219 Wolston's episode with the grand jury investigation and his
subsequent conviction for criminal contempt resulted in fifteen newspaper articles in New York and Washington, D.C. 22° Furthermore, Wolston was mentioned in two publications concerning Soviet espionage activities prior to the
KGB book. In My Ten Years as a Counterspy, a former confederate of
Wolston's convicted uncle wrote that the uncle had identified Wolston as
a Soviet intelligence agent. 221 Also, Wolston was classified in an external
FBI report as among those "the F.B.I. investigation resulted in identifying as Soviet intelligence agents." 222
Sixteen years after the grand jury probe into Soviet intelligence activities,
Mr. Barron's book was published by the defendant. The KGB book listed
the plaintiff as being among a group of "Soviet agents identified in the United
States," and further stated that those in the list were "Soviet agents who
were convicted of espionage or falsifying information or perjury and/or contempt charges following espionage indictments, or who fled to the Soviet
bloc to avoid prosecution. " 223 Wolston sued Reader's Digest Corporation,
claiming that the charges made in the KGB book were false and defamatory.
The trial court, in a decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, held that Wolston was a "public figure" 224 and that the actual malice standard of New York Times therefore applied. 225 The trial court
found that although the book erroneously implied that Wolston had been
indicted for espionage, there was nonetheless "no genuine issue with respect
218. !d. at 161-62.
219. !d. at 162-63.
220. !d. at 163.
221. !d. at 163 n.6.
222. !d. (quoting S. Doc. No. 114, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 24, 26-27 (1960)).
223. !d. at 159.
224. 578 F.2d 427, 429-31 (D.C. Cir. 1978).. The district court found that Wolston was "a
public figure for the limited purpose of comment on his connection with, or involvement in
[Soviet] espionage in the 1940's and 1950's." 429 F. Supp. 167, 176 (D.D.C. 1977). In affirming this finding of Jaw, the appellate court declared:
By failing to appear before the grand jury Wolston invited public attention and
comment. Until that failure occurred he enjoyed obscurity in the wings, but subjecting himself to a citation for contempt he voluntarily stepped center front into the
spotlight focused on the investigation of Soviet espionage . . . . The reference to
him in KGB related strictly to those issues, without intruding into his personal life
or affairs.
578 F .2d at 431.
The court went on to note that although KGB was published 16 years after the grand
jury investigation into Soviet espionage, the issue of public impact raised by that investigation
"continue[d] to be a legitimate topic of debate today ... [because] [t]he mere lapse of time
is not decisive." !d.
225. !d. at 429.
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to the existence of actual malice" on the part of the defendants. 226
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that Walston was not
a public figure within the meaning of Gertz and that it was therefore wrong
to apply the actual malice standard to Walston's claim. 227 Walston, the Court
noted, was clearly not a "general public figure" under Gertz, because he
had achieved no general fame or notoriety and had assumed no role of special
prominence in the affairs of society as a result of his contempt citation or
his connection with the grand jury investigation into Soviet spy activity. 228
Moreover, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the lower courts' holdings
that Walston was a "limited public figure," 229 a concept articulated in
Gertz, 230 to whom the New York Times test would apply for the limited
purpose of comment on his connection to or involvement with the Soviet
espionage activities that precipitated the New York federal grand jury
inquiry. 231 Since Barron's book dealt only with Walston's link to the Soviet
espionage world, why should the actual malice test not shield Barron from
liability when that same linkage already had resulted in Walston's mention
in fifteen newspaper articles, one other book, and an official public FBI
report? 232 At the very least, it seems that Walston's refusal to appear before
the grand jury, and his subsequent plea of guilty to contempt charges,
qualified him as having involved himself purposefully in a matter of

226. In making his allegedly defamatory statements about Wolston, Barron relied upon an
FBI report. As the district court observed, Barron was justified in relying upon the FBI report
for several reasons. First, since the FBI is one of the best investigative agencies in the world,
its investigative skill and resources far exceed any that could possibly have been available to
Barron. Secondly, proof of the report's reliability and validity manifested itself when eight
of the ten individuals identified in the report as Soviet intelligence agents pled guilty and were
convicted of espionage, while the ninth was declared persona non grata and left the country.
Finally, the court noted that the research done by Barron while writing his book never revealed
any evidence that Wolston objected to the statements made about him in the FBI report. !d.
at 434.
227. 443 U.S. at 163-69.
228. ld. at 165.
229. !d. at 166.
230. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351-52 (1974). For a further discussion
of the limited public figure concept, see generally Comment, The Constitutional Law of
Defamation-Recent Developments and Suggested State Court Responses, 33 ME. L. REv. 371
(1981); Note, Whither the Limited Purpose Public Figure?, 8 HoFSTRA L. REV. 403 (1980);
Note, Libel-Creation and Resurrection of a Limited Purpose Public Figure as a Prerequisite
to the Application of the New York Times Actual Malice Standard, 8 N. KY. L. REv. 647
(1981); Note, Libel Becomes Viable: The Narrow Application of Limited Public Figure Status
in Current Defamation Law, 7 OHio N.U.L. REv. 125 (1980).
231. In the district court's opinion, Gertz developed two principal considerations that determine whether a person qualifies as a limited-issue public figure. First, the plaintiff must have
become involved in a public controversy. If he or she has not done so, the first amendment
interest at stake is insubstantial. Second, the plaintiff's involvement in the controversy must
have been in some sense voluntary as well as significant. 429 F. Supp. 167, 175 (D.C. 1977),
aff'd, 578 F.2d 427 (D.C. 1978), rev'd, 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
232. See supra notes 217-20 and accompanying text.
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legitimate public interest, thereby inviting attention and comment regarding
the espionage investigation.
The Supreme Court's refusal to accept this argument demonstrates its
drastically "limited" view of the "limited public figure." The Court heavily
emphasized the fact that Walston had been "dragged unwillingly" into the
controversy surrounding the KBG's presence in the United States, rather than
having "voluntarily thrust" or "injected himself into the forefront" of public
attention. 233 There was no "controversy" about espionage into which Walston
could have thrust himself, the Court noted, "because all responsible United
States citizens understandably were and are opposed to [espionage]." 234 This
is a facially spurious argument, because it would limit public figures to persons involved in public disputes, as opposed to persons involved in significant or dramatic public events. John Hinckley, Jr., for example, would not
qualify as a public figure merely for having shot President Ronald Reagan,
because the assassination attempt was not a matter of "public controversy,"
since "all responsible United States citizens understandably were· and are opposed to" presidential assassination. John Hinckley, Jr., would become a
public figure, however, after his acquittal on attempted murder charges by
reason of insanity, since the insanity defense is an issue over which Americans
are divided. This distinction is ludicrous. It rests on a hypertechnical construction of the term "controversy" and only treats debate as a matter of
first amendment concern, thereby eliminating a plethora of issues and events
such as crime and violence that are subjects of profound concern and for
which full first amendment protection is vital-whether or not "all responsible United States citizens" are opposed to them.
The Supreme Court's decision that Walston's involvement in the controversy (assuming one did exist) over Soviet espionage was totally "involuntary" is similarly flawed in its restrictiveness. It is true, of course, that
Walston did not intentionally invite the FBI and the grand jury to investigate
his connection with serious criminal activity. No one ever does. But how
can the fact that Walston did not "voluntarily thrust himself" before the
grand jury be a legitimate factor in the analysis? The whole point of Barron's book, of the newspaper stories about Walston, and of the grand jury
investigation, was that Walston and others like him were in some way implicated in spying against the United States on behalf of the Soviet Union.
Spies are supposed to be secretive and not invite attention to their surreptitious activity-that is what makes them spies. Under the Walston Court's
analysis, a good Soviet agent is entitled to better protection from media investigation than a bad one, because the good agent has not been caught.
Even when the official authority of the United States is brought to bear
on an alleged agent, that agent is entitled to private figure status in any

233. Walston, 443 U.S. at 166.
234. /d. at 166 n.S.
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media reports concerning the arrest or investigation because, prior to being
investigated, he or she (like any self-respecting spy) led a "private life."
The Wolston Court, however, specifically rejected the view that "any person who engages in criminal conduct automatically becomes a public figure
for purposes of comment on a limited range of issues relating to his
conviction. " 235 That rejection is wrong and short-sighted, since it equates,
in the context of crime, the Gertz requirement of "voluntariness" for limited
public figures as voluntariness in being caught and convicted rather than
voluntariness in committing the crime itself. Furthermore, Wolston voluntarily refused to appear before an extremely important and obviously "public"
body-a special federal grand jury-and he voluntarily pkd guilty and was
sentenced for that failure in a court of law, another obviously public
institution. 236 That Wolston did not wish these unhappy events upon himself
and did not seek media attention from them does not vitiate their substantial social importance, nor does it undercut the critical need for first amendment breathing space in response to them.
What seemed to bother the Supreme Court in Wo/ston was the fact that
Barron's book charged Wolston with being an "indicted" Soviet agent, when
in fact Wolston was a relatively minor figure in the 1957-58 Soviet espionage
investigation who was never indicted for the crime of espionage itself. 237 As
much as the author and the publisher emphasized the critical importance
of Soviet espionage as a public issue, the Supreme Court rejoined that it
was not the issue but the person that was dispositive, 238 and Wolston was
only a small player in the public events that transpired. Wolston was, in
the Court's view, plainly sympathetic-a person only tangentially related to
an investigation into Soviet espionage and an individual whose worst known
crime was contempt of court. The Court seemed to be moved by a notion
that the libel was disproportionate to "the crime." In effect, Wolston is
the Court's message that when an author embarks on a subject that can
be seriously defamatory (such as espionage), and "innocent" persons are
erroneously accused, the New York Times standard will not apply unless
the person defamed plays a major role in the subject matter and virtually

235. Id. at 168.
236. The Court was, however, consistent with its decision in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424
U.S. 448 (1976), in which it held that most litigants are "drawn into a public forum largely
against their will in order to obtain the only redress available to them or to defend themselves
against actions brought by the State or by others." 424 U.S. at 457. For an analysis and critique of the Firestone decision, see supra notes 199-216 and accompanying text.
237. 429 F. Supp. 167, 179 (1977). Although Barron's claim that Wolston was an indicted
Soviet spy was inaccurate, the district court concluded that Barron's reliance on an FBI report
for the source of the information was acceptable; he did not have to check the FBI's source(s)
for their accuracy.
238. The Court reiterated its rejection of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29,
44 (1971), a case that implied that the actual malice standard should extend to defamatory
falsehoods directed to any person if the statements relate to the issue of public importance.
See Walston, 443 U.S. at 167-68.
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"mounts a rostrum" to proclaim that role prior to drawing initial media
attention. 239 This message unfortunately puts the cart before the horse,
because it confuses the questions of ultimate liability under New York
Times-how "false" was the publication and was its falsity intended or was
it the product of recklessness-with the question of whether New York Times
should apply in the first instance. The Court's proportionality concept,
however, is sensible; in assessing the issue of recklessness (or negligence),
it is perfectly proper to require a greater burden of care as the gravity of
the harm increases. 240 The worse the accusation, the less cavalier the
reasonable person should be in making it. To insure that an accusation will
not be considered reckless, greater diligence in investigation may be required
239. See Walston, 443 U.S. at 169-70 (Biackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun, although
agreeing with the majority that Wolston was not a public figure within the context of the
immediate dispute, criticized the Court's construction of the "limited-issue public figure" class
of plaintiffs. Rather, Justice Blackmun asserted that "I believe that the lapse of the intervening
16 years renders consideration of the petititoner's original public-figure status unnecessary .
. . . " /d. at 170.
240. Under Judge Learned Hand's familiar Carroll Towing algebra, liability depends on whether
the burden sustained by the defendant in protecting against possible injury is less than the
potential injury caused by the defendant's action multiplied by the probability of the injury
occurring. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). Whatever standard one adopts on the continuum of fault-from negligence to recklessness to intentional
misconduct-ultimately some comparison of the gravity of the harm, discounted by its probability, to the burden of further precaution must be made. In the defamation context, an assessment of the publisher's burden of precaution should include the actual "cost" of further investigation about the truth of the allegations, as well as the "cost" of delaying the speech.
For example, some news items may be so "hot" that almost immediate publication without
careful verification is perfectly reasonable. In assessing the other side of the equation, the injury multiplied by its probability are factors that will be influenced heavily by the harmfulness
and the inherent plausibility of the accusation. There is a greater duty to investigate (thus increasing the burden) as the accusation becomes more damaging, and also, as the likelihood
of its truth decreases. The Supreme Court has held, however, that in applying the "recklessness" half of the New York Times standard, the mere failure to investigate a story
before publishing it when a reasonably prudent publisher would have so investigated it is not
recklessness for first amendment purposes. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968). Instead, there must "be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication." /d. at 731. Yet, the St.
Amant standard does not preclude traditional Carroll Towing-type assessments of fault in New
York Times cases. Rather, it utilizes precisely those traditional tort law variables that Judge
Hand identified. St. Amant simply made it clear that there must be a substantial imbalance
in the fault equation against the defendant publisher before his or her conduct will be labeled
"constitutionally reckless." Thus, the St. Amant Court noted that mere protestations by the
defendant that he or she subjectively believed a story was true do not insulate the defendant
from liability; the trier of fact must still find the protestations believable. /d. at 732.
The Coun noted that professions of good faith will not be persuasive when the story is fabricated
by the defendant, is a product of his imagination, or is based wholly on an unverified, anonymous
telephone call. /d. More importantly, the Court recognized that claims of subjective innocence
will not be convincing "when the publisher's allegations are so inherently improbable that only
a reckless man would have put them in circulation . . . [or] where there are obvious reasons
to doubt the veracity of the informant on the accuracy of his reports." /d. (emphasis added).
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before accusing someone of spying for a foreign power, rather than of being cruel to his cat. In applying the proportionality concept, however, the
status of the plaintiff as either a private person or a public figure must be
divorced from the calculation of fault; the Wolston Court's transparent skipping ahead to peek at the merits is indefensible.
Again, it is striking to contrast the United States Supreme Court and Illinois Supreme Court approaches. Certainly Doctor Farnsworth did not invite public scrutiny resulting in the newspaper investigation into her medical
practice; the fact that the muckraking efforts that led to the Chicago Tribune
article about her were unsolicited did not deter the Illinois Supreme Court
from deciding that an actual malice standard should apply. 241 Similarly,
"medical quackery" is not an issue about which reasonable Illinoisans
differ-everyone is against it-but that did not dissuade the Illinois court
from holding, and rightly so, that the exposure of dubious medical practices
is a matter of legitimate public interest. 242
3. Hutchinson v. Proxmire.-Hutchinson v. Proxmirew involved a suit
brought by Ronald Hutchinson, an adjunct professor at Western Michigan
University and the Director of Research at Kalamazoo State Mental Hospital
in Michigan, against William Proxmire, a United States senator from Wisconsin, and Proxmire's legislative aide. In 1975, Proxmire invented a mock prize
that he termed the "Golden Fleece of the Month Award." Acting as a sort
of self-appointed vigilante against wasteful federal spending, Proxmire
awarded the "Golden Fleece" to persons or agencies that he perceived as
being implicated in egregious episodes of wasteful or frivolous governmental spending. 244 In April, 1975, the Golden Fleece was awarded jointly to
the National Science Foundation, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Office of Naval Research for spending over $500,000
during a seven-year period to fund Dr. Hutchinson's research. 245 Hutchinson's research involved the study of patterns of emotional behavior of certain animals, such as the clenching of jaws by primates when exposed to
irritating or stressful stimuli. Proxmire ridiculed federal spending on such
research in a speech and press release that belittled Hutchinson's work:
The funding of this nonsense makes me almost angry enough to scream
and kick or even clench my jaws. It seems to me it is outrageous.
Dr. Hutchinson's studies should make the taxpayers as well as his
monkeys grind their teeth. In fact, the good doctor has made a fortune
from his monkeys and in the process made a monkey out of the American
taxpayer.
It is time for the Federal Government to get out of this "monkey
business." In view of the transparent worthlessness of Hutchinson's study
of jaw-grinding and biting by angry or hard-drinking monkeys, it is time

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Farnsworth v. Tribune Co., 43 Ill. 2d 286, 291, 253 N.E.2d 408, 411 (1969).
/d. at 291-92, 253 N.E.2d at 411.
443 U.S. Ill (1979).
/d. at 114.
/d.
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we put a stop to the bite Hutchinson and the bureaucrats who fund him
have been taking of the taxpayer. 246

If monkeys could study humans they might find the events fomented by
Proxmire's speech more interesting than anything human scientists have yet
learned about monkeys; the pompous pontifications and narrow-minded puns
of the senator were exceeded only by the lack of humor and thin skin of
the senator's victim. Legitimate doubts can be raised as to whether the law
of defamation was ever intended to facilitate the expenditure of substantial
social resources in the resolution of such an inane and petty dispute; the
case, nonetheless, reached the Supreme Court. Most of the Supreme Court's
opinion involved the determination that Proxmire was not absolutely shielded
from liability under the speech or debate clause of the United States
Constitution, 247 and is of no concern in understanding the implications of
the recent Illinois decisions on defamation law. The Supreme Court did,
however, deal secondarily with Proxmire's argument that he was entitled to
the benefit of the New York Times actual malice standard because Hutchinson was a "limited public figure" for the purpose of commentary on his
publicly funded research. 248 Hutchinson, after all, had voluntarily applied
for federal funds, and reports of his successes in obtaining federal grants
appeared in local newspapers and scientific journals. 249 Furthermore, Hutchinson was not without access to the media; some newspapers and wire
services reported Hutchinson's response to the Golden Fleece Award. 250
The Supreme Court found, however, that Hutchinson was not a public
figure within the narrowed meaning of that term after Firestone and Wolston.
Repeating the familiar bootstrap argument, 2Sl the Court noted that Proxmire could not turn Hutchinson into a public figure by virtue of Proxmire's
own allegations, because that would permit a defendant to create a public
figure defense through the defendant's own conduct. 252 Pointing to Walston's
emphasis on the term "public controversy" as limited to matters of public
debate, the Court noted that Hutchinson did not thrust himself into the public
eye "to influence others." 253 General concern about public expenditures, even
large ones, was not enough, in the Court's view, to activate the New York
Times test, because that would implicate the taboo of subject matter classification, and ignore the public figure/private figure compromise struck in
Gertz. 254 Hutchinson's significance lies in the decision's reaffirmation of the
Court's restricted interpretation of the public figure classification. As such,

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

121 CoNo. REC. 10,803 (1975) (quoted in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 433 U.S. at 116).
U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 6, cl. I; see 443 U.S. at 123-33.
See Hutchinson, 433 U.S. at 133-36.
/d. at 115 n.ll9.
!d. at 134.
For a discussion of the bootstrap argument, see supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
433 U.S. at 135-36.
/d.
ld.
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it represents a departure from the Illinois Supreme Court's liberal construction of what constitutes a public figure deserving of higher protection from
defamation plaintiffs.
c.

Transforming the Public Figure Concept in Illinois

The orthodoxy after New York Times was that many of the rules formerly applied to conditional (or qualified) privileges under the common law
had been preempted by the constitutional privilege recognized in New York
Times, 255 thereby rendering the conditional common law privilege doctrines
largely obsolete. 256 This orthodox vision, however, grew out of a period in
which the Supreme Court's jurisprudence was characterized by an expansion of first amendment protection for defamatory utterances at the expense
of reputational interests. Consequently, the perceived obsolescence of common law privileges was the product of a conviction that the New York Times
decision would inevitably expand privilege concepts beyond what the common law had ever contemplated .. Constitutional privilege was regarded as
the animated sphere of defamation law; it would be through the progressive
evolution of a public interest approach to the constitutional privilege that
free speech values would achieve fruition. In an almost nostalgic way, the
Illinois Supreme Court in Colson pays tribute to that once lively vision of
the New York Times case, noting that "[s)ince ... New York Times ...
a large area of the law concerning privileges has been taken over and altered
by first amendment constitutional considerations. " 257 Apparently oblivious
to cases such as Gertz, Firestone, Walston, and Proxmire, the Colson court
proclaimed that "[a]s a result, the scope of the privileges in the law of
defamation has been broadened beyond that within which they had previously
been recognized. " 258 It is telling that the court's authority for treating the
New York Times case as the harbinger of a new era of public interest
privileges was Dean Prosser's 1971 textbook, Handbook on the Law of
Torts, m a text written in the Rosenbloom era-well before the United States
Supreme Court rejected any public interest approach to defamation law in
Gertz, Firestone, Walston and Proxmire.
When the United States Supreme Court was "progressive" in emphasizing first amendment values over reputational values, it was true that the
constitutional jurisprudence spawned by New York Times had a liberalizing
effect on state defamation law. 260 Today, however, the Supreme Court is

255. For a discussion on the constitutional privilege enunciated in New York Times, see supra
note 12 and accompanying text.
256. See PROSSER, supra note 4, § 118, at 819.
257. Colson v. Stieg, 89 Ill. 2d 205, 209, 433 N.E.2d 195, 247-48 (1982).
258. /d. at 209, 433 N.E.2d at 248.
259. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 118, at 819.
260. One manifestation of this liberalizing effect was the application of actual malice or
gross negligence standards to private figure plaintiffs when the subject of the allegedly defamatory
statement is one of public concern. See, e.g., Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo.
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actively opposed to the enhancement of first amendment principles at the
expense of protection of reputation; indeed, the Court reacts against to any
hint of Rosenbloom's public interest concept in lower court opinions. 26 '
Nothing seems to hurt a defendant more in Supreme Court litigation than
an allusion to the fact that the allegedly defamatory speech involved a matter of "public interest"; the very mention of the phrase seems to conjure
up horrible memories of the heretical Rosenbloom era. Like a red flag
gyrating before a bull, the public interest theory provokes a head-long charge
by the Court to eliminate the applicability of the actual malice standard in
the case before it. 262
In response to the Court's recent defamation jurisprudence, several state
supreme courts, including the Illinois Supreme Court, are more solicitous
of free speech values than the Burger Court. They are more sensitive to
the recognition that valid assessments of a plaintiffs status as public or
private must necessarily take into consideration the context in which the
speech was uttered. 263 In an ironic turn of legal and cultural history, the
progeny of New York Times now acts as a stultifying force on the natural
evolution of the common law of defamation. As the Supreme Court becomes
even more niggardly in its constriction of the term "public figure," it
threatens to contract the scope of common law privileges below the level
at which they existed before the law of defamation became constitutionalized. For those states that never cared much for the New York Times decision in the first place, this retrogression is welcome; many state supreme
courts will be content to let their common law privileges implode in a sort
of lockstep movement with the Burger Court's constriction of the public
figure test created in Gertz. Illinois, however, is clearly not about to become
a participant in this rearward march. Colson is therefore best understood
as a confused and ambiguous, but nonetheless determined, effort by the Illinois Supreme Court to allow Illinois law to progress toward enhanced free
speech values in contradistinction to the Firestone, Walston and Proxmire
line of federal Supreme Court decisions.
What is critically important, however, is that both bench and bar in Illinois realize that this new movement is exclusively a movement of state law;
it may borrow from first amendment thinking of the Rosenbloom variety,
but it is independent of that line of thought. In short, it is a return to the
use of a case-by-case evolution of common law privileges, an evolution that
86, 96, 538 P.2d 450, 457 (1975) (actual malice); AAFCO Heating & Air Conditioning Co.
v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 162 Ind. App. 671, 679, 321 N.E.2d 580, 586 (1975) (actual
malice); LeBoeuf v. Times Picayune Publishing Corp., 327 So. 2d 430, 431 (La. Ct. App.
1976) (actual malice); Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N,Y.2d 196, 199, 341
N.E.2d 569, 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61, 64 (1975) (gross negligence).
261. For instance, in Walston the wrath of the Supreme Court fell upon the lower courts' public
interest analysis. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's complete rejection in Walston of
a public interest analysis for defamation law, .see supra notes 227-32 and accompanying text.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 207-11, 227-34, and 243-54.
263. See Developments in the Law, supra note 100, at 1404-06.
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had stopped in the interlude between New York Times and Gertz, but is
once again appropriate. If Colson is not so understood, whatever offspring
it spawns will be subject to the type of reversal that occurred in Ohio in
the Zacchini decision. 264 Therefore, contrary to what was said in Colson about
the relationship between the common law and the first amendment, 26 ' today, at least in Illinois, it is the common law privilege concepts that supply
the leading edge, leaving the United States Supreme Court's post-Gertz, first
amendment cases largely irrelevant.
The Illinois Supreme Court's rethinking of the public figure concept in
Colson entailed two elaborations on ideas contained in Gertz, one involving
a normative judgment about the types of persons who may be properly held
to have assumed the risk of heightened public scrutiny, and the other a more
pragmatic judgment concerning the types of persons best equipped to counter
defamatory statements through their own rebuttals. Colson transformed these
two concepts in a manner that made them more applicable to the communications of everyday life.
The first rationale that the United States Supreme Court utilized to support its decision in Gertz, and the rationale that was reemphasized in
Firestone, Wolston, and Proxmire, was the normative judgment that he who
seeks fame must accept some of its slings and arrows. 266 There is a certain
traditional justice to forcing those who voluntarily enter the public arena
to accept heightened public scrutiny and the greater risk of reputational attack as quid pro quo. 267 National or local political controversies are by no
means the only significant arenas in life, however, and most Americans constantly inject themselves into controversies that intimately affect their daily
lives. Workplaces, schools and churches are among the myriad institutions
in which disputes constantly arise, and the ordinary citizen is frequently involved voluntarily in expressing views involving both fact and opinion within
the context of those institutions. Consequently, Colson implicitly recognizes
that robust exchanges of information are vital to the functioning of such
institutions, and that it is equitable to force those who participate in such
institutional controversies to be subject to the enhanced risk of defamation
by others within the context of that voluntary action-as long as the "audience'' to which the defamatory speech is aimed also is limited to the same
contextual setting. 268 This is the essence of Colson's "context public figure"
concept.
264. For an analysis of the Supreme Court's reversal of the Ohio Supreme Court's decision
in Zucchini on grounds that the federal constitution was not violated by the televising of Zacchini's act, see supra notes 170-75 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 29-49 and accompanying text.
266. As the Court stated in Gertz, "the communications media is entitled to act on the
assumption that public officials and public figures have voluntarily expost:d themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood concerning them." Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
267. Cf Gertz, id. at 344 ("An individual who decides to seek governmental office must
accept certain necessary consequences of that involvement in public affairs.").
268. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
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The second of the two primary analytical props for Gertz was the supposition that public officials and public figures enjoy a greater access to channels of communication than do ordinary citizens. 269 Because public officials
and public figures have a more realistic opportunity to parlay their fame
into media access, they are more likely to be able to engage in "self-help"
by countering the defamatory speech with their own speech, published through
the same media channels as the original falsehood. 270 The "context public
figure" concept as developed in Colson accepts this analytical prop of Gertz,
but adjusts it to fit the realities of a more localized information market.
Assistant Professor Colson, the court noted, had ample opportunity to present his own case before the very persons to whom the allegedly defamatory
remarks were spoken. 271 Whatever effect Stieg's remarks may have had on
those charged with evaluating Colson's career, the remarks were not made
in a vacuum; Colson could offer his own counterspeech as well as appeal
the initial decision of the department's personnel committee to a universitywide forum. 272
There is an unspoken interplay in Colson between Colson's opportunity
to meet the impact of the allegedly defamatory remarks and the doctrines
of procedural due process that constrain the decision of a state university
not to grant an assistant professor tenure and promotion. Under the Supreme
Court's landmark decisions in Board of Regents v. Roth 273 and Perry v.
Sinderman, 214 a nontenured professor at a state university is not entitled
to any federal due process protection by university tenure and promotion
committees unless the professor can demonstrate a state-created entitlement
to continued employment. 275 Without engaging in an elaborate review of the

269. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. Ironically, the Gertz Court noted that "the law of defamation
is rooted in our experience that the truth rarely catches up with a lie." !d. at 344 n.9.
270. ld. at 344.
271. Colson v. Stieg, 89 Ill. 2d at 205, 214, 433 N.E.2d 195, 249 (1982).
272. ld.; cf. American Pet Motels v. Chicago Vet. Medical Ass'n, 106 Ill. App. 3d 626,
435 N.E.2d 1297 (1st Dist. 1982). In an action by a pet boarding service and one of its officers
against a veterinarian and a veterinary clinic for libel and slander, the defendants were protected by a qualified privilege because they had a legitimate interest in the allegations of
unauthorized veterinary practices; it was their duty to report such unauthorized veterinary practices; the statements were made to a limited group of recipients; and good faith was shown.
273. 408 u.s. 564 (1972).
274. 408 u.s. 593 (1972).
275. Roth, 408 U.S. at 576; see also Perry, 408 U.S. at 593; cf. Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S.
438 (1979) (attorneys deprived of no liberty or property interest when not permitted to repre- ·
sei1t defendants in an Ohio criminal prosecution, since there was no state or federal law
establishing such an interest); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976) (due process clause
did not require hearing regarding prisoner's transfer to another institution since prisoner had
no justifiable expectation that he would not be transferred unless found guilty of misconduct);
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (police officer not deprived of a property or liberty
interest when denied pretermination hearing and explanation for discharge); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (federal employee deprived of no property or liberty interest although
denied full adversary hearing before his dismissal).

1983]

FUTURE OF DEFAMATION IN ILLINOIS

269

gloss that Board of Regents v. Roth has assumed, 276 one can safely say that
the state of Illinois provided Colson with all (and probably more) of the
procedural due process to which he was entitled under the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Roth and its progeny. 277 Since the heart of Colson's defamation claim was that he was injured professionally by Stieg's
remarks, it would be anomalous if Colson could force Northern Illinois
University, through a defamation action, to abide by a higher standard of
accuracy in reaching personnel decisions about nontenured faculty than the
university would otherwise be subject to under mainstream doctrines of constitutional and administrative law. 278 Doctrines of procedural due process
and defamation would be working at cross-purposes if a state university's
supervisory personnel could be in full compliance with state and federal procedural due process dictates in evaluating teachers for tenure and yet still
be subject to a tort suit for defamation arising from th'e same conduct,
without the benefit of any conditional privilege in the tort suit. Colson,
therefore, embodies a sort of first amendment due process concept engrafted
onto the common law of Illinois; it treats the conditional privilege concept
as triggered, to a large degree, by the existence of built-in channels for
counterspeech within the context of the environment that spawned the
defamatory statements. 279
Intimately tied into this counterspeech, self-help notion in Colson is the
caveat that its conditional privilege is itself conditioned on restraining the
publication of the speech to the "localized market" within which the speech
is of vital interest. Thus, the Colson court indicated that "[i]f the defendant
in our case would have published the statement in question to the public
in general, it is possible that the plaintiff would not have had sufficient ac276. For a detailed review of Roth and its implications, see Smolla, The Reemergence of
the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law: The Price of Protesting Too Much, 35
STAN. L. REv. 69 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Smolla).
277. For a discussion of procedural due process in a Roth-type context, see 2 K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 350-51 (1979); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 480-97 (1978); Glennon, Constitutional Liberty and Property:
Federal Common Law and Section 1983, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 355 (1978); Grey, Procedural
Fairness and Substantive Rights, in DuE PRocEss, NoMos XVIII 182 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977); Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, in
DUE PROCESS, NoMOS XVlll 126 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977); Monaghan, Of "Liberty"
and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REv. 405 (1977); Pincoffs, Due Process, Fraternity, and
the Kantian Injunction, in DUE PROCESS, NoMos XVIII 172 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds.
1977); Smolla, supra note 276; Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestions for the Revival of
Substantive Due Process, 1975 SUP. CT. REv. 261; Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property":
Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 445 (1977).
278. For a discussion of the relationship between the existence of state tort remedies and
federal due process requirements, see Smolla, The Displacement of Federal Due Process Claims
by State Tort Remedies: Parratt v. Taylor and Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 1982 U. ILL.
L. REV. 831 (1983).
279. This aspect of Colson was emphasized heavily in an early appellate court decision applying Colson. See American Pet Motels v. Chicago Vet. Medical Ass'n, 106 Ill. App. 3d
626, 631-32, 435 N.E.2d 1297, 1301 (lst Dist. 1982).
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cess to the channels of communication to overcome or offset the damaging
effect of defendant's statement." 280 Although the court did not state explicitly that such an excessive publication would constitute sufficient abuse
of the qualified privilege, it strongly intimated that such would be the case. 281
This context public figure approach taken in Colson is not a concept unique
to that decision alone. In addition to the obvious influences of Farnsworth, 282
a number of prior state appellate court decisions had interpreted Illinois common law in a manner consistent with Colson. For example, in Korbar v.
Hite, 283 the defendant wrote an article published in the Aluminum Workers
News that implied that the plaintiff, president of the Employees' Credit
Union, was incompetent and proclaimed that "he could care less" about
the steel and aluminum workers' problems. 284 The court held that the
statements were protected by the New York TimeS actual · malice standard
because within the contours of the credit union's activities, the plaintiff was
a public figure. Looking to the nature and extent of the plaintiff's involvement in the controversy that gave rise to the alleged defamation, the court
noted that the plaintiff had thrust himself into the forefront of the dispute
by virtue of running for and being elected president of the credit union. 285
In so doing, the court found that he invited attention and comment within
the institutional parameters in which the credit union operated. 286 Consequently, the court held that the plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted
with actual malice in writing the allegedly defamatory article.
Korbar is a sound opinion, because it is grounded in the common sense
notion that proper conduct by the president of the workers' credit union
is probably more critical to the average aluminum worker's daily livelihood
and happiness than is proper conduct by the president of the United States.
Just as importantly, the Aluminum Workers News is likely to be a far more
significant informational source and forum for debate to that aluminum
worker than is the New York Times. Unless the actual malice standard is
intended to be an elitist standard shielding only the national corporate press,
it seems obvious that to many hardworking people, localized trade or labor
280. 89 Ill. 2d at 214, 433 N.E.2d at 250.
281. The Colson court stated:
We make no assessment of the propriety of the use of the New York Times privilege
[when the statement's publication is excessive] in such a situation. However, given
the narrow extent of the publication in this case and the fact that the plaintiff
had an opportunity for input to the committee and through appeal to have its decision reviewed by the University Council Personnel Committee, the reasoning of
Gertz, Wolston and Hutchinson does not preclude applying the New York Times
privilege in this case.
/d.
282. Farnsworth v. Tribune Co., 43 Ill. 2d 286, 253 N.E.2d 408 (1969); see supra notes
53-74 and accompanying text.
283. 43 Ill. App. 3d 636, 357 N.E.2d 135 (1st Dist. 1976).
284. /d. at 638, 357 N.E.2d at 136-37.
285. Id. at 641-42, 357 N.E.2d at 138-39.
286. /d. at 642, 357 N.E.2d at 139.
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publications have just as strong a claim to first amendment protection as
the Wall Street Journal or the Washington Post. ·"Uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open" debate concerning mismanagement of a small town credit union
is as important to most Americans as debate about mismanagement of the
Federal Reserve Board. There are many people who voluntarily enter
arenas of prominence in local communities and institutions-and those who
enter them legitimately can be asked to accept the consequences of the attention they invite. Those who enter such decentralized "mini-public arenas"
and thereby achieve some special prominence should be deemed public figures
as long as the criticizing speech is limited to the boundaries of the arena.
Another Illinois appellate decision prior to Colson that employed a context public figure approach is Johnson v. Board of Junior College District
No. 508. 287 In Johnson, the defendants had allowed some students to publish
a document that accused two teachers of breaking a booklist agreement
entered into between the students and the teachers. The teachers sued the
Board of Education, its members, and certain administrators and teachers
of the college as publishers responsible for the alleged defamation. 288 The
appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, holding that the
plaintiffs were public figures subject to the New York Times actual malice
privilege. 289 Though the teachers obviously were not public figures for all
purposes, the court held that they had become public figures within the junior
college community by their active participation in the controversy concerning the books to be used in university classes. 290
The public interest concept has also permeated false light, invasion of
privacy actions in Illinois. 291 In Adreani v. Hansen, 292 a municipality's park
287. 31 Ill. App. 3d 270, 334 N.E.2d 442 (1st Dist. 1975).
288. !d. at 276, 334 N.E.2d at 447.
289. 31 Ill. App. 3d 270, 334 N.E.2d 442.
290. A case similar to Johnson is Basarich v. Rodeghero, 24 Ill. App. 3d 889, 321 N.E.2d
739 (3d Dist. 1974), in which the plaintiffs were public high school teachers and athletic coaches.
The court held that the plaintiffs were public figures when considered within the context of
the high school and the surrounding community. "Public school teachers and coaches, and
the conduct of such teachers and coaches and their policies," the court stated, "are of as
much concern to the co~ unity as are other 'public officials' and 'public figures.' " /d. at
892-93, 321 N.E.2d at 742.
291. Illinois courts recognize invasion of privacy as a legitimate cause of action under the
state's common law. See Leopold v. Levin, 45 Ill. 2d 434, 440, 259 N.E.2d 250, 254 (1970);
Eick v. Park Dog Food Co., 347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1st Dist. 1952). Prosser
classified invasion of privacy actions into a now classic four-part scheme: (I) unreasonable
intrusion upon the seclusion of another; (2) appropriation of another's name or likeness; (3)
public disclosure of private facts; and (4) placing another in a false light in the public eye.
PROSSER, supra note 4, § 117, at 804-14. For cases recognizing Prosser's classification of privacy
actions under Illinois law, see Cantrell v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 529 F. Supp.
746, 756 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Midwest Glass Co. v. Stanford Dev. Co., 34 Ill. App. 3d 130, 133,
339 N.E.2d 274, 277 (1st Dist. 1975).
False light invasion of privacy is the most nebulous form of invasion of privacy. According
to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, it consists of placing someone in a "'false light" before
the public in a manner that "would be highly offensive to a reasonable person." RESTATEMENT

272

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:219

district sought to acquire land from certain real estate developers. No agreement could be reached on the fair market value of the property, so condemnation proceedings were instituted. A letter, published in the editorial section of the local newspaper, expressed disgrace at seeing the village go to
court on account of the developers' greed. 293 The real estate developers sued
the writer, alleging that the article invaded their right of privacy. 294 In affirm(SECOND) OF ToRTS § 652E (1977). Since its inception, the false light theory has had an uneasy
relation to the tort of defamation. As Prosser points out, since by definition all actionable
(untrue) defamatory speech puts plaintiffs in a "false light," the false light tort is arguably
"capable of swallowing up and engulfing the whole law of defamation." PRossER, supra note
4, § 117, at 813; see also Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REv.
1093 (1962) (discussing the relationship between false light invasion of privacy and defamation).
The only analytical difference between false light and defamation is that false light speech
need not be defamatory-that is, injurious to reputation-in order to be actionable. To establish
the tort of false'light, the plaintiff only has to establish that the speech is "highly offensive."
For instance, the speech might include praiseworthy, but nonetheless false, statements about
someone; therefore, the speech may be objectionable to a reasonable person and therefore actionable under the false light theory. (In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), the only
false light case to reach the United States Supreme Court, members of the Hill family, who
were held hostage in their own home, were depicted by a magazine article as more heroic and
aggressive than they were in fact.) The relationship between false light and defamation is explained more fully in a comment to the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
Relation to defamation. The interest protected by this Section is the interest of
the individual in not being made to appear before the public in an objectionable
false light or false position, or in other words, otherwise than as he is. In many
cases to which the rule stated here applies, the publicity given to the plaintiff is
defamatory, so that he would have an action for libel or slander under the rules
stated in Chapter 24. In such a case the action for invasion of privacy will afford
an alternative or additional remedy, and the plaintiff can proceed upon either theory,
or both, although he can have but one recovery for a single instance of publicity.
It is not, however, necessary to the action for invasion of privacy that the plaintiff
be defamed. It is enough that he is given unreasonable and highly objectionable
publicity that attributes to him characteristics, conduct or beliefs that are false,
and so is placed before the public in a false position. When this is the case and
the matter attributed to the plaintiff is not defamatory, the rule here stated affords
a different remedy, not available in an action for defamation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652E comment b (1975). Due to the fact that false light
and defamation are often duplicative, it is extremely important that in cases in which the two
causes of action are interchangeable, plaintiffs not be permitted to avoid the matrix of constitutional and common law defenses that circumscribe defamation actions merely by labeling
the action "false light." For example, the full range of constitutional and common law defenses
now applicable to defamation actions in Illinois under the twin mandates of Gertz and Colson
should apply to false light actions with undiminished force. Thus far, Illinois courts have been
aware of this problem and generally have applied the type of public interest approach used
in Colson to invasion of privacy actions. See, e.g., Adreani v. Hansen, 80 Ill. App. 3d 726,
400 N.E.2d 679 (1st Dist. 1980); Eick v. Park Dog Food Co., 347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d
742 (1st Dist. 1952); see also Cantrell v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 529 F. Supp.
746, 758 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (applying Gertz to false light action).
292. 80 Ill. App. 3d 726, 400 N.E.2d 679 (lst Dist. 1980).
293. /d. at 727, 400 N.E.2d at 681.
294. The plaintiffs claimed that, in addition to being defamatory, the article falsely depicted
them as "ruthless businessmen who were attempting to secure undue sums of money from
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ing the trial court's dismissal of the false light count, the appellate court
found that the defendants had no cognizable privacy interest relative to matters concerning the condemnation dispute. m The court stated that although
the developers did not seek publicity actively, their negotiations with the
park district and the local notoriety that those negotiations assumed made
the developers public figures for the purpose of comment on the land acquisition dispute. 296
Another case that seems to demonstrate adherence to the public interest
concept in privacy actions is Cassidy v. American Broadcasting Co., 297 which
involved a suit brought by an undercover policeman who was surreptitiously
filmed while in a massage parlor by Channel Seven News in Chicago. In
affirming the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the
court held that the broadcasters were entitled to the actual malice standard
because the policeman was discharging a public duty. 298 The court held that
while engaged in gathering and disseminating news concerning an official's
discharge of his public duties, the press is protected under New York Times
from privacy actions as well as libel actions. 299
It must be emphasized that the context public figure concept should not
be limited to speech within specific communities or institutions, but instead
should be defined as extending to any definable specializ.ed forum for discus-

the public." /d. at 730, 400 N.E.2d at 683. Thus, the plaintiffs alleged that this false light
unduly invaded their privacy interests.
295. /d.
296. /d. at 726, 400 N.E.2d 679.
297. 60 Ill. App. 3d 831, 377 N.E.2d 126 (1979).
298. /d. at 838, 377 N.E.2d at 131. The court reasoned that the public has a legitimate
interest in monitoring the conduct of a policeman while on duty because law enforcement is
a primary function of local government. /d. Since an on-duty policeman is not a private citizen
but rather a public official discharging a public duty, no right of privacy against intrusion
can be said to exist with reference to the gathering and dissemination of news concerning the
discharge of those public duties. /d. at 837-39, 377 N.E.2d at 131-32. For similar reasoning,
see Coursey v. Greater Niles Township Publishing Corp., 40 Ill. 2d 257, 264-65, 239 N.E.2d
837, 841 (1968).
299. 60 Ill. App. 3d at 837-38, 377 N.E.2d at 130-31. Cassidy is an interesting lllinois counterpoint to the Supreme Court's Wolston decision, in which alleged involvement in surreptitious
anti-social behavior (spying for a foreign power), which was reported by a newsman, did not
trigger the New York Times rule. In combination, the two decisions create the anomalous possibility that a person engaged in secretive illegal activity-a mafia figure, drug smuggler, or Soviet
spy-only would have to prove negligence in an action for defamation or false light invasion
of privacy, while the undercover government agent working in secret opposition to that person
would have to prove New York Times malice. The following hypothetical illustrates the potentially absurd results of this approach. A concealed "action news mini-cam" films what appears
to be a cocaine sale on a streetcorner, and the film is shown with commentary accusing the
two principles of criminal activity. Unbeknownst to the broadcaster, the would-be seller is actually an undercover DEA agent trying to penetrate the higher levels of cocaine trafficking,
and the other party is an underworld drug dealer. If the story ultimately turned out to be
false and possibly defamatory (perhaps there was no drug deal actually made or discussed on
that day), the underworld figure would have a much stronger privacy or defamation action
than the agent, who would be encumbered by the New York Times barrier.
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sion or debate about particular activities or issues. 300 Just as antitrust cases
often involve localized markets and submarkets for the purpose of determining anti-competitive effects, the public figure defense should involve a
definition of the "marketplace of ideas" within which a particular person
may validly be labeled a public figure. For example, when a context public
figure approach was utilized by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in Time, Inc. v. Johnston, 30 ' the sport of professional basketball formed the relevant "marketplace of ideas." Sports Illustrated published
an article which quoted Boston Celtic coach Red Auerbach as saying that
his star center, Bill Russell, had "destroyed" the career of Neil Johnston
with his great ability to block opponents' shots. 302 In a libel action brought
by Johnston, the court held that, despite the fact that Johnston had retired
from professional basketball nine years prior to the publication of Auerbach's interview, he was a public figure for the limited purpose of ongoing
discussion of his life as a professional basketball player. 303 The court stated
that the "mere passage of time will not necessarily insulate from the application of New York Times v. Sullivan publication[s] relating to the past
public conduct of a then 'public figure' " if legitimate public interest still
existed concerning his prior public life. 304 Johnston's public figure status for
the purposes of comment on his career as a professional basketball player
remained undiminished. 305
In sum, Colson v. Stieg represents the possible beginnings of a flexible
approach toward determining the public figure status of a defamation plaintiff in Illinois. Rather than examine the societal status of the plaintiff
in the abstract, Colson invites a more finely tuned assessment of the functional relationship between the speaker, the listener, the person allegedly
defamed, and the content of the speech itself. If understood as an injection
of liberal first amendment jurisprudence into the ongoing development of
Illinois state law, Colson's context public figure approach is a sensible accommodation of reputational and free expression interests.

III.

CHAPSKI

v. COPLEY PRESS: REJECTION OR REAFFIRMATION

oF THE INNOCENT CoNSTRUCTION RuLE?

A.

The Development of the Innocent Construction Rule in I/linois

In Chapski v. Copley Press, Inc./ 06 the Illinois Supreme Court purportedly
"modified" the innocent construction rule, 307 a rule of interpretation that
300. See supra notes 217-42 and accompanying text.
301. 448 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1971).
302. /d. at 379. Johnston was an exceptional professional basketball player who played for
the Philadelphia Warriors. After he retired, he accepted a position as an assistant basketball
coach at Wake Forest University in North Carolina. /d.
303. /d. at 380-81.
304. /d. at 381-82.
305. /d. at 382-85.
306. 92 Ill. 2d 344, 442 N.E.2d 195 (1982).
307. /d. at 351-52, 442 N.E.2d at 198-99.
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defines defamatory language in a given situation. The rule had been the object of judicial confusion 308 and repeated criticism. 309 In order to assess the
impact of Chapski on the innocent construction rule, a review of the development of the rule in Illinois prior to Chapski is essential.
1.

John v. Tribune Co.

The innocent construction rule originated as obiter dictum in John v.
Tribune Co. 310 In John, Eve Spiro John brought a libel suit against the
Tribune Company predicated on a newspaper article that reported the results
of a police raid in her apartment building. The article stated that Dorothy
Clark, also known as "Dolores Reising, 57, alias Eve Spiro and Eve John,"
a former girlfriend of the notorious gangster Tony Accardo, had been arrested for "being keeper of a disorderly house and selling liquor without
a license." 3 " The plaintiff, Eve John, whose maiden name was Eve Spiro,
lived in an apartment below that of the woman who had in fact been ar-

308. See, e.g., Rasky v. CBS, Inc., 103 Ill. App. 3d 577, 431 N.E.2d 1055 (1st Dist. 1981)
(suit dismissed because reference to plaintiff as "slumlord" was capable of innocent construction and did not impugn plaintiff's professional fitness as lawyer and real estate operator);
Newell v. Field Enters., Inc., 91 Ill. App. 3d 735, 415 N.E.2d 434 (1st Dist. 1980) (newspaper
article stating that the plaintiff chose to save a parrot rather than a woman from a fire lowered
community respect for plaintiff and hence was not subject to an innocent interpretation); Garber
Pierre Food Prods., Inc. v. Crooks, 78 Ill. App. 3d 356, 397 N.E.2d 211 (1st Dist. 1979)
(attorney's letter accusing nursing home food supplier of "blackmail" and "extortion" not
libelous per se because language could be construed as merely a criticism of supplier's policy
decision regarding prices and delivery of goods to nursing home); Makis v. Area Publication
Corp., 77 Ill. App. 3d 452, 395 N.E.2d 1185 (1st Dist. 1979) (newspaper article stating that
the closing of a sky sailing school could have been attributed to accident, argument, or crime
could be innocently construed because crime was only one of three given possibilities and therefore
did not amount to libel per se regarding plaintiff's business reputation); Bruck v. Cincotta,
56 Ill. App. 3d 260, 371 N.E.2d 874 (1st Dist. 1977) (article suggesting that plaintiffs made
building alterations without permit did not imply that plaintiffs committt:d a crime because
failure to obtain permit was not an indictable offense); Moricoli v. Schwartz, 46 Ill. App.
3d 481, 361 N.E.2d 74 (1st Dist. 1977) (plaintiff nightclub singer had cause of action against
defendants for calling him "fag," but plaintiff was required to prove actual damages); Watson
v. Southwest Messenger Press, Inc., 12 Ill. App. 3d 968, 299 N.E.2d 409 (1st Dist. 1973) (statement in article which referred to village mayor's ticket "fixing" could be innocently construed);
Delis v. Sepsis, 9 Ill. App. 3d 217, 292 N.E.2d 138 (1st Dist. 1972) (letter describing plaintiff
as a "liar," "dishonorable," and "deluded" was construed as mere name-calling and therefore
could not damage plaintiff's reputation); Lorilland v. Field EQters., Inc., 65 Ill. App. 2d 65,
213 N.E.2d I (1st Dist. 1965) (statement in newspaper article that plaintiff's former wife had
initiated bigamy suit falsely implied plaintiff had committed a crime and thus was not susceptible of innocent construction) (cited in Chapski v. Copley Press, Inc., 92 Ill. 2d at 348, 442
N.E.2d at 197 (1982)).
309. See, e.g., Polelle, The Guilt of the "Innocent Construction Rule" in Illinois Defamation Law, I N.I.U.L. REv. 181 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Polelle]; Symposium, Libel and
Slander in Illinois, 43 CHI.[-]KENT L. REv. I (1966). Professor Polelle's article is the most
comprehensive review of the innocent construction rule in Illinois to datt:.
310. 24 Ill. 2d 437, 181 N.E.2d 105, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 877 (1962).
31 I. !d. at 439-40, 181 N.E.2d at 106.
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rested. The plaintiff alleged that both articles were "of and concerning her"
because her name was Eve Spiro John. 312
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the Tribune Company had not defamed the plaintiff. In so doing, the court found that the aliases could not
be read as referring to the plaintiff and, therefore, the plaintiff had failed
to establish colloquium 313 as a matter of law. 314 The court went on to construe the parameters of the innocent construction rule as follows:
We further believe the language in defendant's articles is not libelous of
plaintiff when the innocent construction rule is consulted. That rule holds
that the article is to be read as a whole and the words given their natural
and obvious meaning, and requires that words allegedly libelous that are
capable of being read innocently must be so read and declared nonactionable as a matter of law. Although this court has not heretofore expressed the rule, it has been adopted and applied by our Appellate Courts
and by Federal Courts sitting in Illinois. Since both of the publications
here are capable of being construed as referring only to Dorothy ClarkDolores Reising as the keeper of the disorderly house, they are innocent
publications as to the plaintiff. 315

From this inauspicious beginning in the Illinois Supreme Court, the innocent construction rule became a virtually insurmountable barrier to recovery
by a plaintiff whenever an allegedly defamatory statement was susceptible
to an innocent interpretation.
As conceded in John, the innocent construction rule had not theretofore
been embraced explicitly by the court. 316 Arguably, the court previously
adopted the reasonable construction rule; in determining the defamatory
nature of words, allegedly defamatory statements are to be taken in their
usual context and, if ambiguous, such statements are to be sent to the jury
for determination of whether they were in fact understood as defamatory. 317
Whether the court was correct in asserting that the innocent construction
rule had been adopted by the state appellate courts and the federal courts
312. !d. at 440-41, 181 N.E.2d at 106-07.
313. "Colloquium" is one of the usual parts of a complaint for defamation; it is an averment that the words complained of were "spoken of and concerning the plaintiff." BLACK's
LAW DICTIONARY 240 (5th ed. 1979).
314. 24 111. 2d at 442, 181 N.E.2d at 107-08.
315. /d. at 442-43, 181 N.E.2d at 108 (citations omitted).
316. !d. at 442, 181 N.E.2d at 108.
317. See, e.g., Schmisseur v. Kreilich, 92 Ill. 347 (1879) (defendant's statement that plaintiff
"had acted the whore" was reasonably equivalent to charging that plaintiff had been guilty
of fornication or adultery and was actionable without colloquium or innuendo); Barnes v. Hamon,
71 Ill. 609 (1874) (defendant's statement that plaintiff had burned defendant's house could
reasonably be construed as having charged plaintiff with committing arson and therefore was
actionable); Nelson v. Borchenius, 52 Ill. 236 (1869) (defendant's statement that plaintiff trader
was a "villain," "rascal," and "cheater," while not actionable per se, might be actionable
when referring to a person in plaintiff's business) (cited in Polelle, supra note 309, at 186-200).
This article does not purport to examine the wisdom or validity of the John decision based
on prior precedent, or express any opinion on the approach adopted by precedent prior to
John. For such a discussion, see Polelle, supra note 309, at 200-12.
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applying lllinois law is uncertain. 318 In any event, John has since been viewed
by the Illinois judiciary as precedent not only for applying the innocent construction rule to the issue of colloquium, 319 but also as precedent for ascertaining whether the words themselves are defamatory 320 and whether the alleged libel or slander is actionable per se. 321
Despite its varying interpretations and applications, the overall impact of
the innocent construction rule is to remove from the jury's consideration
statements which are susceptible of an innocent as well as a defamatory interpretation-regardless of how unlikely or unreasonable the innocent interpretation might be. 322 If, according to the John court, allegedly defamatory
words "that are capable of being read innocently must be so read and
declared nonactionable as a matter of law," such words will never reach
the jury's consideration. 323
The primary flaw in the innocent construction rule is its illogical method
for determining which statements are to be nonactionable as a matter of
law and which are to be sent to a jury. Under the rule as applied in John,
allegedly defamatory words capable of being read innocently must be so read
and declared nonactionable by the judge as a matter of law. Therefore, only
those statements which the court determines are incapable of any innocent
construction are to be sent to the jury for a determination of whether they
were understood to be defamatory. Under this procedure, however, if a judge
determines that no innocent construction exists, there is nothing left for the
jury to determine. In theory, though apparently not in actual practice, the
plaintiff should then be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Alternatively,
the judge should be compelled to enter a directed judgment or judgment
notwithstanding the verdict if the issue is submitted to the jury and the jury
determines otherwise. 324

318. See Polelle, supra note 309, at 205-10.
319. Bravo Realty, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 84 Ill. App. 3d 862, 406 N.E.2d 61 (1st Dist. 1980);
Belmonte v. Rubin, 68 Ill. App. 3d 700, 386 N.E.2d 904 (1st Dist. 1979).
320. Valentine v. North American Co., 60 Ill. 2d 168, 328 N.E.2d 265 (1974); Zeinfeld v.
Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 41 Ill. 2d 345, 243 N.E.2d 217 (1968); Wexler v. Chicago Tribune
Co., 69 Ill. App. 3d 610, 387 N.E.2d 892 (1st Dist. 1979); Kirk v. Village of Hillcrest, 31
Ill. App. 3d 1063, 335 N.E.2d 535 (2d Dist. 1975).
321. Makis v. Area Publications Corp., 77 Ill. App. 3d 452, 395 N.E.2d 1185 (1st Dist. 1979).
322. See supra cases cited at note 308.
323. 24 Ill. 2d 437, 442, 181 N.E.2d 105, 108; PRossER, supra note 4, § Ill, at 747-48.
On the other hand, under the reasonable construction rule purportedly adopted in many preJohn cases, the court first determines whether the words reasonably may be understood to
be defamatory; if so, the jury then determines whether the words were in fact defamatory
to the plaintiff. If the words are susceptible only of a defamatory interpretation or only of
a nondefamatory interpretation, the plaintiff or defendant, respectively, is entitled to prevail
as a matter of law. See also Beeson v. Gossard Co., 167 Ill. App. 561 (1912) (defendant's
statement that plaintiff was an innocent "model" for corsets when plaintiff was lecturing on
medical benefits of wearing a corset was capable of only one construction: statement was libelous
per se and evidence of defendant's innocent intent was inadmissible).
324. See Polelle, supra note 309, at 214.
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Troman v. Wood

Prior to the recent Chapski decision, two Illinois Supreme Court decisions intimated the court's possible discomfort with the doctrine it had
cavalierly espoused in John. In Troman v. Wood, m plaintiff Mary Troman
brought a libel suit based upon the inclusion of a photograph of her house
in an article on gang activities. 326 The plaintiff alleged that the article and
the picture, taken together, were understood by readers to mean that the
plaintiff's home served as headquarters for the gang and that the plaintiff
was somehow associated with the gang. 327 In a quixotic attempt to distinguish
John, the court reasoned:
In our opinion the reference to the plaintiff by name and the photograph
of a house identified as her residence compel the rejection of defendant's
contention. Unlike John, . . . no question arises here as to the identity
of the person referred to by the article. Whether the article was in fact
understood by readers to refer to the plaintiff might ultimately be a question for the jury, should there be controversy on that matter. But the
preliminary determination whether the article is capable of being so
understood is a question of law which must, upon the motion to dismiss
in this case, be resolved in favor of the plaintiff. ... We reach the same
conclusion with respect to defendant's claim that the article is not
defamatory of the plaintiff. If the article were read as meaning that the
plaintiff allowed her house to be used as a headquarters for persons engaging in criminal acts or for storage of stolen goods, it can hardly be doubted
that her reputation would be injured. Whether the article was in fact so
understood is a question which must await the presentation of evidence.'"

For analytical purposes, it is significant that the Troman court concluded
that, for purposes of evaluating a motion to dismiss the complaint, the article could be understood as referring to the plaintiff only, obviating any further inquiry into the appropriate rule of interpretation. The court then
remarked that should a "controversy" arise on whether the article was in
fact understood as referring to the plaintiff, the issue "might" be left for
the jury. 329 Under either the reasonable construction rule or the innocent
construction rule, the court would have been compelled to reverse the grant-

325. 62 rll. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1976).
326. /d. at 188, 340 N.E.2d at 294.
327. Id.
328. Id. at -189, 340 N.E.2d at 294.
329. /d. Based on this section of the opinion, Professor Polelle has concluded that Troman
distinguished John on the basis that the colloquium issue in Troman "presented a reasonable
question of fact for the jury whether or not the plaintiff in that case was referred to by the
allegedly libelous article, whereas the connection in the John case between the defamation and
the plaintiff was too attenuated to be made by any reasonable jury." Polelle, supra note 309,
at 203. More precisely, Troman distinguished John on the ground that while the colloquium
issue in Troman was a question of law that had to be resolved in favor of the plaintiff on
the motion to dismiss, the issue might present a question of fact for the jury if subsequently
there s~ould be "controversy" whether it was in fact understood as referring to the plaintiff.
62 III. 2d at 189, 340 N.E.2d at 294 (emphasis added).
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ing of the defendant's motion to dismiss, given its finding that there was
"no question" that the article referred to the plaintiff. Mere "controversy"
or ambiguity, however, is not sufficient to put the issue of colloquium to
the jury under John; ambiguous words must be given their innocent meaning and declared nonactionable as a matter of law. On the other hand, the
issue "might" be left for the jury under the innocent construction rule if
a "controversy" were to arise as well, the only difference being if the outcome of the controversy was that the statement could not be interpreted
as referring to someone other than the plaintiff. At the least, it cannot be
ascertained decisively from this portion of the court's language whether it
had chosen to apply the innocent construction rule or some other test.
In reiterating that the "preliminary determination whether the article is
capable of being so understood is a question of law which must, upon the
motion to dismiss . . . be resolved in favor of the plaintiff, " 330 the court
relied on Ogren v. Rockford Star Printing Co. 331 and a comment to the
Restatement of Torts 332 as indirect support 333 for its conclusion. 334 The relevant portion of the comment to the Restatement states that the plaintiff
must prove that a statement was published "of and conc{:rning him, that
is, he must satisfy the court that it was understandable as intended to refer
to himself, and must convince the jury that it was so understood." 335 This
portion of the comment does not directly reflect the innocent construction
rule, because under that rule a court must be satisfied not merely that the
statement is understandable as referring to the plaintiff, but also that it is not
understandable as referring to someone else. 336 In not specifying how to show
that the article was understandable as referring to the plaintiff, however,
the court may have found the comment to be sufficiently ambiguous to connote no particular test in and of itself. Yet, by stating the proof requirement as only mandating that the plaintiff establish that it was understandable as referring to him, the comment logically does evoke the reasonable
construction rule.
Similarly, the portion of Ogren cited in Troman utilized the reasonable
construction standard in determining whether the words spoken concerned
the plaintiff. 331 Ogren's apparent adoption of the reasonable construction
330. 62 Ill. 2d at 189, 340 N.E.2d at 294.
331. 288 Ill. 405, 123 N.E. 587 (1919).
332. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 613(J)(c) comment d (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975).
333. Troman, 62 Ill. 2d at 189, 340 N.E.2d at 294. The court uses a "cf" signal to introduce the citations. "Cf" indicates that the cited authority supports a proposition different
from the main proposition but sufficiently analogous to lend support. UNIF. SYs. CITATION
9 (13th ed. 1981). In effect the Troman court cites two authorities presenting somewhat ambiguous propositions as lending analogous support to the ambiguous proposition posited by
the court. In light of this, it is wishful thinking to view Troman as clearly adopting one rule
or another on the issue of colloquium.
334. 62 Ill. 2d at 189, 340 N.E.2d at 294.
335. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 613(1)(c) comment d (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975).
336. /d.
337. The Ogren court stated:
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rule is contained on the first of the two pages cited by the Troman court. 338
On the second of these pages, the Ogren court evaluated the plaintiffappellant's objection to the lower court's refusal to permit evidence that
the article concerned the plaintiff. The court concluded that the plaintiff
should be permitted to present evidence on the issue of colloquium only
after the defendant has disputed the advanced colloquium and offered
evidence to refute the purported reference to the plaintiff. 339 The court noted
that there was little or no doubt that the defamation referred to the plaintiff and that defendant had failed to offer evidence to rebut this reference. 340
Had Troman cited only this page in the Ogren opinion, its reliance on
Ogren might have been limited to its determination that the defamation referred to the plaintiff. However, the citation to Ogren which incorporated the
reasonable construction rule cannot be ignored. Its inclusion, had it been
cited as direct support, could be used to construe Troman as adopting the
reasonable construction rule conclusively. Unfortunately, Troman's reliance
on Ogren and the Restatement's comment as merely indirect support for
its conclusion sufficiently obscures the framework upon which the court based
its decision. Hence, no conclusive rejection of John on the issue of colloquium can be inferred from Troman. Those who would construe Troman
as an explicit overruling of John on the issue of colloquium may have given
Troman a significance which the court deliberately attempted to avoid. Of
course, since the John legitimization of the innocent 'construction rule was
merely obiter dicta, the Troman court had no need to overrule John on
that issue even if it did intend to adopt a reasonable construction rule. Nevertheless, the Troman court's citation to two sources arguably incorporating
a reasonable construction standard must be evaluated in light of the court's
use of these sources as indirect support and its own explicit attempt to
Where the words are ambiguous or equivocal in meaning, the question of the meaning
to be ascribed to them is for the jury, although the question as to whether or
not any particular meaning is libelous is for the court. Where there is a controversy
as to whether or not words were spoken of and concerning the plaintiff, the question whether they were so spoken of and concerning the plaintiff is for the jury.
In this case the defendant by its special pleas denies that certain portions of the
articles were spoken of plaintiff, a defense which is admissible under the general
issue. Plaintiff offered witnesses to prove that by the language of the articles they
understood the words in question to be spoken of and concerning plaintiff, but
on objection the court refused to admit the evidence. We think the better rule is,
that where the language is clear and unambiguous, as it is in this case, and such
as there can be little or no doubt of its being spoken of and concerning plaintiff,
no such evidence is admissible for plaintiff in the first instance, but if the defendant disputes the fact and offers evidence to prove it, where, as here, the evidence
also refers to another person or object, then it would be proper for the plaintiff
to offer proof on the question in rebuttal. No such evidence was given for the
defendant, and we hold the court did not err in this particular.
288 Ill. at 413, 123 N.E. at 590 (cited in Troman, 62 Ill. 2d at 187, 340 N.E.2d at 294).
338. Ogren, 288 Ill. at 413, 123 N.E. at 590.
339. Id. at 413, 123 N.E.2d at 590-91.
340. /d.
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distinguish John. Although evidencing a reluctance to extend John beyond
its original parameters on the issue of colloquium, the court's opinion may
not be taken on its face as a rejection of John's dicta or even of its viability
as a rule of construction on the issue of colloquium.
On the other hand, the Troman court's unwillingness to apply John in
determining the defamatory nature of the words is clear. In evaluating this
aspect, without reference to John, the court apparently found that as a matter
of law, the words reasonably could be construed as defamatory. 34 ' The court
then considered the issue of whether the article was in fact so understood
to be a question for the jury to determine. 342 In so doing, the court implicitly followed the traditional reasonable construction rule of not requiring a determination of whether an innocent construction was possible before
denying the defendant's motion for dismissal. 343 Had the court applied the
innocent construction rule, such a determination would have been necessary
before the court could conclude that the defendant was not entitled to
dismissal. 344
3.

Catalano v. Pechous

The second case foreshadowing the court's decision in Chapski is Catalano
v. Pechous. 343 The plaintiffs in Catalano were seven aldermen from the Berwyn city council who voted to approve a controversial bid for a garbage
collection contract with the city. 346 The aldermen sued the city clerk, Pechous,
and others responsible for the publication in a local newspaper of a statement allegedly made by Pechous at a council meeting and repeated by him
to a newspaper reporter. 347 In connection with the council's approval of the
controversial garbage bid, Pechous allegedly alluded to the price paid to Judas
for his betrayal of Christ, 348 and said that "two hundred forty pieces of
silver changed hands-thirty for each alderman." 349 The appellate court
reversed the circuit court's grant of Pechous's motion for summary judgment and its denial of the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. 350
In its opinion, the lllinois Supreme Court addressed four issues: (1) whether
Pechous's statement charged that the plaintiffs were paid a bribe for award341. Troman, 62 Ill. 2d at 187, 340 N.E.2d at 294.
342. Id. at 189, 340 N.E.2d at 294.
343. For discussions of the reasonable construction rule, see supra notes 317, 320, & 337,
and accompanying text.
344. 62 Ill. 2d at 189, 340 N.E.2d at 294. Therefore we cannot agree with Professor Polelle's
conclusion that "[t]he Troman Illinois Supreme Court approach apparently limits the innocent
construction rule to the meaning of the words used and does not extend it to the issue of
colloquium . . . . " Polelle, supra note 309, at 204.
345. 83 Ill. 2d 146, 419 N.E.2d 350 (1980).
346. /d. at 149, 419 N.E.2d at 352.
347. /d.
348. /d. at 157, 419 N.E.2d at 355.
349. /d. at 151, 419 N.E.2d at 353.
350. Id. at 149-50, 419 N.E.2d at 352.
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ing the contract; (2) whether Pechous's statement was defamatory; (3) whether
the statement was capable of an alternative construction that would render
it nondefamatory; and (4) whether the statement was a statement of fact
or a constitutionally protected expression of opinion. 3 " On the first question, the court concluded, contrary to defendants' claim that the words used
merely referred to political motivation, that "the allusion of Judas' betrayal
of Christ was intended to convey the thought that the plaintiffs received
something of value in exchange for voting to award the contract to Clearing, and had thereby betrayed the public trust." 352 In holding that the
language was actionable per se, m the court found "not important" the fact
that the criminal offenses of bribery and official misconduct were imprecisely
charged since the plaintiffs "were accused of venality, and such a charge
would be hurtful to them." 354
The Catalano court's analysis to this point is more significant for what
it does not say than for what it does. The court, in its preliminary determination that the language was actionable per se, did so without reference
to the innocent construction rule. If the Catalano court had applied the innocent construction rule in determining whether the words were defamatory
per se, it is unlikely that the court would have reached the result it did,
since it would have been a simple matter to find that the words were susceptible of an interpretation that did not charge a crime. Although it is difficult to draw a line between the application of the innocent construction
rule first to determine if words are defamatory and, second, to ascertain

351. /d. at 164, 419 N.E.2d at 359.
352. /d. at 157, 419 N.E.2d at 355.
353. Recent cases in Illinois have taken the position that libel per se ordinarily is restricted
to what would constitute slander per se. See Richardson v. Dunbar, 95 Ill. App. 3d 254, 259,
419 N.E.2d 1205, 1210 (3d Dist. 1981); Coursey v. Greater Niles Township Publishing Corp.,
82 Ill. App. 2d 76, 81, 227 N.E.2d 164, 167 (1st Dist. 1967), aff'd, 40 Ill. 2d 257, 239 N.E.2d
837 (1968). The four classes of words which constitute slander per se under Illinois common
law are words imputing infection with a communicable disease, words imputing the commission
of a criminal offense, words imputing inability to perform the duties of an office or employment or want of integrity in the performance thereof, and words prejudicing a person in that
person's profession or trade. Coursey, 82 Ill. App. 2d at 81-82, 227 N.E.2d at 167. All other
slander is per quod and requires allegation and proof of special damages. /d.
354. 83 Ill. 2d at 157, 419 N.E.2d at 355-56 (citing Zeinfeld v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc.,
41 Ill. 2d 345, 348, 243 N.E.2d 217, 220 (1968)). For support of its position that a crime
need not be charged with the particularity of an indictment, the court cited its opinion in Zeinfeld
v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., in which the court's analysis began by giving the allegedly
defamatory statement its most innocent construction. 41 Ill. 2d at 348, 243 N .E.2d at 220.
Nevertheless, the court found that the most innocent construction possible was defamatory
per se, although it did not charge specifically the commission of a crime. /d. Zeinfeld, then,
would appear to have applied the innocent construction rule to the determination of defamatory
meaning, but not to the determination of whether language is actionable per se without proof
of special damages. Thus, the method used in Zeinfeld, was first to give the most innocent
construction possible to the words, and then to determine whether that construction was
defamatory per se without regard to the. innocent construction rule.
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if they are defamatory per se, Catalano does not appear to have extended
the rule to the latter determination. 355
The Catalano opinion proceeds to formulate what might be the forerunner of Chapski's "reasonable innocent construction rule." The defendants
argued that Pechous's statement meant nothing more than that the plaintiffs were politically motivated in awarding the contract to a company for
which a political ally had recently gone to work. 356 The court, however, found
the argument not a "plausible" or "fair reading" of the words because the
political ally referred to by the plaintiffs went to work for the company
after Pechous made his statement in the council meeting. 357 The court then
found that Pechous's statement was reasonably susceptible of a defamatory
meaning but not reasonably susceptible of an innocent meaning. 358 Under
the reasonable construction rule, the plaintiffs would have been entitled to
judgment as a matter of law, which is consistent with the court's holding
that Pechous was liable for the words he used. Under an innocent construction rule in which the innocent construction must be reasonable, however,
the defendants also would have been entitled, in theory, to judgment as a
matter of law, though in practice Illinois courts send such cases to the jury. m
Since the court determined that the statement was not reasonably susceptible of a nondefamatory meaning and, therefore, the plaintiffs arguably were
entitled to summary judgment under either rule, it cannot be said with cer-

355. It is significant to note that in remarking that the innocent construction rule had been
extended to the determination of whether language is actionable per se, the Chapski court only
cited the appellate court decision of Makis v. Area Publications Corp., 77 Ill. App. 3d 452,
395 N.E.2d 1185 (1979), and did not allude to Catalano. Chapski, 92 Ill. 2d at 349, 442 N.E.2d
at 197.
356. Catalano, 83 Ill". 2d at 158, 419 N.E.2d at 356.
357. /d.
;) 358. /d. at 157-58, 419 N.E.2d at 356. Professor Polelle finds Catalano to be somewhat
' more ambiguous on whether the statement was susceptible of an innocent meaning:
By alternately finding that an innocent meaning was not "plausible," then not a
"fair reading" of the words, and finally "not capable" of an innocent meaning,
the Illinois Supreme Court obscured its methodology. Was it saying that no reasonable
person would believe the innocent meaning? If so, this same result could have more
naturally been achieved with an unambiguous expression of the reasonable construction rule. Or was it saying that no innocent construction was even thinkable?
If so, then it is still following the classic innocent construction rule even though
Justice Oark found an innocent construction quite thinkable under the circumstances.
Polelle, supra note 309, at 223 (footnotes omitted).
We would take issue with several points in Professor Polelle's discussion. First, the Catalano
court said that Pechous's statement was "not capable of an alternative reading which would
render it nondefamatory." 83 Ill. 2d at 164, 419 N.E.2d at 359. In context with the court's
previous discussion, this signifies that the statement was not capable of a reasonable, innocent
construction. The court did not conclude that the statement was not capable of an innocent
meaning, because it acknowledged the innocent meaning suggested by the defendants but rejected it as unreasonable. /d. at 157, 419 N.E.2d at 356. Second, holding in favor of the plaintiff based on a finding that "no reasonable person would believe the innocent meaning" is
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tainty which rule the court applied. In essence, the court did not accept or
reject the applicability of the innocent construction rule; it merely refused
to accept an innocent construction that it found to be implausible. Nevertheless, given the court's failure to reject the innocent construction rule despite
several opportunities to do so, it could be argued that the court was indeed
modifying the innocent construction rule while assuming its applicability.
Catalano has to be taken as a modification of the innocent construction
rule because, apart from the question of whether the alternative construction in that case was indeed implausible, plausibility rarely, if ever, had been
a prerequisite to a finding of an innocent construction in the lower courts. 360
The John court did declare that a statement must be read as a whole and
that the words used be given "their natural and obvious meaning." 361 Yet,
John also required that words "capable of being read innocently must be
so read." 362 Catalano's possible plausibility overlay on the innocent construction rule may be said to be true to this dual nature of the John rule since
it requires that the innocent construction be a reasonable interpretation of
the allegedly defamatory statement. In · this sense, Catalano's possible
"reasonable innocent construction" rule was a return to the rule stated in
John. In its departure from the direction in which the appellate courts had
taken John, 363 Catalano suggested a limit on how far the courts should reach
to construct a nondefamatory interpretation of a purportedly defamatory
statement. This schizophrenic approach to the rule may have been the source
of Justice Clark's dissatisfaction with the court's opinion. Comparing the
court's opinions which apply the rule with those which ignore the rule (including Troman), 364 Justice Clark remarked that it was "surely ... intolerable
to have the innocent construction rule consistently applied in the circuit courts
and the appellate courts while it is ignored in this court." 365
The Catalano court had one additional innocent construction rule hurdle
to confront in its opinion. Two of the defendants argued that if Pechous's
statement could be construed either as a statement of fact or as a nonac-@
tionable expression of opinion, the rule of innocent construction required ·
not tantamount to adoption of the reasonable construction rule because such a holding could
result from application of either the innocent construction rule or the reasonable construction
rule. Finally, the court could not be saying that "no innocent construction was even thinkable,"
because it acknowledged that the defendants had proposed one. !d. For these reasons, we do
not find, as Polelle suggests, that the court was unclear on whether an innocent construction
was possible or reasonable.
359. See Polelle, supra note 309, at 214.
360. See id. at 182-86, nn.2-19.
361. John v. Tribune Co., 24 Ill. 2d 437, 442-43, 181 N.E.2d 105, 108, cert. denied, 371
u.s. 877 (1962).
362. /d.
363. See notes 319-21 and accompanying text.
364. Catalano, 83 Ill. 2d at 184, 419 N.E.2d at 368-69 (Clark, J ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
365. !d. at 184, 419 N.E.2d at 369. The Catalano court applied its reasonableness require-
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that the statement be considered a nonactionable expression of opinion. 366
The court, without specifically addressing the applicability of the innocent
construction rule, concluded that "[t]o charge that the approval of the contract was procured by a bribe cannot fairly be transmitted into a criticism
of the merits of the award of the contract." 367 The court proceeded to find
that an accusation of crime is a statement of fact, not an expression of
an opinion. 368
If "fairly" in the above-quoted portion of the court's opinion is read as
"reasonably," 369 then the court concluded that Pechous's statement could
not reasonably be read as an expression of opinion. Thus, the court rejected
the defendant's argument that the innocent construction rule required a communication to be construed as an expression of opinion, if it could be so
interpreted, 370 without regard to the reasonableness of the interpretation.
In sum, Catalano may be read to suggest an interpretation of the innocent construction rule which requires that the innocent construction be a
reasonable one, whether it is a nondefamatory construction or a construction as an opinion. 371 Having concluded that Pechous's statements could not
reasonably be construed as opinions or as nondefamatory statements, the
court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to judgment in their favor as a
matter of law. 372 As noted above, it cannot be determined conclusively from
the outcome of the case whether the Catalano court was adopting a reasonable
construction rule or modifying the innocent construction rule; the court did
not need to determine whether the defendants would have been entitled to
summary judgment had Pechous's statements been reasonably susceptible of
a defamatory interpretation or of an interpretation as an expression of
opinion.
Catalano and Troman are essential to an understanding of what the Illinois Supreme Court attempted to do in Chapski and, perhaps more impor-

ment strictly. It was far from clear that the defendants' alternative construction was implausible. As Justice Clark pointed out, the ambiguity surrounding the date of Pechous's first statement made it uncertain, for purposes of evaluating the summary judgment motions, whether
the statement was made before the political ally had been hired. Id. at 183, 419 N.E.2d at
368. Even if the statement had been made before the hiring, a reasonable assumption could
have been made that the contract was awarded with the knowledge that the hiring would take
place.
366. id. at 158, 419 N.E.2d at 356.
367. /d. (emphasis added).
368. Id. at 159-63, 419 N.E.2d at 357-59.
369. Such a reading is consistent with the above analysis on the issue of defamatory meaning. See supra notes 357-59 and accompanying text.
370. See supra note 366 and accompanying text.
371. Professor Polelle concludes that Catalano "rebuffed" the extension of the innocent
construction rule to a fact/opinion determination. Polelle, supra note 309, at 222. It would
appear, however, that the court only found that the statement could not reasonably be construed as an opinion.
372. Catalano, 83 Ill. 2d at 164, 167, 419 N.E.2d at 359, 360.
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tantly, what it arguably did not do. Chapski, in all likelihood, will be heralded
as the death knell of the innocent construction rule in Illinois. Yet, to use
the court's own language, the decision is a "modification" of the innocent
construction rule. 373 The question then becomes whether the Chapski court
in fact has adopted the reasonable construction rule of interpretation or
chosen to reaffirm, but clarify, the rule of innocent construction as originally
articulated in John.

B.

Inside Chapski

Plaintiff Robert Chapski, an attorney, filed a libel action against the Copley
Press, a reporter, an executive editor, and the publisher of a newspaper
published by the Copley Press. 374 The action was predicated on a series of
newspaper articles tracing the history of judicial proceedings for custody of
a child prior to her death.m The boyfriend of the child's mother subsequently was convicted of the involuntary manslaughter of the child. 376 Chapski
had represented the mother in her successful attempt to obtain custody of
the child. 377 The ten newspaper articles examining the plaintiff's role in the
juvenile and divorce proceedings contained references to "unscheduled" hearings between the plaintiff and the judge, inquiries into Chapski's moral obligation to have provided further information to the judge, and a report of the
proceedings before the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission
regarding the plaintiffs conduct. 378
The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint
based on the innocent construction rule, a decision which the appellate court
affirmed. 379 The trial and appellate courts determined that either the language
itself could be construed innocently or the articles as a whole could be read
as referring to the legal system in general rather than to the plaintiff in
particular. 38 ° Chapski argued before the Illinois Supreme Court that an innocent interpretation of the articles was "strained," 38 ' and he supported his
argument by referring to one of the articles in which his name was alleged
to have appeared in bold black type twenty times. 382
The Illinois Supreme Court's opinion focused primarily on the history and
development of the innocent construction rule in Illinois. 383 A review of this

373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.

Chapski v. Copley Press, Inc., 92 Ill. 2d 344, 351, 442 N.E.2d 195, 198 (1982).
Id. at 345, 442 N.E.2d at 195.
Id.
Id. at 346, 442 N.E.2d at 196.
Id. at 346, 442 N.E.2d at 195.
/d. at 346, 442 N.E.2d at 196.
100 Ill. App. 3d 1012, 427 N.E.2d 638 (2d Dist. 1981).
92 Ill. 2d at 347, 442 N.E.2d at 196.
/d.
/d.
/d. at 347-51, 442 N.E.2d at 196-98.
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portion of the court's opinion is crucial to an understanding of what the
court perceived to be the flaws in the rule and, by extension, what aspects
of the rule the court saw fit to "modify." 384

1.

Chapski's Historical Sketch of the Innocent Construction Rule

The court's history of the rule began, appropriately enough, with its decision in John. 385 The court first noted that the innocent construction rule
in Illinois arose from the obiter dictum previously quoted from John; 386 the
court further noted that, since John, the rule had been applied by the appellate courts ''in something less than a completely uniform fashion . . .
and often over vigorous objections concerning its application or whether it
continues to be a fair statement of the law . . . . " 387 After remarking that
the rule had been extended to "slander as well as libel to dc!terrnine whether
the words themselves are defamatory, to the determination of whether the
language is actionable per se, and to the issue of colloquium," 388 the court
conceded that its own application of the rule had not been consistent, citing
John and Troman for comparison. 389
The court proceeded to examine a predecessor of the innocent construction rule, the mitior sensus doctrine. 390 This doctrine required that words
be interpreted in their best possible sense and that the plaintiff negate any
possible nondefamatory meaning. 391 The court termed the innocent construction rule in John as "similar," but "less arbitrary" than the mitior sensus
doctrine. 392 The court observed that the principal criticism of the innocent
construction rule was that under the rule, as under the doctrine of mitior
sensus, courts "strain to find unnatural but possibly innocent meanings of
words where such a construction is clearly unreasonable and a defamatory
meaning is far more probable." 393 The court declared that such an approach
is "itself incompatible" 394 with the rule's requirement that words be given
384. /d. at 351-52, 442 N.E.2d at 199.
385. !d. at 347, 442 N.E.2d at 196.
386. /d. at 347-48, 442 N.E.2d at 196; see supra text accompanying note 315.
387. 92 Ill. 2d at 348, 442 N.E.2d at 196.
388. /d. at 348-49, 442 N.E.2d at 196-97 (citations omitted).
389. /d.
390. /d.
391. /d. at 349-50, 442 N.E.2d at 197-98. Mitior sensus was an old common law doctrine
which required that words be interpreted, if possible, in a nondefamatory meaning. The doctrine's relation to the innocent construction rule is evident. For further elaboration on the doctrine of mitior sensus, see PROSSER, supra note 4, at 747; Holdsworth, Defamation in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, 40 LAW Q. 302, 405-08 (1924) (cited in Chapski, 92 Ill.
2d at 350, 442 N.E.2d at 198). See also GREGORY, supra note 150, at 994-96 (historical overview of mitior sensus doctrine).
392. Chapski, 92 Ill. 2d at 350-51, 442 N.E.2d at 198; see Symposium, Libel and Slander
in Illinois, 43 CHI.(-]KENT L. REV. I (1966).
393. Chapski, 92 Ill. 2d at 350-51, 442 N.E.2d at 198.
394. !d. at 351, 442 N.E.2d at 198.
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their "natural and obvious meaning." 395 The court found that the "inherent
conflict [was] contained in the definition itseir'; 396 that is, the two-part definition of the rule in John 391 was resolved in some cases ''by construing the
words innocently as a matter of law only where the words are reasonably
susceptible of such a construction or the allegedly defamatory language is
ambiguous." 398
The impact of this portion of the court's analysis is not the basis for
a rejection of the innocent construction rule, but rather a rejection of the
rule as it previously had been applied. The court did acknowledge the "inherent conflict" 399 in John's definition of the rule. Yet, the court resolved
this conflict by stating that an innocent construction is appropriate only when
the words were reasonably susceptible of an innocent construction. 400 The
court diminished the criticism of the innocent construction rule to the
previously mentioned "principal" objection that courts strain to find innocent meanings despite their improbability. 401 This unsatisfactory aspect of
the rule, according to the court, is a misapplication of John and inconsistent with the second requirement of John: that words be given their "natural
and obvious meaning. " 402 Consequently, the court appeared to be of the
opinion that the principal criticism of the rule is predicated on the misapplication of the John version of the rule, and that any conflict in John's
statement of the rule was soluble.

395. Id. (quoting John v. Tribune Co., 24 Ill. 2d at 442, 181 N.E.2d at 108).
396. Id.
397. See John, 24 Ill. 2d at 442, 181 N.E.2d at 108.
398. Chapski, 92 Ill. 2d at 351, 442 N.E.2d at 198 (emphasis in original). Professor Polelle
apparently disagrees, asserting the following:
The linguistic absurdity of the innocent construction rule is perhaps alleviated, but
not eliminated, by the suggestion that if words are given an innocent interpretation
only when reasonably susceptible of it, then this part of the rule can be reconciled
with the corollary requirement that the words be given their natural and obvious
meaning. But if the plaintiff had been called "gay" at the business meeting described
in Moricoli v. Schwartz, 46 lll. App. 3d 481, 361 N.E.2d 74 (1977), a jury question
would still have been presented even if some would have reasonably thought that
defendant was referring to the cheerful disposition of the plaintiff. The fact remains that as long as others may have also reasonably interpreted the remarks to
refer to plaintiff's alleged homosexuality it makes no sense to say words are being
given their natural and obvious meaning when the innocent meaning must
automatically be taken even though the defamatory meaning is equally plausible
or even more so.
Pollele, supra note 309, at 221-22 (footnotes omitted).
399. Chapski, 92 III. 2d at 351, 442 N.E.2d at 198.
400. /d. at 352, 442 N.E.2d at 199.
401. Id. at 350-51, 442 N.E.2d at 198.
402. /d. at 351, 442 N.E.2d at 198, (quoting John v. Tribune Co., 24 Ill. 2d at 442, 181
N.E.2d at 108).
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Chapski's Modification of the Innocent Construction Rule

The crucial paragraph containing the court's "modification" of the innocent construction rule followed from the court's criticism of the rule as applied by the Illinois courts. 403 Predicated on the "inconsistencies, inequities
and confusion" 404 resulting from the "rule as originally announced in John,
and the broader protections that now exist to protect first amendment interests . . . together with the availability of the various privileges, " 403 the
court determined that a "modification" 406 of the innocent construction rule
would better serve the values inherent in the first amendment and the individual's interest in reputation:
We therefore hold that a written or oral statement is to be considered
in context, with the words and the implications therefrom given their natural
and obvious meaning; if, as so construed, the statement may reasonably
be innocently interpreted as referring to someone other than the plaintiff
it cannot be actionable per se. This preliminary determination is properly
a question of law to be resolved in the first instance; whether the publication was in fact understood to be defamatory or to refer to the plaintiff
is a question for the jury should the initial determination be resolved in
favor of the plaintiff. 407

This modification may be taken as rejection of the innocent construction
rule in favor of the reasonable construction rule, or as a reinterpretation
and affirmation of the innocent construction rule enunciated in John. The
first clause of the foregoing quote is merely a paraphrase of John's first
requirement. It sheds no light on whether the court is affirming or rejecting
John, however, because courts that have adopted the reasonable construction rule use similar language. 408 (It is unlikely that any modern American
court would require that words be considered out of context or be given
unnatural meanings.)
The confusion in the new standard stems, as is often the case in defamation actions, from the court's use of the term "per se."••• The court held
that if a statement may "reasonably be innocently interpreted or reasonably
be interpreted as referring to someone other than the plaintiff it cannot be
actionable per se." 410 The court failed, however, to clarify whether it was
holding that the statement was not "actionable per se" because: (1) it was
not actionable as a matter of law; (2) it was not defamatory on its face
as a matter of law; (3) it was not actionable per se as falling within one

403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.

/d.
!d.
/d. The court specifically noted the Colson decision. /d.
/d.
/d. at 352, 442 N.E.2d at 199 (citations omitted).
See PROSSER, supra note 4, § Ill, at 747.
Chapski, 92 Ill. 2d at 352, 442 N.E.2d at 199.
/d.
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of the special categories of defamation for which special damages need not
be alleged and proven; or (4) it was not actionable per se without proof
of special damages or defamatory on its face as a matter of law at that
point in the proceedings. If the court was holding either (1), (2), or (3),
then it simply added a new gloss to the John rule. Following this interpretation, the court obviated the strained efforts of the lower courts to
find innocent interpretation of allegedly defamatory statements by requiring
that the innocent interpretation be reasonable, but retained the rule that a
statement subject to an innocent meaning may not be presented to the jury
for its evaluation of the statement's actual meaning. If the court's statement
is read as referring to that point in the proceedings when the court is making only a preliminary determination and, assuming that the statement is
reasonably susceptible to a defamatory interpretation as well, it would suggest that the issue should be left for the jury to resolve, as would be the
case under the reasonable construction rule.
The final clause in the quoted portion of the court's opinion assists in
clarifying the ambiguity. The court stated that "whether the publication was
in fact understood to be defamatory or to refer to the plaintiff is a question
for the jury should the initial determination be resolved in favor of the
plaintiff."'" This statement utterly fails to clarify what is required by the
court for the issue to go to the jury. Does the trial court merely determine
that the statement may not be reasonably interpreted as having an innocent
meaning or as referring to the plaintiff-just as under the innocent construction rule? That would appear to be the court's intent, since the "initial
determination" refers to the determination of whether the statement is
reasonably susceptible of an innocent interpretation or as referring to someone other then the plaintiff. 412
Unfortunately, the court's citation to Troman on both the colloquium and
interpretation issues adds to the confusion of the court's modification of
the innocent construction rule. As discussed above, the Troman court
distinguished John on the issue of colloquium by finding that there was no
issue of identity on the face of the article in Troman, 413 without clarifying
which test it had applied.'" Yet, on the question of whether the article was
defamatory, the court did appear to follow the reasonable construction rule
in determining that the article could be interpreted in a defamatory way. 415
Although the court did not accept or reject the innocent construction rule
explicitly on either issue, 416 Troman has been interpreted as an attempt by
the court to limit John to the issue of defamatory meaning and to adopt

41 I.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.

!d.
/d.
See
See
See
See

(emphasis added).

supra
supra
supra
supra

text accompanying notes 327-28.
text accompanying note 330.
text accompanying note 342.
notes 325-44 and accompanying text.
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a reasonable construction approach in determining colloquium. 417 Troman
may have been cited by the court in Chapski as support for nothing more
than the court's position that the question of how a statement is in fact
understood is to be made by the jury, if reached. 418 In that sense, the court's
citation of Troman could not have been intended to reflect in any way on
the method by which the court's "initial determination" must be made.
However, Troman is neither so clear in its approach nor so fundamental
to the Chapski court's opinion that it can be said to mandate any particular
interpretation.
Though Troman's citation may be advanced to demonstrate that the court
was adopting the reasonable construction rule, there are several other indications in the court's opinion, of varying degrees of persuasiveness, that
demonstrate that the court did not intend to abandon the innocent construction rule. First, to interpret the opinion as adopting the reasonable construction rule, it becomes necessary to read "actionable per se" in such a way
as to read in the assumption of a defamatory interpretation alternative to
an innocent interpretation, and then to assume that the court was also referring to a particular point in the defamation proceedings. H is difficult to
posit an explanation for the court's use of the term "actionable per se"
in this context. To interpret "actionable per se" as referring to the innocent
construction rule involves fewer semantic acrobatics, and obviates the necessity
for reading assumptions into the court's statement.
Second, "per se" is a term of art in the law of defamation signifying
either that the words are defamatory on their face or that they are actionable
without proof of special damages. 419 Given either of these meanings, the
court can be viewed as continuing to adhere to an innocent construction
rule-that is, if a statement is reasonably susceptible of an innocent interpretation or as not referring to the plaintiff, the court must find against
the plaintiff as a matter of law. There is a hint in the opinion that the court
was using the term "actionable per se" in the sense of actionable without
proof of special damages. In its discussion of the appellate court's extension
of John to issues other than colloquium, 420 the court noted that the decision
in Makis v. Area Publications Corp. 421 extended John's innocent construction rule to the issue of whether the actionable language fell into one of
the traditional categories of slander for which special damages would be
417. Polelle, supra note 309, at 204.
418. The appellate court in Chapski used Troman as authority in this limited sense. See
Chapski, 100 Ill. App. 3d 1012, 1017, 427 N.E.2d 638, 642 (2d Dist. 1975).
419. PRossER, supra note 4, § 112, at 763. Special damages are defined as "[tlhose which
are the actual, but not the necessary, result of the injury complained of, and which in fact
follow it as a natural and proximate consequence in the particular case . . . . " BLACK's LAW
DICTIONARY 354 (5th ed. 1979). In a defamation action, special damages would include the
damages that flow from the injured reputation.
420. See Chapski, 92 Ill. 2d at 348-49, 442 N.E.2d at 196-97.
421. 77 Ill. App. 3d 452, 395 N.E.2d 1185 (1st Dist. 1979).
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presumed-the so-called per se categories. 422 The Chapski court characterized Makis as extending John "to the determination of whether the language
is actionable per se," 423 thereby employing the precise language it would
later use in enunciating its new standard. In part, this approach is in keeping with the appellate court's evaluation of the issue in Chapski as being
whether the plaintiff was defamed in the performance of his professional
duties. 424
By characterizing its opinion in Chapski as a partial reaffirmation of John,
the court attempted to buttress the opinion. The court never explicitly rejected, overruled, or even criticized the John decision itself. Rather, it proposed a "modification" of the innocent construction rule. 425 That it was
indeed the court's intention only to modify the rule with an overlay of
reasonableness is supported by the historical development of the rule 426 and
by the court's determination that the application of this rule in the case
would not be "unfair" in light of previous decisions which "in essence"
applied the court's modified approach. 427 The focus of the court's concern
in its examination of the innocent construction rule was the rule's practical
application in the lower courts. As discussed above, the court found such
strained constructions inconsistent with John and noted with approval those
appellate courts that had imposed a requirement of reasonableness for innocent constructions. 428 Possibly referring to these latter decisions, the court
refused to find application of its ruling unfair to the defendants "[s]ince
several opinions of the appellate court have in essence applied the modified
approach we announce today. " 429
Finally, the court admonished the trial court that the innocent construction rule requires language to be treated as a constitutionally protected expression of opinion only if such a characterization is reasonable. 430 This admonishment demonstrates that the innocent construction rule would be alive
and well on remand, with the caveat that any proposed construction of the
422. /d. at 456-57, 395 N.E.2d at 1188; see also Polelle, supra note 309, at n.135 and accompanying text (exploring Makis's application of the innocent construction rule to determinations of whether language was defamatory per se or per quod).
423. Chapski, 92 Ill. 2d at 348-49, 442 N.E.2d at 197 (emphasis added).
424. See Chapski, 100 Ill. App. 3d at 1016-17, 427 N.E.2d at 641-42.
425. Chapski, 92 Ill. 2d at 351, 442 N.E.2d at 198.
426. /d. at 347-51, 442 N.E.2d at 196-98; see supra notes 385-402 and accompanying text.
427. 92 Ill. 2d at 352, 442 N.E.2d at 199.
428. /d. at 351, 442 N.E.2d at 198. The relevant Illinois appellate court decisions referred
to in the court's opinion as imposing a reasonableness requirement include Altman v. Amoco
Oil Co., 85 Ill. App. 3d 104, 406 N.E.2d 142 (1st Dist. 1980); Moricoli v. Schwartz, 46 Ill.
App. 3d 481, 361 N.E.2d 74 (1st Dist. 1977); Roemer v. Zurick Ins. Co., 25 Ill. App. 3d
606, 323 N.E.2d 582 (1st Dist. 1975). Chapski, 92 Ill. 2d at 351, 442 N.E.2d at 198. Professor
Polelle also has noted several other cases cited in John itself which incorporate the same standard.
See Po1elle, supra note 309, at 211 n.132.
429. Chapski, 92 Ill. 2d at 352, 442 N.E.2d at 199.
430. /d.
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allegedly defamatory statement as an opinion must be reasonable. Interestingly, the court referred to Catalano, the recent progenitor of the
"reasonable" innocent construction rule,' 3 ' as direct authority for this
proposition. 432
What, then, was the import of Chapski's modification of the innocent
construction rule? The rule may be expressed as follows: In determining the
defamatory nature of a written or oral statement, the statement is to be
considered in context, with the words and the implications therefrom given
their natural and obvious meaning. If so construed, and if the statement
may be reasonably interpreted in an innocent manner, the words must be
so read and declared by the court to be nonactionable as a matter of law.
If the words cannot be so read because they are not reasonably susceptible
of an innocent interpretation, it is for the jury to determine whether the
words were in fact understood as defamatory. Chapski suggested that the
plaintiff is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law by stating that the
issue must go to the jury when the "initial determination" is resolved in
favor of the plaintiff.
This expression of the rule is the same as that for the traditional innocent
construction rule, 433 except that any innocent construction must be reasonable.
As a result, it is still true in Illinois that in a case in which reasonable persons may differ as to whether a statement is defamatory or nondefamatory
the defendant will prevail as a matter of law without the issue ever having
gone to the jury. Conversely, in a case in which the court finds that the
statement is not reasonably subject to an innocent interpretation, the plaintiff will not be entitled to judgment as a matter of law sinc:e the issue must
be determined by the jury.
The Chapski court's reasonable innocent construction rule is not limited
to determining the defamatory meaning of words. Rather, Chapski appears
to have formulated the rule in a way that may have encompassed the determination of whether the language in the case was actionable per se or per
quod. 434 If this was the court's intention, the decision addressed only the
easiest situation that might arise. It posited that a statement could not be
actionable per se if it could be interpreted innocently or as n:ferring to some-

431. See supra notes 345-69 and accompanying text.
432. See Chapski, 92 Ill. 2d at 352, 442 N.E.2d at 199.
433. See supra text accompanying note 324.
434. See supra text accompanying notes 420-24. The term "per quod" is defined as follows:
At the common law, "per quod" acquired two meanings in the law of defamation:
when used in the frame of reference of slander it meant proof of special damages
was required and when used in the frame of reference of libel it meant that proof
of extrinsic circumstances was required. . . .
Words "actionable per quod" are those not actionable per se upon their face,
but are only actionable in consequence of extrinsic facts showing circumstances under
which they were said or the damages resulting to slandered party therefrom.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1027-28 (5th ed. 1979).
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one other than the plaintiff. In such a case, the statement is not defamatory,
and, a fortiori, cannot be defamatory per se. What must a court do if it
initially determines that a statement is not subject to an innocent interpretation or does not refer to someone other than the plaintiff? According to
Chapski, whether the publication was in fact understood to be defamatory
or to refer to the plaintiff is a question for the jury. Who, then, determines
whether the language is defamatory per se? Is that determination encompassed within the determination of whether the statement is defamatory, a
decision to be made by the jury? If, for example, a complaint fails to allege
special damages and such allegations are necessary to sustain the complaint,
or if the defamation does not fall within one of the categories which does
not require a showing of special damages, it seems illogical to send the issue
to the jury before the court has determined that the statement could be
defamatory per se and, thus, actionable without allegations and proof of
special damages. 435 Must the judge make a preliminary determination that
the statement cannot reasonably be construed as falling outside the per se
435. The first case to apply Chapski substantiated the authors' viewpoint that with respect
to the per se determination, the innocent construction rule must be applied by the judge as
a preliminary matter. In Costello v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., Ill Ill. App. 3d 1009, 445
N .E.2d 13 (5th Dist. 1983), a newspaper published by defendant carried an editorial in which
the writer called the chairman of the county board, Costello, a liar. Costello contended that
the accusation constituted libel per se since it reflected adversely upon him with respect to
his duties as county board chairman. No special damages were pleaded. At trial, the defendants successfully demonstrated that under the innocent construction rule, the editorial was a
criticism of the plaintiff's conduct in a particular instance, not a general attack on the plaintiff's honesty or character. The appellate court reversed, reasoning that:
As the plaintiff points out, the editorial in the instant case repeatedly attacked him
as a liar and also included an explicit reference to "two more years of the Costello
brand of lying leadership." The language of the editorial makes it quite apparent
that it was an actionable assault on the plaintiff's character in general, not mere
criticism of his conduct in a particular instance. Accordingly, we find that the editorial
constituted libel per se because it imputed to the plaintiff an inability to perform
his duties and a want of integrity or lack of honesty in performing the duties of
his office.
Moreover, the Illinois Supreme Court recently clarified the application of the
innocent construction rule in Chapski . . . .
. . . Although Chapski allows trial judges to continue to make a preliminary
determination whether a statement may reasonably be innocently construed, contorted interpretations of language so that it might be seen as innocent are now
precluded. The court stressed that this modified rule would serve to protect both
the individual's interest in vindicating his good name and reputation as well as
first amendment interests . . . .
Since the editorial in the instant case repeatedly attacks the plaintiff's honesty
and makes reference to "two more years of the Costello brand of lying leadership," we feel the Chapski decision does not allow us to consider this language
innocent of libelous content as a matter of law. To do so would require us to
strain to find a possible, but unnatural, innocent meaning, when a defamatory meaning is far more probable.
/d. at 1014-15, 445 N.E.2d at 17-18 (citations omitted). The court "hedged its bets" somewhat
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categories before sending it to the jury for its determination of whether the
statement was in fact defamatory? Chapski answers none of these questions,
although the trial court would have to confront them on remand if it were
to find, as Chapski seemed to suggest, that the articles could not reasonably
be given an innocent meaning or construed as referring to someone other
than the plaintiff.
Also, Chapski made it clear that the court considered its reasonable innocent construction rule to apply to the issue of colloquium. 436 Therefore, if
a statement can reasonably be interpreted as referring to someone other than
the plaintiff, it must be so read and declared by the court to be nonactionable as a matter of law. If it cannot be reasonably interpreted as referring to someone other than the plaintiff, the jury must then determine whether
the statement was in fact understood as referring to the plaintiff. Finally,
in determining whether a statement is one of fact or of a constitutionally
protected expression of opinion, it must be found nonactionable as a matter
of law if the statement may reasonably be interpreted as an opinion rather
than a statement of fact. 437
The Chapski court's cutback on the breadth of the innocent construction
rule 438 was predicated on the development of the New York Times actual
malice standard and the increased availability of various privileges, including
those recognized in Colson. 439 The court's preservation of the rule was based
on the constitutional interests of free speech and free press served by the
rule. 440 At this point, it is impossible to weigh Chapski's increased protecby holding in the alternative that the editorial reflected generally on the plaintiff's integrity,
and that it could not be innocently construed as referring to a particular instance of plaintiff's
conduct. !d. In any event, the court apparently viewed the application of the innocent construction rule to the determination of libel per se as requiring a preliminary determination by
the court, at least when special damages were not pleaded. See also Fogus v. Capital Cities
Media, Inc., Ill Ill. App. 3d 1060, 444 N.E.2d 1100 (5th Dist. 1983) (defendants suggested
no plausible innocent construction of their statements and had not responded in their brief
to plaintiff's contention that allegations of criminal conduct are libel per se).
Interestingly, in determining whether the allegations of dishonesty constituted fact or opinion, the Costello court made no reference to Chapski or the innocent construction rule. Instead, the court relied on Catalano in concluding that the defendants had "made factual
statements that the plaintiff deliberately lied for politically motivated reasons." Costello, 111
Ill. App. 3d at 1016, 445 N.E.2d at 18.
436. Chapski, 92 III. 2d at 352, 442 N.E.2d at 199.
437. /d.
438. Though Chapski evinces a retraction by the court from the innocent construction rule,
the opinion opened the door to an application of the rule to a broader range of issues. There
is no question after Chapski that the rule applies to the issue of colloquium as well as to
defamatory meaning. !d. With the aid of Catalano, the court applied the rule unequivocally
to the determination of whether a statement is a statement of fact or an expression of opinion.
Also, Chapski arguably laid the ground for application of the rule to the determination of
whether language is actionable per se or per quod. See supra notes 420-24 and accompanying text.
439. Chapski, 92 Ill. 2d at 351, 442 N.E.2d at 198. For a discussion of the privileges recognized
in Colson, see supra notes 35-49 and accompanying text.
440. !d. at 351-52, 442 N.E.2d at 198-99.
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tion of individual reputation (through its reasonableness requirement) against
its broadened protection of free speech on the issues to which the rule may
now be applied. The outcome will depend, of course, on the stringency with
which the courts will apply the reasonableness standard and their willingness
to extend Chapski beyond its most narrow parameters.
Aside from thpse issues noted above, 441 the question remains whether the
innocent construction rule will apply in false light cases. Professor Polelle
has suggested that either the policy behind the innocent construction rule
is valid as to both defamation and false light or it is valid as to neither. 442
Yet, that conclusion is premised on his perception of both torts as being
"fundamentally premised on a false statement that causes harm by bringing
one into discredit among the members of the community. " 443 This
characterization, however, ignores one fundamental distinction between these
torts: a cause of action for false light may be predicated on a false portrayal of an individual in a "positive" light."•• Given the purpose of the
innocent construction rule-to render nonactionable language capable of
nondefamatory interpretation-the rule is directly inconsistent with "positive"
false light cases. Application of the innocent construction rule to false light
cases, therefore, would completely swallow up the one conceptual distinction between false light and defamation.
On the other hand, failure to apply the innocent construction rule to false
light cases might lead to false light "swallowing up and engulfing the whole
law of defamation. "us There would be a great incentive for plaintiffs to
sue under a false light theory for language with defamatory implications
because it would avoid the innocent construction rule and other technical
hurdles to an action brought under defamation law. Of course, a compromise
position would be to apply the innocent construction rule only to false light
cases with defamatory overtones, although the manageability of such an approach would be subject to question. The best approach, so long as the
innocent construction rule remains in effect, might be to abolish false light
as a theory of recovery altogether. Those false light actions sounding in
defamation would be subject to recovery on a defamation theory in most
cases. Cases in which the plaintiff is portrayed in a positive false light do
not serve as important a function in preserving individual reputation as other
false light and defamation actions. Weighing the lesser interest in individual
reputation in such actions against the greater interest in free speech and press
so zealously guarded in this jurisdiction and reaffirmed in Chapski and Colson, the free speech interest should prevail.

441.
442.
443.
444.

See supra text accompanying notes 433-37.
Polelle, supra note 309, at 217:
/d. (emphasis added).
See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); see also PROSSER, supra note 4, § ll7,
at 813 ("the false light need not necessarily be a defamatory one, although it very often is,
so that a defamation action will also lie").
445. PRossER, supra note 4, § ll7, at 813.
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CONCLUSION

Illinois has a long history of formulating its own peculiar brand of defamation law. The Colson and Chapski decisions insure that the uniqueness of
Illinois' approach to defamation will continue. The Illinois Supreme Court
has clearly allied itself with the views espoused in lago's cynical speech concerning the value of reputation 446 by placing Illinois at or near the bottom
of all states in protection of reputation. At the same time, Colson and Chapski place Illinois in the nation's forefront in its commitment to "uninhibited
robust, and wide-open" free expression. For both media and non-media
speakers, there is no other state that is as liberal in construing speech and
granting conditional privileges in a manner calculated to shield the speaker
from liability for defamation.
446. See supra text accompanying note 2.

